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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Thanksgiving for Peace

On Thanksgiving Sunday (13th May) great congregations flocked to our cathedrals and parish churches to offer thanks to God for Victory and Peace in Europe. To those who are unable to believe in divine government of the world, and to those who are unable to regard the World War in which we have been engaged as anything else than a disastrous relapse into brutality and barbarism, it is hard to justify such thanksgiving.

Those, however, who survey the creative process—manifesting itself at first as an interaction of physical and chemical forces and subsequently, through biological evolution, achieving the creation of rational and moral beings—and are in consequence led to postulate the operation of a Divine Creative Mind, can justifiably thank the Creator at every fresh advance in the creative process of which they are no mere spectators but are themselves the most important part. This creative process must not, however, be regarded as stopping short with Nature but as extending into the sphere of human history. Those who take short and narrow views of Human History may easily fail to discern this; but those whose method is to look for God in the whole rather than through the chinks of His universe will discern the creative process realizing itself not only in Nature but also in the advent and adventures of Man on this planet.

At the present stage of the creative process on this planet, it is clear that the creative action is mainly operating in the psychological sphere of human personality. The World War in which we are engaged is primarily—and to a degree never before witnessed

in our human history — a war of psychological forces definitely ranged, either on the side of human progress in accordance with the good and wise Will of the Creator, or on the side of retrogression and so thwarting, or at least hindering, the realization of the Divine creative ideal.

Having from its very beginning recognized this World War as a Crusade on behalf of human freedom, justice, happiness and progress, we are unable to feel anything but gratitude to the Creator for His gifts of Victory and Peace — a Victory and Peace in which Man, for the purpose of his creative development, is privileged to co-operate with his Creator. The suffering and sacrifice entailed in this co-operation — like the Passion of Jesus Christ — is that from which our human nature shrinks back; but it is only by going forward with the Cross,

> 'Toiling up new Calvaries ever
> With the cross that turns not back,'

that salvation for mankind can be secured.

Our gratitude to those who in obedience to the Divine Will have suffered vicariously is great indeed and something for which we can truly thank God. This, as we understand it, is the Christian justification for Thanksgiving Day, though it be a justification which agnostics are unable to accept and which pacifists feel compelled to reject since war is in their eyes the greatest of evils.

But Thanksgiving Day for Peace and Victory stresses the duty of securing to the full the proper fruits of victory and the need to take every precaution to maintain in the right way the Peace so dearly bought. What we won in the War of 1914-18 was lost in the Peace, and that not by injustice to the vanquished, nor by an unrelenting refusal to admit the vanquished to the comity of nations, but by our own moral cowardice, easy-going optimism and sentimental wishful thinking. Every political party in our nation erred. The Church was as much in error as the State, and the experience of age allowed itself to be silenced by the slogans of youth. The pacifists were the most guilty. Led by noble personalities, they succeeded in giving the impression to the foes of Peace that the British people would never again engage in war. The wise motto, *si vis pacem para bellum* — if you desire peace, prepare for war — was regarded as an avaricious slogan coined by the armament firms in order to increase their dividends.

Henceforth we have to realize that the Prince of Peace is not the Prince of Pacifists but the Prince of Peace-makers who are prepared to secure Peace based upon freedom, justice, truth and human rights, even at the price of a self-sacrificing war. But that is not enough, unless we recognize that the only true, beneficial and enduring peace must be built upon moral and spiritual founda-

tions. Without such foundations, human society becomes the prey of materialistic greed, selfish ambition, lustful envy and then inevitable strife. Unless moral and spiritual values are supreme in human society, unity is impossible and a precarious Peace becomes the mere product of cowardice, love of comfort and moral callousness.

The amazing courage, patience, fortitude, ungrudging service, open-handed generosity which have characterized the conduct of many millions of our fellow-countrymen in this war furnish the soundest proof that our British civilization does possess those moral and spiritual foundations. We have inherited these from the past; and no little wisdom, energy and many-sided service is needful to secure them for the future. A new earth demands new heavens, and our organized religion demands in many respects to be reformed and transformed if it is to become in increasing measure the main factor in the development of the future.

'New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still and onward
Who would keep abreast of truth.'

Eugenics and Sterilization

In a recent debate in the House of Lords on the care of homeless children (reported in the *Times* of 31st March) Dr. Hunter, Bishop of Sheffield, made a significant contribution. He emphasized that a fundamental issue of social morality is involved in the problem on which much hard thinking is needed in Church and State. Dr. Hunter asked:

> 'Do the principles of freedom and the rights of man require that subnormal adults should be allowed to contaminate a neighbourhood with their sordid, filthy houses and to bring into the world children for whom they have no care or affection? What kind of disciplinary control can be exercised on such parents in a free democracy, and by whom could it safely be exercised?'

A great deal of the 'hard thinking' has already been done by numerous committees of competent experts appointed in various countries to investigate a right remedy for the social evils to which the Bishop referred. What is really required to-day is not primarily 'hard thinking' but the popularization of the results of hard thinking and the moral courage which will effectively prompt our politicians to act in accordance with the demands of our social reformers. Population problems are not popular among politicians, as Dr. Inge has pointed out, and for the simple reason that the unborn have no votes.'

A very able summary of the results and recommendations dealing with the point at issue — namely, the right of the State to

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sanction and promote the practice of sterilization of mentally deficient adults and of the inheritors and carriers of socially devastating forms of incurable disease—is accessible to English readers in an inexpensive volume entitled *Sterilization, A Christian Approach*[*] by J. P. Hinton and Josephine Calcutt. Mr. Hinton, like Malthus, is a Church of England clergyman; Miss Calcutt has had a distinguished academic career in social science supplemented by much practical experience in London and Liverpool.

Not the least important feature of the treatment of their theme is that it is both scientific and Christian. Their main conclusions are summarized as follows in a Foreword by the Rev. Leslie Weatherhead:

> '1. In view of hereditary defect, mental and physical, the misery it causes to the individual and the burden to the State, sterilization is desirable in many cases.
>
> 2. Sterilization can now be carried out by surgical means which in the case of a man do not amount to an operation more serious than, say, the removal of tonsils and in the case of a woman the removal of the appendix. [The operation on the male is known as vasectomy, on the female salpingectomy: castration is not advocated.]
>
> 3. Following such an operation, sexual activity and desire remain the same. Intercourse can be indulged in. No physical or psychological symptoms follow the operation. The only difference is that no child can be born.
>
> 4. The State could easily frame precautions lest sterilized persons in the community should threaten morality. In point of fact in countries in which sterilization is in vogue immorality has decreased, not increased.
>
> 5. In the present state of the law in England the operation of sterilization *merely* to prevent defective children being born is illegal, and no doctor, for that reason alone, could safely carry it out. Yet the Brock Committee's Report says definitely, "We have failed to find any evidence unfavourable to sterilization, provided that proper care is exercised in the administration of the law"' (pp. 6-7).

The duty of the State in this matter is perfectly clear. The wealth of scientific evidence, united to the judicious recommendations of social experts, admits of no valid excuse on the part of our legislators either for negation or procrastination. But the State is not the only body responsible for the accomplishment of this urgent reform. The Christian Church is also responsible and is able to exercise a very powerful influence on behalf of or against the legalization and practice of *voluntary sterilization*. We stress the term *voluntary sterilization*; for, in a Christian social democracy, compulsory sterilization is abhorrent.

The Roman Catholic Church is as strongly opposed to the practice of human sterilization, as it is also opposed to birth control by the use of contraceptives. This disapproval is plainly set

[1] *Sterilization, A Christian Approach.* By Rev. J. P. Hinton, B.A., and Josephine E. Calcutt, B.A. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935; 5*s*.)

forth in the Papal Encyclical, *Casti Connubii*, 1930, promulgated by Pope Pius XI. Therein it is declared to be contrary to nature and that

> 'no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good.'

This piece of scholastic casuistry is disposed of by the following considerations :

> 'Nature demands children, but there are "grave" reasons to suppose that nature intends children to be born in the image of God and to come to a fulness of life which is the rightful heritage of all men. Therefore consciously to bring a defective child into the world would appear to be a grave reason against the primary end of marriage as stated by Roman Catholics. And no amount of argument will ever convince reasonable and humane people that such an act can ever be "conformable to nature and morally good." No normal parents would deliberately desire a defective child, and it is a far greater sin of unnaturalness to tolerate such pathetic cases than the so-called unnaturalness of preventing such cases occurring at all' (p. 134).

Moreover, as Mr. Hinton only too truly asserts, it is useless to appeal to the individual Roman Catholic to oppose the Papal Decree 'in the name of any higher moral good, in the interest of the community, or indeed of his fellow-men.'

But the Christian Church needs to do more than confute ecclesiastical and traditional objections to voluntary sterilization. Mr. Weatherhead advocates a more positive and practical policy for Church officials, and writes in the Foreword to which we have already referred :

> 'It is indubitable that certain physical diseases are hereditary. Any acquaintance with the horror of a young person who discovers that he has inherited epilepsy, congenital cataract, deaf-mutism, syphilitic and other diseases stirs one to ask for legislation to prevent innocent children from suffering the mental and physical tortures of hereditary diseases. I feel this so strongly that when people ask me to marry them I always ascertain whether there is, on either side, any disease which could be passed on. If there is, I feel justified in certain cases and after consultation with medical authority, to refuse to marry them unless they give certain guarantees in regard to procreation. They can go and get married at a registry office, I know, but I hold that the Church should not give her blessing to a union which is going to bring into existence other lives which will be damned at the outset to years of pain and misery, a burden to themselves, a heartbreak to their parents, and possibly an economic responsibility which the State will be asked to bear both during school years and after' (p. 6).

We are compelled to point out that no Church of England clergyman is at liberty to act in accordance with the example set by Mr. Weatherhead. We remember when a country rector had called the banns of a couple, the local doctor came into the vestry and said : 'Rector, those people ought not to marry. She is tubercular and he has insanity in his family.' The rector replied : 'I

can do nothing. By law I am compelled to call their banns.' The rector was perfectly right in his interpretation of his legal duty. There is no remedy except to secure legislation to implement such reforms as Mr. Hinton's book demands.

As to the State's responsibility, it may be pointed out that there are already over 300,000 mental defectives in this country and that a number of these are free to propagate their species, and that statistics show that they are more prolific than the mentally sane. The increasing economic burden with which our community is faced, due to the increase in the number of mental defectives, demands an immediate remedy, although we must add that, serious as the growing economic burden is in this sphere, it is not in our estimation the most cogent reason for reform.

Sir Francis Dalton used to say that Eugenics ought to be a religion. Dean Inge in *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems* makes reply: 'It is a religion, and its name is Christianity.'

The Execution of God

'The Execution of God'—this phrase, which will seem blasphemous to some, ludicrous to others, but merely smart journalese to Fleet Street, was coined by Dorothy Sayers and used as the heading of her article in the *Radio Times* of March 23, 1945, being subsequently reproduced in the daily press. She substituted, however, in the body of her article the phrase, 'the hanging of God':

> 'In the year 30, Almighty God was publicly hanged at Jerusalem for blasphemy and insurrection.'

Theologians reading such language might charge Dorothy Sayers with being a Patripassian or Theopaschitian, and identify her views with those of Praxeas, who—Tertullian asserted, 'crucified the Father.'

Dorothy Sayers, however heretical her language, is not heretical in heart; and so we should not trouble either to convict or convert her, if it were not for her language misleading the ignorant and creating a needless prejudice against Christian theology. Unfortunately there are many who, on account of the great popularity of her play, *The Man Born to be King*, regard her as an authority in Christian doctrine. Nor can we blame those who are thus misled, since she claims, by her constant study of it, to have worn out her Greek Testament.* It behoves us, therefore, to betake ourselves to the Greek Testament and seek to discover whether it justifies the language of Dorothy Sayers.

We note first that nowhere in the Gospels of *Mark*, *Matthew*, *Luke* (or, as a New Testament scholar would say, nowhere in the

* 'Miss Sayers wrote to me . . . she had "worn out one Greek Testament and had amassed a considerable theological library"' (*The Man Born to be King*. Foreword, p. 9, by J. W. Welch).

Synoptic sources, *Mk.*, *Q.*, *M.*, *L.*) does Jesus call Himself God. Secondly, neither do St. Peter, St. Paul, St. James, St. Jude, or the Apocalypse call Jesus God. They give Him many titles, but they never call Him God absolutely. That title they reserve for God the Father alone. Their confession of faith conforms with that of St. Paul :

> ' For us there is one God, the Father, . . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ ' (*I Cor.* viii, 6).

Thirdly, we note that in our English versions the *Epistle to the Hebrews* i, 8 cites *Psalm* xlv, 6 as speaking of Jesus in the following terms :

> ' Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever.'

But the right translation of the Psalm is undoubtedly

> ' God is Thy throne for ever and ever.'

Possibly Dorothy Sayers has been led astray by this mistranslation : she might have escaped the error had she referred to Bishop Westcott's Commentary on *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (pp. 24-26).

We note, fourthly, that there are two significant passages in the Fourth Gospel in which the word God (*theos*) is used of Jesus. The first occurs in the opening of the Gospel :

> ' In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'

He who cannot read his Greek Testament would be justified in holding that in this passage the Word, later incarnated in Jesus, is spoken of in exactly the same terms as God the Father. This, however, is not the case. God the Father is here called the God (*ho theos*), whereas the Word (later incarnated in Jesus) is called God (*theos* without the definite article). This distinction is very important, for the term *ho theos* is substantival and expresses the Personality of God, whereas the anarthrous *theos* is adjectival and should properly be translated Divine, *i.e.* partaking of the nature of God. Commenting on ' The Word was God,' Westcott writes :

> ' (*theos*) is necessarily without the article inasmuch as it describes the nature of the Word and does not identify His Person. It would be pure Sabellianism to say the word was *ho theos* ' (Commentary, p. 3).

Hence this passage does not affirm, as does Dorothy Sayers, that Jesus is ' God Almighty.'

The second passage is *John* xx, 28, where Thomas calls Jesus ' my God ' (*ho theos mou*). This language would justify Dorothy Sayers if it were the language of dogma and not merely the language of devotion — the adoring exclamation of one who swings from scepticism inadvertently into its opposite extreme. This title (*ho theos*) Jesus nowhere claims for Himself in the Fourth Gospel; and it is distinctly contradicted by two passages in that Gospel.

The first is *John* xx, 17, where Jesus, addressing Mary Magdalene, says :

> 'Go, tell my brethren I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God.'

Plainly in this passage Jesus regards the Father as His God as well as the God of the Apostles—which, of course, agrees entirely with the doctrine of the Lord's Prayer (Our Father). Also, by speaking here of the Apostles as His brethren, He thereby affirms that they are Sons of God. In the other passage, *John* x, 34-36, Jesus defends Himself against the charge of blasphemy brought against Him by the Jews because He called Himself (the) *Son of God*. This title, the Son of God, or the Son, is the proper title of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel and in other important New Testament passages. It affirms that Jesus, while recognizing men generally to be potential Sons of God, yet recognized a unique Divine Sonship in His own case, since He had been anointed by the Divine Spirit to carry out the unique Messianic mission of establishing the Kingdom of God on earth—or, as the Fourth Gospel would express it, the giving of Eternal Life to mankind.

> 'I came that they might have life and have it abundantly' (*Jn.* x, 10).

This is the orthodoxy of the Greek New Testament, and it is not possible to be more orthodox than the Greek New Testament. No Church dogma—so the Church of England teaches—has any authority unless it be grounded on the Holy Scriptures and can be proved to be true from the Scriptures. It may be well to remind Dorothy Sayers that both the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds were originally composed in Greek.

We remember many years ago being confronted by a begging notice in an ancient Coptic Church in Cairo :

> *Give us money for the sake of Our God Jesus.*

This, although Dorothy Sayers would see nothing unorthodox about it, is sheer Apollinarianism. Dean Hastings Rashdall in a notable paper, 'Christ as Logos and Son of God,' wrote :

> 'When a Sunday school teacher asks his class, "Who was Jesus Christ?" and tries to elicit the answer "God," without the addition of the all-important "and man," he is teaching Apollinarianism' (*The Modern Churchman*, Vol. XI, p. 280).

Much so-called orthodoxy is really Apollinarianism. What Dorothy Sayers has given her readers is not a fresh and daring re-interpretation of orthodoxy, but a heresy condemned at the General Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D.

May we venture to suggest that Dorothy Sayers, before she writes another Gospel drama, should undertake to study her Greek Testament (especially the Gospels) under the guidance of a competent tutor. She would then become aware of certain fine but important distinctions of which she is at present robustly ignorant.

India and China in the English Convocations

At the recent sessions of the Convocations of Canterbury and York, the South India Scheme re-appeared under pressure from an Anglo-Catholic minority who were strongly opposed to the practical acceptance by the Church of England of this hopeful experiment for the realization of Christian unity in South India. This belated attack upon the South India Scheme had at least one excellent result. It provided our new Primate with the opportunity of giving public proof of his qualities of statesmanship, breadth of vision and Christian comprehensiveness. Cautious and conciliatory, charitable and courageous, the Primate refused to retreat from the decision so recently reached under his predecessor. His conviction was that co-operation and experiment might be expected to solve various difficulties with which the scheme was bound to be confronted in the various stages of its progressive realization.

The Times, in a leader of 19th May, commends the Primate's clear-headed handling of the controversy. We would venture to add that the Primate's sympathetic breadth of vision is even more deserving of our gratitude.

> 'Those among us who wish even now to get the scheme held up must earnestly ask themselves whether it is right or wise to attempt to obstruct that practically unanimous desire or to induce the Church in India to reverse a decision deliberately reached. They should consider how in present circumstances such action would be regarded in India and by Indian Christians. They should consider the opinion of some observers from India that the choice is not between this scheme and a continuation of things as they are, but between this scheme and a state of things among Indian Christians much less satisfactory than they are now.'
>
> 'For this enterprise, born of much faith and prayer and charity, rests on the belief and hope that divided Churches will in the living unity of a corporate life achieve a unity of faith, order, worship, and witness, true to the traditions of the Universal Church, in which each contributing Church will find enrichment and fulfilment in the Body of Christ. If that aspect of the matter has been absent from what I have said, as not apposite to my particular purpose, it is certainly present to the minds of us all.'

There are movements in the Christian world to-day of which all that is asked of our Church authorities is that which Gamaliel asked of the Jewish Sanhedrin: 'Refrain . . . and let them alone; for if they be of God, you cannot overthrow them' (*Acts* v, 38).

Another issue with which the Primate was required to deal in Convocation concerned the action of the Bishop of Hong-Kong in ordaining a woman to the priesthood. The Primate read out to Convocation a letter drafted by the late Archbishop Temple recording his judgment in the matter:

> 'It stated that the great pastoral difficulties with which the Bishop of Hong-kong was confronted were appreciated, but "at the same time I

cannot think that in any circumstances whatsoever an individual bishop has the right to take such a step, which is most certainly contrary to all the laws and precedents of the Church, and I therefore feel obliged to tell you that I do profoundly deplore the action that you took and have to regard it as *ultra vires*." Dr. Fisher added that he entirely endorsed the judgment therein expressed.'

It appeared, however, that Archbishop Temple had written the letter under a misapprehension. He had supposed that the English portion of the Diocese of Hong-Kong was under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury. This the Bishop of Hong-Kong denied, and asserted that the whole Diocese of Hong-Kong was as much part of the Province of China as was the Diocese of Peking, and that therefore he would abide by the decision of his own House of Bishops when it met.

In as much as the admission of women to Holy Orders must depend primarily upon whether their ministrations are desired by the great majority of their fellow Church-folk in their own locality, it is only right that this question should be settled by the Chinese Church and not by the Church of England. Moreover, such matters cannot be rightly settled by appeals to ancient precedent and custom but must be settled under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in accordance with the practical needs and actual conditions of the Church of this age. It was in this spirit that the Bishop of Hong-Kong ordained a Chinese deaconess to the priesthood in a time of crisis, and it must therefore be right that judgment on the validity and desirability of his action should be duly reviewed by the representative Church of his Province.

When, in the light of woman's war service, we review the case for the admission of women to the higher grades of the Christian Ministry, the Church might do well to take as its motto Milton's appeal on behalf of Truth : ' Give her but room.'

The Symbolism of Coventry Cathedral

We republish from *The Times* of May 23 a letter by Bishop Henson which expresses with felicity and acumen what liberal-minded Churchmen are compelled unwillingly to feel about the plans for the construction of the new centre of Divine Worship in Coventry :

THE NEW COVENTRY CATHEDRAL.

A Criticism.

Sir,—The new Coventry Cathedral is, I assume, designed by its promoters to give some effective expression to the essential unity of English Christians by providing a visible and permanent illustration of common Christian worship and co-operative Christian witness and work.

It is intended to be both the symbol of an inspiration and the disclosure of a policy. The ' high altar ' in the centre will provide the first ; and the

'four pulpits' placed around it in the corners will illustrate the last. In fact, the new cathedral will constitute a parable in stone proclaiming, interpreting, and assisting an ecclesiastical policy by which finally the ideal of a genuinely Catholic Church shall be realized, and the Kingdom of Christ in England and ultimately throughout the world shall be triumphantly established.

The more I consider the architectural scheme, the less I find myself able to approve its suggestion. It seems rather to emphasize the exclusive claims of an episcopally ordained ministry than to remove the historic scandal of that calamitous exclusiveness. If the central altar were equally accessible to all the preachers in the four cathedral pulpits, so that the varying apprehensions and applications of the unchanging Gospel which they have expressed should be apparently and authoritatively harmonized in the confession of a single allegiance and the oblation of a common worship, then, indeed, none could easily fail to recognize the significance of the spectacle.

As now planned, the new cathedral is in danger of delivering a message which is incoherent and, perhaps, self-stultifying. If, indeed, the spirit of discerning charity, which has recognized in the four pulpits, 'diversities of ministration but the same Lord,' could recognize also the identity of divine commission in the Lord's ministers, albeit ordained in varying modes, when at the Lord's table they bring to His true servants the life-giving sacraments of His Presence in the Lord's Supper, then the witness of Coventry Cathedral would truly be precious, timely, and widely effective. Otherwise, I cannot perceive any special importance in its novel architectural arrangements, but incline to prefer the older pattern.

Coventry Cathedral, when it has been completed, will constitute not merely a noble monument of civic enterprise, but also an eloquent expression of Christian patriotism and hope. It may well become a living centre of social reformation and so far will tend indirectly to assist the cause of ecclesiastical reunion and social harmony. But it will not point the way to visible fellowship among 'all who profess and call themselves Christians' for it will neither help us to criticize our own so-called 'principles' and to examine our alleged 'facts,' nor will it release us from the secret bondage of inhibiting prejudice and the resolute and resourceful obstructiveness of organized fanaticism.

'I hope that the generous effort to replace the great church which had for so many generations adorned so magnificently the ancient city will be crowned with success, but I hope also that a larger conception of ecclesiastical unity than its structure suggests will govern the thought of English churchmen.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. Hensley Henson,
Bishop.

Hyntle Place, Hintlesham, Ipswich.

A lie in the soul of the artist is bound to betray itself in the symbolism of his art. It would seem from Dr. Henson's letter a lie in the ecclesiastical soul of Coventry is betraying itself in the architecture of Coventry Cathedral. If that be so, it is not too late to remedy this defect in 'significant form.' What South India promises to be for the Anglican Communion, might not Coventry Cathedral become for our National Church?—a place where

Christians of every denomination can meet, regardless of ecclesiastical distinctions, to join in united worship of the God of Love. We had hoped that the great Cathedral of Liverpool was going to prove itself to be such a centre and a symbol: but adverse forces defeated the realization of this ideal. It falls to the Bishop of Coventry to restore the situation.

> 'Who knoweth whether thou art not come to the throne for such a time as this?'

Problems of Artificial Insemination

On the 19th of April Artificial Insemination was formally brought to the notice of the House of Commons.

> Mr. Driberg (Maldon, Ind.) asked the Minister of Health if he could now make a full statement on the current experiments in artificial insemination of women; and if any births had resulted or were expected shortly to result therefrom.
>
> Mr. Willink (Croydon, N.U.): So far as my information goes, this operation is being performed with donated semen on a small scale in this country in cases where at the joint request of the husband and wife the responsible medical practitioner has satisfied himself that it is desirable. I do not think that the subject as a whole is one which can be satisfactorily discussed within the limits of a Parliamentary question and answer, but I think it right to say that I am advised that it would be a breach of the law to register as legitimate a birth which occurred as a result of this operation when the husband is not in fact the father of the child (*Times*, April 20).

Further questions followed in which the practice was referred to as a 'disgusting habit'; and the Minister of Health was asked whether 'in the interests of common decency' he would make representations to the War Cabinet 'that this whole experimental scheme should be brought to a conclusion.' When this request was received with cheers, Dr. Edith Summerskill (Lab.) terminated the discussion by asking for 'scientific calm' and that the House should not be stampeded by those who approach the subject of Insemination 'solely from an emotional angle.'

The raising of this question in the House of Commons was preceded by three articles in the *Church Times* of March 9, 16 and 23, contributed by a Catholic sociologist. Since then, Dr. W. F. Joynt, Director of Obstetrics in Adelaide University, has stated that experiments in Artificial Insemination are so far advanced that legislation may soon be introduced to legalize the practice in Australia. It would appear that in the United States of America the practice has reached such large dimensions that, according to the *News-Chronicle*, 50,000 births have resulted from it.

Artificial Insemination creates many medical, legal and ethical problems. The medical profession have been first in the field, and

the fact that in this country Lord Horder is President of the Family Planning Association which has undertaken a number of the experiments in Artificial Insemination guarantees their responsible and beneficent character. Nevertheless, a number of physiological and psychological problems remain to be solved involving the relations of husband and wife, parents and children, and the unity of the home. These problems are extremely intricate and delicate; for human beings, even in our British civilization, can feel so very differently about them.

Our own reaction is one of repulsion combined with apprehension that the remedy may easily prove to be a source of greater ills than the situation which it seeks to remedy: but in this, as in other matters, we have to realize that many things which at the outset seem shocking and distressing to the individual, when first confronted with them, have proved to be of inestimable value to the community when practised by philanthropic science, *e.g.* post-mortem examinations, the vivisection of animals, blood transfusion, etc. In such cases, the test is not emotional reaction but practical effects.

The legal difficulties with which this practice is faced are considerable, first in the sphere of the Registration of Birth which at present involves a false declaration. Next there is the problem whether it is in the interests of our social life that children born in this way should be legitimated and thereby be enabled to become the legal heirs of the married couple responsible for their birth. In the case of hereditary titles, entailed estates, and the succession to legal rights created by Wills, Marriage Settlements, etc., the difficulties to be faced are great indeed. These, however, are problems to be solved by our legal authorities. We should wish, however, to add that the document permitting Artificial Insemination, besides being signed by both husband and wife and a qualified medical practitioner, ought also in our judgment to be countersigned by a magistrate.

Religious objections to the practice of Artificial Insemination, based on the argument that it is 'contrary to Nature and to Natural Law,' belong to a past which regarded Nature as static and as the expression of Divine finality and perfection. As evolutionists we know that Nature is an evolutionary process in which the latest stage transcends and subsumes the earlier stages. Man — the latest and highest product of the creative process — possesses in increasing measure the right and power to exercise authority over Nature in accordance with the decisions of his rational and moral consciousness. 'Thou hast put all things in subjection under his

feet' sang the Psalmist. It is quite true that, as Francis Bacon said, we rule Nature by obeying her; but this obedience to Nature means that we use our knowledge of Nature to make Nature fulfil our rational and moral Will. In order to achieve this we eradicate weeds, cut down trees, exterminate wild beasts, remove appendices and tonsils, extract teeth and substitute artificial dentitions, amputate limbs and supply mechanical devices to take their place. In short, we do for Nature what Nature cannot do for itself; and provided our action can be shown to be beneficial, it is rationally and morally justifiable. The simple question, therefore, is whether a policy and practice of Artificial Insemination can be shown to be beneficial. If it be beneficial, then it is morally and therefore religiously justifiable.

Definitions of marriage and legitimacy need revision and enlargement by our legal and religious authorities, and that not in terms of sexual intercourse but of that higher mutual relationship which St. Peter described as

> 'Heirs together of the Grace of Life.'
>
> (The Greek word here used for life is that higher life which St. John defines as eternal.)

There is another important issue involved. Legally it may have to be recognized that the maternal relationship of mother to child possesses a stronger claim than that of the paternal relationship of father to child. We remember an able and thoughtful man, the father of a delightful family of boys and girls to whom he was devoted, asserting that he was not conscious of a distinctive paternal relationship which discriminated his love for them from that which he would have felt for younger brothers and sisters. We believe this to be far otherwise in the case of the mother of a family.

> 'All great men,' said Dickens, 'seem to have had only one parent, a Mother.'

If this maternal relationship is really the supreme one, it has a very definite bearing upon the practice of Artificial Insemination. There is need in this matter for much hard thinking and open-minded investigation by all parties concerned and not least by our Parliamentarians.

Who would have thought in 1932, when *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley was published, that we should so soon be actually and practically facing some of the situations which it visualized?

PEOPLE AND THEIR HOMES*

By the Right. Rev. E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., D.D., F.R.S.,
Bishop of Birmingham.

THE leaders of this country have changed surprisingly with changing social conditions. Comparatively few portraits survive from times earlier than the Tudors. But the portraits of the Elizabethans give us strong, yet sensitive, faces such as belong to brave adventurers and poets. In the seventeenth century we have the somewhat effeminate cavaliers and the stern, resolute Puritans. A century later, we have the coarse, hard-living, heavy-drinking men who deliberately destroyed the Elizabethan educational system. In the later nineteenth century, the prosperous manufacturer thrust himself forward. Coming from a worker's home where thrift and hard toil were regarded almost as religious duties, he employed—and sometimes exploited—his fellows. His portraits show how self-confidence grew with success. He was typical of a prosperous middle-class which, in alliance with the hereditary aristocracy, governed England.

It is of great importance and of no little interest to reflect that these representatives of different eras are successive generations of the same race of men. They were thrown up from the common people to whom they owed their fundamental characteristics. They all had more than average character and capacity; but fundamentally they differed far less from one another than we differ from, say, the Latin or Slav races. In fact, they serve to remind and to warn us that conditions of life are of vast importance in shaping a nation.

We must not exaggerate such importance. In fact, nature matters far more than nurture. The quality of a racial stock will fairly rapidly prove stronger than the surroundings in which it is placed. Every nation, moreover, has its different stocks, some good, some bad, most of average quality. Bad racial stocks are at present a growing source of anxiety to thoughtful men in every country where Western European civilization prevails. We are ignorant as to why these bad stocks have arisen. All we can say is that there come from time to time changes in the fundamentals of man's make-up, so-called genetic changes. Then the individual shows qualities not inherited from his parents. These new quali-

* An address delivered at the Annual Congress of the Co-operative Movement at Nottingham on Whit-Sunday, May 20th, 1945.

ties may be good or bad: they may lead to genius or to feeble-mindedness. And, once they appear, they are handed on generation after generation. So we get able families who achieve great positions when opportunities are favourable. So also we get, alike in our towns and in our villages, groups of 'problem' families, sometimes almost sub-human, immoral, dirty, thievish, untruthful. The same development shews itself in cattle. Let herds, even those occupying good pastures, breed at random, and, sooner or later, 'scrub' cattle will appear. So well recognized is the fact that it is an offence for a farmer to keep a bull, a 'scrub' bull, which has not passed tests for quality.

Under the harsh social conditions of other centuries defective children were not able to survive: the village idiot was a butt who died early. Nowadays, with our humane social services, 'problem' children grow up to create 'problem' families. Constantly a 'scrub' population is appearing. And war intensifies the process. On the battlefield some of the best are killed: the feeble-minded youth is of no use in the army. He is sent home and gets high wages in a simple job which he does badly. The ill-effects of war last long: they are a menace to the community when rejoicings for victory are long forgotten.

I wish you to try to balance the different tendencies in human life of which I have spoken.

In the first place, the racial stock matters supremely. Physical and moral and spiritual qualities are handed on generation after generation. Children of people with sound health, good sight, and acute hearing, tend to have children similarly endowed. The children of honest and truthful people tend to be honest and truthful. Religious people tend to have religious children. In fact, religious fervour has a way of breaking out in definite parts of the country even though it may, as it were, have lain dormant for generations. Herein is the fact of fundamental importance. The racial stock is of primary significance.

But, secondly, environment counts for not a little. The surroundings in which a child is brought up, the conditions under which families live, matter greatly. If good, they make finer men and women: if bad, manners and morals and health deteriorate. Good stocks will react fiercely against bad conditions: they may find these conditions so intolerable that they die out: or, desperately struggling, they will improve the conditions. Bad stocks, on the other hand, will endure sordid, unhealthy surroundings; and breeding recklessly, will maintain their numbers in miserable poverty. The best stocks are harmed or eliminated by bad surroundings, from the worst the chance of improvement is taken away.

Thirdly, we have to remember the disquieting fact that changes, which we can neither predict nor explain, occur from time to time whereby certain fundamentals in a stock alter. Those alterations may be good or bad : they may lead to genius or to feeble-mindedness. When bad, they constitute the most difficult of all our social problems. Nature is harsh : she eliminates the bad : what is unfit to survive perishes. But civilized man, save when he goes to war, has learnt to be humane. He protects the weak and even the worthless. So our mental deficients, our 'problem' families, increase. We do not yet know enough of the laws by which bad — or good — qualities are inherited to lay down adequate rules for improving the quality of our racial stocks. We know that mental defect is inherited, and some improvement in present tendencies could be made by sterilizing our feeble-minded. Many countries have legalized such sterilization. But a man or woman may carry such defect, hidden beneath the appearance of normal capacity. No remedial action is then, at the present stage of our knowledge, possible.

As an example of the carrying of a hidden defect, I may mention colour blindness. A woman seldom shews it but, if it is latent in her make-up, she hands it on to half her sons. Do you know that one man in twenty is colour-blind? Only one woman in four hundred shews the defect. If you wish to be really safe when crossing the traffic lights, have a woman to drive you!

What to do with human changelings, with individuals in whom a grave defect suddenly appears, is a problem which we in England have avoided : it is a problem which we must for our national welfare ultimately try to solve. Fairly often we hear of a child being born, pitiably defective in mind or body, and of the parents' relief when it dies. I am convinced that in such cases early euthanasia should be permitted under proper safeguards. Equally from the Christian standpoint, as I see the matter, there is no objection to medically-controlled sterilization.

Let us now set aside the question of changelings, new and defective human types which fortunately only constitute a small percentage of the population, and think of the vast mass of our people. We really differ very little from one another. Most of us four centuries ago had common ancestors. Our fundamental make-up, physical and spiritual, is much the same. Our differences of social class, manners, education, money, lie on the surface. They are like the polish on good metal. Often we exaggerate their value. 'The rank is but the guinea stamp : the man's the gold for all that.'

But, of course, the opportunities of life matter enormously. For the healthy growth of a child a good home is essential. If

physical conditions be bad, its health will only too probably be harmed. Houses that are damp or verminous, that have no proper lavatory accommodation or facilities for washing, are a menace to the community. That is why the foremost need of the present day is the building of homes for the people. I say 'the people' advisedly. The nation lives, not in its mansions surrounded by parks, nor in many-bathroomed residences, but in its workers' houses. There is a great saying of the French left-wing philosopher Rousseau which we ought never to forget. 'It is the people that make up the human race: what is not the people is so small a group as not to be worth the trouble of counting.' No nation has set its feet firmly on the path of social progress until it has provided good houses for all its workers. And a good house is one that does not demand heart-breaking drudgery if it is to be kept clean. With modern invention and discovery we can make homes that relieve the mother of much of the drudgery of the past. The nations of Europe, during the next interval between destroying one another, may perhaps begin such progress.

After good homes the next need is good, simple food. A child suffers both physically and mentally — it is slow and dull in mind — if it has not enough food of the right kind. Among such food milk is of especial importance. We must admit that, through ignorance or laziness, many mothers provide the wrong sort of food for their children. Moreover, much money that ought to be spent on good food is wasted on drink. But the great evil of the past has been that the family income has been too small when the children were growing up. During the crucial years of childhood and youth, there has been a lack of good food. This produces permanent ill-effects. It is noteworthy that a labour leader often dies at sixty: a middle-class leader in civil affairs, who works equally hard, will probably live a dozen years longer. The foundations of life are laid when we are young. A man of much ability who will, I believe, give good service to the State, said to me a few years ago, 'My father, who is not yet sixty, is a very old man. He had a grim childhood.'

The third need for a child, if he is in years to come to give his best to the community, is, of course, education. The nation has realized this need and is prepared to spend vast sums to ensure that every child gets the best education it can profit by. It may be doubted if we get good value for our money. In industrial areas the personal influence of teachers who live remote from the schools is less than we should desire. Such schools are too often barracks surrounded by a few hundred yards of asphalt playground. And almost everywhere the finer things of the human spirit, and especially religion, tend to be crowded out of the school curriculum.

A nation's education cannot be separated from the whole ordering of its life. In part, our present troubles are due to the lack of planning of our most populous areas. The homes of the workers should be near the factories where they work. Surrounding relatively small groups of factories there should be a green belt. Schools for the workers' children could then each have some dozen acres of playing fields. You may say that any such scheme means, in the first place, that the people must appropriate the land: and, secondly, that our present urban areas, so far as they are a legacy from the nineteenth century, must be abolished. Well—'The land for the people' was the Chartists' cry: in my opinion a slogan we might well revive. As for rebuilding unwholesome urban areas, it need only be said that we have the material, and that within a few years we shall have large-scale unemployment unless we use the labour available. It is no impossible task to house our people in healthy surroundings.

I am an eager advocate of such developments because—the reason may surprise you—I regard religion as of vital importance in human life. The best types of religion decay and disappear when people cannot enjoy nature. People go to the cinema, the pub, and the bookmaker, when they are cut off from trees and flowers and fields, when they cannot go, as did their ancestors, to quiet haunts of wild things for peace of mind and renewal of spiritual strength. I personally feel remote from God in an industrial area where practically everything is ugly or sordid. Surely those who dwell there must feel the same. The world which God made, and which man has not desecrated, is full of beauty. In it the best that is in us can flower. When we are near to God-given beauty, we can forget narrow aims and pass beyond daily needs to think of larger issues and, in particular, of the meaning of man's life.

The Psalmist mocked those who thought that their homes would endure for ever. To him the days of a man were three score years and ten. He allowed that some men are so strong in health that they live for four score years. Then this life passes away and we are gone. Gone where? Are we of no more significance than our houses, nice new houses, which within a century will crumble to dust? Is the spirit of man such stuff as dreams are made of? Or are we set here with our hopes and dreams, sorrow and uplifting love, to prepare for an eternal home, the many mansions of the Father's house, the kingdom of God?

BASIC INDIA: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS FUTURE*

By Sir Robert Bristow, C.I.E., late Administrative Officer and Harbour Engineer-in-Chief, Cochin, S. India.

I.

Introductory.

A MARKED revival of interest is noticeable in the problem of India's self-government. There have been similar revivals before, but mostly in response to movements generated in Britain or India, and the British public have made it clear that the people's conscience is still active on the subject of India's right to self-determination. India's views, of course, or some of them, have not lacked publicity.

But the present revival outside India is both on a wider scale and based on a sounder foundation: it is a demand for accurate information, free from any prejudicial bent, rather than precipitate action in any direction. The long series of enquiries and conferences which preceded the Reform Acts of 1919 and 1935, and the working of the Acts themselves, have borne fruit in two ways: (1) a revelation of unsuspected cleavages of opinion in India has been given to the world at large, and (2) a vital experience of administrative difficulties, to India in particular. The outbreak of this war and the failure of the Cripps' Mission lit up the problem for all to see. Here at last was exposed to the world the magnitude of the racial antagonisms between Indians in their own country. Here, it was at last realised, could be no problem for superficial journalism or well-intentioned sentiment. Indeed no. Here was a problem whose complexity appeared so great as to convince not only India's well-wishers in England, but other nations, including even America, that no facile solution lay ready to hand were it not for the so-called 'divide and rule' policy of British Raj.

People now realize that the Indian problem must be seen in an Indian perspective and not with untaught Western eyes. Even to those who best know the country and the people, and who entirely desire their welfare in every respect, it is a bewildering one, the vital issues of which are confused by sectional clamour and un-

*A paper read before the Institute of International Affairs at Capetown, Sir Edward Harding, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. (Chairman), on March 7, 1945.

warrantable interference. Too long has the popular journalist or author, intoxicated with the exuberance of his own verbosity, been allowed to mislead public opinion; and it is the purport of this paper to describe very simply and in correct proportion the salient features of the Indian problem. My particular qualifications for the task consist of forty years' professional and administrative experience in public service, including twenty-one years in India, where I came to know every phase of India's life, official, social, economic and political. My wife is equally well-informed on the social side, and there was no family or school, no convent or church, no welfare institution in the Indian State of Cochin where she was not known. This paper is a summary of this personal experience and accumulated knowledge and their bearing upon the issues with which India confronts us.

I must try to give the basic facts about such personal matters as marriage and children, education and work, as well as the larger subjects of religion and politics, industry and commerce. I shall refer to India's own plans for industrial and agricultural development and the reaction to them in well-informed quarters; and I must suggest a reasonable and logical conclusion. This outline will be bare of detail, but I will guarantee three things: its correct proportion, its relevance, and its sincerity.

II.

Marriage. All over the world the question of marriage is now being discussed with a freedom, frankness and sustained persistence which is without parallel in human history. It is not, I think, that the principle of monogamy is seriously threatened, but, rather, that people are striving to find the essentials of right marriage in order to preserve monogamy as the soundest, and possibly the oldest, of marriage customs. Against this background of enquiry among other nations we find in India many customs which vary according to tradition and to social and economic needs. We have, for example, in S. India, the orthodox polygamy of the Muhammadan, the orthodox polyandry of the Toda (believed to be the descendant of the Neolithic pre-Dravidian), and the monogamy of the Christian and Hindu, all within a comparatively small area. The Hindu may be polygamous but rarely is. The caste system of the Hindu is deeply interwoven in the marriage custom of that race and encourages, if not requires, early marriage. Only recently in Cochin State has the marriage age been raised to 16 years, and against strong orthodox opposition. On the other hand, the educated Indian woman is breaking away from some of the old traditions, including the rigid purdah system, and is proving herself an

accomplished modernist in public affairs as well as a capable mother in her own home, retaining the best of Indian life and gradually adapting the best of the Western.

India, like China, is a strongly sexed country, and the vital statistics are alarming, the population having increased from 306 millions in 1921 to 338 millions in 1931, and to 389 millions in 1941. This corresponds with the greater areas of land under cultivation, more purchasing power, more internal security, and wider and better medical services; but it suggests that the tendency is for the population to increase to the extreme limit of, and even beyond, whatever food supply is produced, for there is a sad excess of under-nutrition even now; moreover, both soil deterioration and erosion are increasingly evident. Some observers think that, with greater national prosperity, the birth-rate would decline, as in England, while others reject this theory as being misapplied to Indian conditions, and indeed, as contradicted by the statistics themselves. Of this huge population the Hindus, including the depressed classes, number about two-thirds, the Moslems a bare quarter, and the others in diminishing proportions: Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and Jews.

The double problem seems to be that of artificially restricting the birth-rate to something like its present maximum and of greatly increasing the food production over new and existing cultivation without demanding more labour than is already available. The soil problem is under close observation, as will be seen, but the practice of birth restriction is opposed to the principles of both Hinduism and Roman Christianity. Nevertheless, it has been seriously suggested by some progressive Indians that free education on the subject of birth control is a more urgent necessity than the provision of more irrigation and more soil fertilizers. Some of the basic reasons for the high fecundity in India are said to be the climate itself, the kind of food taken (some of it high in Vitamin D and some with its admixture of condiment, spice and curry), the comparative lack of sports and other pleasurable diversions, and the economic urge to produce children as workers. These seem to be fairly constant factors, and I am inclined to agree with those who, with every respect for the sanctity of tradition, believe that a higher marriage age and a suitable form of birth control are essential to a stable and prosperous India. The increasing literacy of women may gradually achieve this automatically, but the problem is deep-seated and real, and of equal urgency with any other. We will call this problem No. 1.

III.

Education. How is it possible for these vast masses of people to be educated? If we take the term basic to mean what is true of say 90 per cent. of the population, we discover that India is illiterate; and if we go a step further and try to imagine the difficulties of teaching only the children, or the adults, of an illiterate population of 350 million souls, we find that India must remain illiterate, on the whole. At least, that seems the commonsense view, but perhaps in this matter very uncommon sense is required, and recently a plan has been produced by Mr. John Sargent, a Government authority, which foreshadows a marked increase of literacy though at an enormous cost, rising in fact to 235 million pounds per annum in fifty years' time. This cost would be distributed over the Provinces and there would be decentralization, which in India means rather more inefficiency than elsewhere owing to the enormous areas to be inspected and supervised. The fact remains, however, that the children are required to work in cottage or field industries almost as soon as they can walk, talk, and understand a simple instruction. As everyone knows, India is a highly-productive country: jute, cotton and rice; tobacco, tea and opium; coffee, pepper, spices and sugar; wheat and barley; cocoanuts and oil-seeds; timber; cattle, sheep and poultry, and so on; and the education required for the rearing of such products is imbibed from sources wholly outside elementary schools. The children grow up in an atmosphere which is constantly educational to their immediate needs and it is difficult to convince their parents that anything more is necessary. Nevertheless, the peasant farmer of India grows into a very astute and industrious person. His methods may be ancient, some of them are; but he cultivates his ground — as well as he knows how — to the last square yard of productivity; he knows what his crop is worth and what rent he should pay. He and his whole family, as a class, are sober and industrious; they truly inherit the earth to a degree only found in the great Eastern countries. They are indifferent to Governments so long as they can work in peace and enjoy fair treatment, which they certainly get under British rule. It is true that plans for doubling soil production are being prepared, but if these are found practicable they will certainly not have a good effect on literacy as such: the children will be required elsewhere, at any rate for considerable portions of the year. Perhaps the education of India's rural illiterates can only be done in the evening, and then chiefly by a completely new technique of radio-television on an elementary scale. It may be added that both the Indian Army and the jute and cotton mills provide educative centres in their respective areas.

For the literates, the kind of education given and its scope have been matters of controversy almost since 1858 when British education began. Broadly, the charge has been that although the English language and English literature have been eagerly assimilated, western culture has on the whole been given undue prominence in an oriental civilization, and that the teachers have been lacking in numbers and proficiency owing chiefly to what has been called 'a parsimonious and unimaginative Treasury.' Broadly again, the system has followed the English models of primary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, with State-aided convents and other religious institutions doing a good deal for the lower and middle classes. It is noteworthy that schools are most frequent along and near the west coast of India, the Indian States of Cochin, Travancore and Baroda having a higher degree of literacy than any other equal areas of India. There are separate institutions for training in science, engineering, agriculture, forestry, etc., and one of the criticisms of the educational policy in India, as in England, is that more might have been done in the direction of modern science. On the other hand, the impact of some modern sciences in England upon the comparatively modern Christianity of the Reformation made deep cleavages among the English people. For the British to have introduced and propagated the modern sciences in India, where the religious system is so much older, and before there was a strong demand for them, might have brought bloodshed and disaster. In the older sciences, of course, India has shown the way, in mathematics particularly.

Education is India's problem No. 2: a high percentage of illiteracy and great unemployment among the literates, the supply greatly exceeding the demand.

IV.

Work. We have already referred to work in cottages and fields, and have now to consider that small human fraction of India, men and women—clever, eager, sensitive, zealous—and their educated reaction to commerce and politics. They play an important part in Government controls, in the British Services and the political Assemblies. They overwhelmingly preponderate in law, communications, posts and telegraphs, and in all clerical life. The merchants finance and manage enormous factories; they conduct overseas business and meet the English merchants on their own ground. The professional classes are spreading rapidly; the soldiers are among the finest in the world, and the civil artisan class, educated or not, is wholly Indian and Anglo-Indian (Eurasian). However static his past, the educated Indian, man or woman, takes to modern life as a duck to water. It is, in fact, the inevit-

able reaction to a long period of inertia, and partly due to the complementary influence of British education and British industry. Though late in time, literate India has been born again; it is a strong and lusty family, and, in simple terms, is suffering from growing pains. That is exactly the position; and it has been sadly misrepresented. The trouble is that the family is not wholly at one as to who should inherit the family estate, and already, in Government Departments, the authorities have been forced to lay down a scheme of rationing, so to speak, among the many claimants for Government posts. Here we find increasing and aggressive competition not only between Hindu and Moslem, but also between Brahmin and non-Brahmin, Nair and Christian, and others. Although this is an illustration in little of the larger national problem in so far as it is a struggle for place and prestige, the fact is that industry has not developed quickly enough to keep pace with education, and such aggressive competition was bound to arise among the different classes. As to qualifications and aptitude, I found that both my indoor and outdoor staffs were most efficient and loyal, the indoor and superior staff mostly Hindu, the ships' crews mostly Moslem, the labour mostly Christian. So far as my personal staff were concerned, I regarded them as collaborators rather than subordinates, and I was richly rewarded. I learned much from them, and I think they would be the first to acknowledge that the debt was reciprocal. It was a partnership in ideal proportions of self-discipline, mutual respect and mutual assistance, and if, from time to time, we had our differences, that too, was a sign of life and real kinship, not of cold-blooded indifference. My experience must have been typical of large numbers all over India.

It will be seen therefore that in each phase of personal life, Basic India has a problem of outstanding difficulty: in marriage and population, in education, and in employment.

V.

We now pass on to the wider basic considerations. Industry supplies the material needs of life, commerce distributes them, legislation applies laws which govern both, and religion either reveals the ethical principles which should permeate and condition all human activity or else prescribes an ecclesiastical and cultural system by which, indirectly rather than directly, human life can be influenced for good. From time immemorial these two principles have been in conflict and the end is not yet. Perhaps, after all, they are complementary. In unravelling these four-fold strands we may find ourselves unravelling the rest of the Indian riddle, and we will unravel them backwards.

First, Religion. Whatever form its religion may take, whether systematic, credal or mystical, India is at root a deeply religious country. Hinduism is a system whose roots are in the remote past. There was a civilization at Mohen-daro in Sind more than 3,000 years B.C. which nursed the religions that gave birth later to the *Rig Vedas*, the first collection of ancient texts and hymns, and sacrificial formulas addressed to the celestial divinities of sun and stars, and of fire. To this was added, later, the *Upanishads*, which contain the doctrine of Transmigration and Reincarnation; and then, still later, the *Mahabharata*, 'a gigantic collection of compositions' reaching forward to about the year 200 A.D. In the sixth book of this collection we have the inspired *Bhagavad-Gita*, the 'Song Celestial,' to quote Edwin Arnold, with its exalted and austere cosmic philosophy. Hinduism is a vast literature reflecting the forms of worship, the mythologies, the cults, the religious philosophies of thousands of years. Imagine the effect of such a religion which, although undoubtedly influenced by Buddhism, has never had its own Reformation, its Martin Luther, its higher and lower criticism and its liberal modernist, upon the life and soul of a nation; then place beside its transcendental philosophies and systematic polytheisms the simple monotheism of Muhammad and the esoteric practices of the Yogi and other mystics, and some idea can be gained of the difficulty of finding a common meeting place, a kind of common multiple which can permeate and influence legislation. Indeed, the Hindu conception of religion is wholly other than ours, and in none is there a common ethic and practice as provided in the religion of Jesus by the Lord's Prayer, the Two Great Commandments and the Beatitudes—the spirit of which has entered so deeply into English social legislation and English ideas of justice, and is indeed greatly honoured in parts of India by some of the Hindus, who have a very clear conception of the Christian ethic as it should be translated into action. The reaction to Christianity in other quarters is obscure. There is an anti-Christian school, producing anti-Christian pamphlets; a Gandhi campaign on behalf of the untouchables for whom Christianity rather than Hinduism had been a saving grace, and a movement towards Catholic art in some Hindu temples. I am not sure whence these movements derive, but a change is pending if only just becoming visible.

It is much to the point that Dr. Major, Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, has at this juncture produced a remarkable little book called *Basic Christianity, the World Religion*, in which he reduces to its elements the simple teaching of Jesus and shows how it might be assimilated by both of India's great religions without altering their own structures of belief and practice—a *very* remarkable

little book, published by Blackwell's of Oxford, to which I would like to draw special attention as bearing strongly on one of India's great problems.

VI.

Legislation. The approach *via* religion helps to clear the air, but it has to be remembered that the legislature concerns only three-fifths of the whole country, the remaining two-fifths being occupied by the Indian States, numbering 562 and governed by the hereditary Rulers under the suzerainty of the Crown. The relative independence of these States, not only to the British Government but to any Government which might take over British India, is not the least of India's difficulties, for the States have loyalties and traditions of tremendous local significance which are most zealously guarded as a sacred trust by their Rulers.

In British India there are eleven Provinces in which the framers of the Act of 1935 made a comprehensive attempt to satisfy the claims of all parties and castes. The names are Bombay, Bengal and the Punjab; Bihar, Assam and the N.W. Frontier; Orissa, Sind and the United Provinces (Agra and Oudh); the Central Provinces, and Madras, the oldest of all. Each Province has a Governor, and each Governor a Council of Ministers and a Legislative Assembly. In six of the senior Provinces there is also a second chamber called the Legislative Council, to which the Governors may nominate a minor proportion of members. There are about 30 million voters, who are influenced to a large degree by the three active political organizations, the Indian National Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League.

The constitution of the Assemblies is by popular election on a property or tax-paying basis, and seats are allotted to 12 groups, namely, the General Population, Muhammadans, and Women; Anglo-Indians or Eurasians, Europeans, and Indian Christians; Backward Areas and Tribes, or Scheduled Castes; Commerce, Industry, Mining, Planting (one group); Land-holders, Labour, Universities, and (in two Provinces only) Sikhs. The numbers elected to each group are reasonably representative of the community, and the total number of seats varies from 228 in the United Provinces to 50 in the N.W. Frontier. The total in the eleven Provinces is 1,585 seats, of which the Europeans hold only 26.

In the second chamber the members are drawn from the General Population, the Muhammadans, the Europeans and, in Madras only, the Indian Christians. There are 186 seats in all, of which the Europeans hold only nine. Thus the Provinces make their own laws and administer their own areas.

At New Delhi, the Government of India and the Governor-General act both in their direct and over-riding functions under

the Act of 1935, which provides for a Governor-General's Council of about 15 members and the two chambers as for the Provinces. The Government discharges its present duties through 17 departments: Finance, External Affairs, Home and Legislative; Commerce, Labour, Civil Defence and Education; Health and Lands, Defence, Railways, Supply; Commonwealth Relations; Information and Broadcasting; War, War Transport, Posts and Air; Industry and Civil Supplies. Relations with Indian States are dealt with directly under the Viceroy in his capacity as Crown representative, and not by the Government of India as such. The judicial system and legal advisers are largely staffed by Indians, although appeals from the High Court may be carried to the English Privy Council.

Such is the great legislative structure of India, reasonably democratic, overwhelmingly Indian in numbers and adapted to the reasonable needs of all parties, castes and creeds. For all practical purposes India is actually autonomous, and it is amazing how this fact has been suppressed or misrepresented. It is true that certain over-ruling powers of the Government and Governor-General are used occasionally, but very reluctantly, and only in cases where the lawful business of the country is at stake. No better electoral system and no better-proportioned political structure has yet been suggested by any responsible body of opinion, and it has certainly brought to light the various differences of Indian opinion, which is all to the good in that it clarifies the situation.

VII.

Industry and Commerce. We must now take a broad view of India's trade as a whole, trace it to its sources, and consider it in relation to the political complexion of the Provinces just mentioned, and to certain plans for giving the Moslems a separate national representation. India's trade is in a healthy state, and since the war India has become a creditor nation. Before the war, India and Burmah together constituted Britain's fourth best customer with an export and import value of commodities of 93 million pounds, against 147 millions with America (U.S.), 109 millions with Australia and 102 millions with Canada. The Indian portion of this trade was handled chiefly through the major ports of India now under the control of local trusts responsible to the Government of India, and not to the Provinces in which they are situated. In order of magnitude the figures are Calcutta, handling $8\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of goods per annum, Bombay $6\frac{1}{2}$, Karachi $2\frac{1}{4}$, Madras $1\frac{1}{4}$, Cochin 1, Vizagapatam $\frac{1}{2}$. In addition, there are the minor ports under the control of the Provincial Governments,

and certain ports belonging to the Indian States, most of which, though not all, are open roadsteads. There is also Chittagong, a railway port on the extreme east and near Burmah. It will be noticed that out of a pre-war total of 20 million of goods tons handled every year at the major ports, Calcutta and Karachi handled between them $10\frac{3}{4}$ millions, more than half. Now these ports are in the Provinces of Bengal and Sind, where the Muhammadans hold a majority, as they do also in the Provinces of the Punjab and the N.W. Frontier, which adjoin Sind, and it has been proposed that these areas should be politically separated from the rest of India under the alternative methods known as Pakistan and Regionalism, in some form or other. I have grave doubts as to the political and economic consequences of such a partitioning, fiscal and otherwise:

First: It is of the essence of the proposal that the Moslem areas shall be autonomous, although, on the whole, there will be large resident minorities, as, in fact, there will still be important minorities in the Hindu areas. Large resident minorities are always a danger.

Second: This double autonomy means either a duplication of all-India public services such as Customs, Police, Post and Telegraphs, Major Ports, Railways, Defence, etc., or else

Third: The creation of a Central Authority to which both would be subject on certain matters, thus creating another problem over a new Central Constitution, as there is now.

Fourth: Regionalism takes the two large ports of Karachi and Calcutta from the total potential of India as a national unit in international affairs.

Fifth: It also confirms and consolidates racial prejudices and adds a new ground of dissent in that Moslems, who comprise barely one-quarter of the total population, will control the ports handling most of India's trade.

Sixth: It will complicate and aggravate fiscal difficulties and lead to road and rail disputes in connection with the handling of hinterland traffic.

Seventh: The external naval and military situation will be greatly complicated, unless it is entirely removed from political control.

These are sufficient objections, surely, to suggest that Pakistan or Regionalism is a mistaken and dangerous political expedient besides having no basis in economic reality.

VIII.

Development. We must now look at India's own plan for development, called the Bombay plan, whence it proceeds. Its clearly-stated, and entirely praiseworthy, motive is to raise the standard of living all over India. It is to cost £7,500 millions in fifteen years, and it is to achieve its aim by altering the balance of economy as follows:

(1) The National Income is at present (pre-war) made up in the proportion of Agriculture 53, Industry 17, Services 22.

(2) This proportion is to be changed as follows: Agriculture 40, Industry 35, Services 20.

Notwithstanding the 20 per cent. reduction of the figure for agriculture, the food output is to be at least doubled, which gives an idea of the extent to which industry is to be raised in comparison. It is a stupendous task which the Bombay reformers have set themselves, and how wise they were to preface their report with the remark that the success of the plan would depend on there being a Government in power which would enjoy the entire confidence of the people! It has been explained that this does not necessarily mean a Congress Government, or a purely Indian Government; it is more in the nature of an axiom in Euclid, a logical premiss. Meanwhile, the Government of India has appointed committees with able leadership in a new Department of Development and Reconstruction (not previously mentioned) to prepare similar plans of reconstruction, and I have no doubt that the Bombay Plan will serve an excellent purpose if only as a basis of comparison.

My own reaction to the Bombay Plan is, first, if it is to cost 7,500 million pounds to raise the whole standard of living, then the money will have to come, in the main, from industry, which means that India, with her cheap labour and vastly improved mechanical resources, will be a formidable competitor for world markets; second, if it is necessary for India to compete in larger degree for world markets, in order to raise her standard of living, and perhaps to import more food, she is perfectly justified in doing so — Heaven knows there is a lot of leeway to make up; third, India will hardly double her food output without some form of collective farming, which will also release labour for industry, though perhaps not so much labour as in Russia. Moreover, the soil of India is not necessarily so adaptable for collective farming as in Russia. It is unsuitable for permanent chemical fertilization, and I do not know where natural compost is to come from unless the immemorial fuel of India, cow manure, is mixed with it. Both this and the elimination of the Bania, the money-lender of the dis-

tricts concerned, are problems of the greatest difficulty — perhaps not insuperable, but staggering at first sight to an old-stager.

So far as I have been able to judge, I think the reaction to the plan in well-informed quarters is very similar to my own, and I would only add that under the terms of the Atlantic Charter the new balanced economy of India will have to fit into an international pattern, and that we have learned from bitter experience that the greatest benefactor of the human race is certainly not he who manufactures two articles when only one, and perhaps none at all, is really necessary. In the main, however, I have a warm regard for India's effort to realize her wholly admirable aims.

IX.

Conclusions. I put my suggestions rather dogmatically, but merely for brevity's sake. Unlike Mr. Beverley Nichols, I know that I am not the legal authority for pronouncing a '*Verdict* on India'!

(1) Hitherto in this paper I have tried only to give facts, figures, and reasonable inferences from them. I must begin my conclusions by a few remarks about occultism, the doctrine of hidden mysteries, as in theosophy, alchemy, astrology, magic, etc. Vast numbers of Indians of all classes profoundly believe both in occultism and in the existence of evil spirits, from whom they protect themselves by certain devices and customs. Whether as a result of this belief or not I do not know, but there are forces working in India — spiritual, metaphysical, or what you will — which I cannot define. Every experienced and sensitive person knows that they are there, and I believe India is unique in this respect. At any rate, I have never felt them elsewhere; and it is fatal to despise or underrate India's psychic background.

(2) These forces will possess people according to their willingness to be possessed and also according to their 'etheric' wavelength. I know this sounds somewhat imaginary and far-fetched and use the simile only because it is so familiar in another way. It has a great bearing on the present situation.

(3) I do not think that the creation of any physical or political barrier, nor indeed of any form of Dominion Status, will have any appreciable effect on these hidden influences, the power of which has to be experienced before it can be realized. What is required is a new wave-length in the human receiver, reaching out to new international influences.

(4) India must, in fact, tune-in to international economics, not internal politics. That, I believe, is the key to the problem. It

entails a sublimation of passionate political feeling to a dispassionate study of all-India needs.

(5) The study should be founded on the basic fact that geographically, economically and internationally, India is One. To split the country up into regional groups with separate Governments is to admit failure, to lower India's prestige, to reduce India's economic potential, to invite endless internal friction and strife, and most probably to perpetuate some form of foreign government at the centre over which the whole political squabble will start *de novo*.

(6) The Indian States should contribute their own proposals to the national plan and ultimately carry them out. They will retain their constitutional rights, adjusting their legal codes to an all-India standard, and conforming generally to the national pattern in economics, politics and administration. Throughout India, moreover, there will have to be a sincere searching of hearts over existing legal systems. For example, the Courts have the greatest conceivable difficulty in sifting contradictory evidence.

(7) India's own representatives should go to the post-war conferences as a single unit and should adapt their economic plan with as little modification as possible to the balanced world-economy visualized in the Atlantic Charter. This united front is essential; it will be a great binding force among them.

(8) There is reason to suppose that part of the above programme is already in progress, but its final shape must have the explicit approval of representative Indians.

(9) When the final plan is agreed upon the Services must be reorganized to meet the changed conditions. The Secretariats especially will have to be remodelled after a different fashion so that selected business and professional experts are available for minuting and sharing in administrative decisions. The present system is, in part, intolerable and would wreck any plan, however admirable.

(10) It is most unwise to dwell upon difficulties, as, for example, Suppose the parties will not agree? *They will have to agree*. That is the literal truth. The war has set up an entirely new situation, and India cannot afford to remain outside an international organization which is settling world affairs, not even to please the most extreme partisans. There are two paths open : one leads to cultural eminence and economic prosperity, the other to racial disruption and disaster.

(11) And what part will Britain play after all this? That, too, will be decided by events. Who can tell at this stage? It is like

trying to solve an equation without knowing the value of any of the factors, and this question and answer show up very clearly the absurdity of trying to divorce economics from politics. What we really desire is a world in which politics and industry will be co-ordinated with an agreed economic policy. It is that policy which will decide if the British are necessary in India, and if not, when and how they should leave. What competent authority would choose its partners and staff before settling its defence and economic plans? This I submit, in all humility, is the immediate answer to India's problem. The demand that Britain should leave India at once has no foundation in reality.

(12) Let me quote, finally, a paragraph from *Russia and the Peace*, by Sir Bernard Pares. I shall alter only one word, substituting 'India' for 'Russia':

> '*Realities of this kind* (my italics) make it impossible that we should give play to political preferences; least of all could we listen to the suggestions that we should let this war lead on to a quarrel with *India*. We shall stand up to her, and we shall expect her to do the same to us, but we shall seek a solid and workmanlike solution — based on serious and sympathetic study — for every problem that may face us. We shall explore the possibilities of every kind of co-operation profitable to both sides in our post-war relations; and the enormous tasks of reconstruction with which *India* will then be dealing will give us the most practical means of proving to her that her partners in war are also her friends in peace.'

A LAYMAN'S VIEW OF THE IRISH CHURCH

WHEN I was a child, almost every middle-aged clergyman of the Church of Ireland had been ordained before the Church's disestablishment, that is, before 1869, and the privileged position which the Church held before that date still affected the attitude of the members towards their fellow-countrymen of the Roman and other Churches. Roman Catholics still worshipped in 'chapels'; indeed their Cathedral in Cork was always the 'North Chapel' to us youngsters and even to the maids, who were in almost all cases Catholics. There was no arrogance in the attitude, as far as I know, and on general principles I feel pretty sure that there was none: arrogance would have left a legacy of dislike, perhaps of hatred, which would have made the relations of Catholics and Protestants far more unpleasant than they have in fact been since the religious minority has been at the mercy of the majority.

As far as individuals have been concerned, the relations between Catholics and Protestants have been generally friendly.

The Roman Catholic Irishman is a kindly person, though, as a member of an association, he can at times be very cruel, the herd instinct being strong in him and the habit of criticism weak. His religious upbringing has not encouraged him to criticize social problems on their moral side; the word of his *führer* is too often acted on without question. In 1641 and during the vice-royalty of Tyrconnell (1687-1691), in 1789 and in the struggle which ended with the 1921 Treaty, the Catholic Irish often allowed the herd instinct to triumph over their Christianity. But such outbreaks have not blotted out from the minds of Protestants the memory of kindly acts on the part of individual Catholics, or from the minds of Catholics recognition of the Protestant desire to do them justice.

Even in the eighteenth century, a time in which religious standards are reckoned to have been low, there must have been a considerable amount of 'basic Christianity' in the official representatives of the Irish Church and in the ranks of its laity. It was of course true, as Dr. Johnson said, that 'the Irish were in a most unnatural state, the minority prevailing over the majority,' though it was hardly true that there had been 'no instance, even in the ten persecutions, of such severity as that which the Protestants of Ireland had exercised against the Catholics.' The Penal Laws were abominable, but there is no reason to believe that they expressed the habitual sentiments of the Protestants towards their fellow-countrymen, or were consistently enforced.

They expressed the mood of people who had been recently injured and badly scared. When the Penal Laws were enacted, Irish Churchmen had vivid memories of what their Church had suffered during Tyrconnell's vice-royalty. There must even have been many elderly people who remembered the massacres of 1641, in which, according to Dr. Edmund Curtis, about 10,000 Protestants perished. All had, moreover, in mind the recent dragonnades and the rejoicing of the French Court and Church at what was regarded as the end of Protestantism in France. Huguenots had come to Ireland, and their stories, we may be sure, did nothing to reassure Irish Churchmen. There was plenty of evidence to convince Protestants that Roman Catholic toleration could only be counted on so long as Catholics were politically weaker than Protestants. The doctrine of toleration was almost a novelty even in Protestant circles. On the whole, though one must deplore the enactment of the Penal Laws, one can find excuses enough for the part which Irish Protestants had in putting them on the Statute Book; and the fact that many of their provisions fell into desuetude half-way through the eighteenth century seems to show that their enactment had been due to fear more than to a desire for uniformity or for vengeance.

From the middle of the century the duty of Christians towards their neighbours became clearer. The work of the Wesleys had spread to Ireland. John Wesley paid twenty visits to the country, and Methodism, for many years regarded, though perhaps not universally welcomed, as an auxiliary of the Church, had become firmly established. It was the period in which the slave trade was being attacked, and in which the French revolutionists were declaring war on privilege, demanding the *carrière ouverte aux talents*. But in Ireland, as Curtis points out, the *disabling* provisions of the Penal Laws still excluded Roman Catholics from the service of the State, though the *penal* provisions had become obsolete. Nevertheless, the liberal (or Christian) spirit was yearly becoming stronger, and in 1793 the Catholic Relief Act entitled Roman Catholic students at Trinity College, Dublin, to graduate —many years before non-Anglicans could graduate at Oxford and Cambridge.

These concessions were all to the good, but Protestant ascendancy still remained. Protestants might be bountiful, but a high-spirited people could not be expected to live happily on the charity of a minority. Privilege remained even after 1829, the year of Catholic Emancipation. The Church of Ireland, united to the English Church since 1800, was a State establishment. It was the Church of a minority, but it had the social position of the Church of England. The position of its clergy was perhaps somewhat higher than that of the Church of England clergy; not because more of the Irish clergy belonged to the upper classes, but because most of the clergy and laity of the Church of the majority belonged to the lower. The Church occupied a privileged position, and the day of privilege was drawing to a close. Attacks were made in Parliament on the Church's position, and plans for 'concurrent endowment' were put forward. One proposal, the strangest of all to Irishmen of to-day, was made by the famous Dr. Doyle ['J.K.L.'), Roman Catholic Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin. About the year 1824 he proposed that the Church of Ireland and his own should unite! A conference of bishops representative of the two Churches might discuss their Churches' differences—those arising from their views on the Canon of Scripture, Faith, Justification, the Mass, the Sacraments, the celibacy of the clergy, the language of the Liturgy, Invocation of Saints, and Prayers for the Dead. The discussions, one ventures to say, were bound to be lengthy; the conference indeed might have lasted as long as the Council of Trent. And in the end it is unlikely that even what Mr. de Valera would call 'external association' would have been reached. Bishop Doyle may have been aiming at a solution something like that which brought the Uniat Churches of South-East

Europe into being, but he must have had a very superficial knowledge of his opponents if he thought that a theological compromise could have made an essential change in the Churches' mutual relations. The right (or duty) of private judgement had not been included in the subjects for discussion. In other words, the Protestantism of the Church of Ireland had been ignored. Bishop Doyle seems to have been a broad-minded man, but consideration of the essential characteristics of the Roman and Anglican systems, and knowledge of their histories, show that corporate union between the Churches of Ireland and Rome was as impossible as union would be between a democratic and a totalitarian State.

Here, by the way, one might suggest that the eagerness of Church of Ireland historians to prove that their Church in its early days was independent of Rome is to be ascribed in some measure to that Protestant spirit which in the Church of England long before the Reformation strove for home rule in the affairs of the Church. Home Rule—decentralization—is Protestant; centralization, due to distrust in human nature, is Roman. Be this as it may, the historians of the Irish Church, led by the late Dr. George T. Stokes, who was Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Dublin University at the end of the last century, have stressed the independence of the Celtic Church, though acknowledging their Church's membership of the Anglican communion. Independence was lost with the coming of Henry II to Ireland, but the linking of the fortunes of the Irish and English Churches ensured the ultimate recovery of the Irish Church's independence—home rule, at any rate—when the Church of England broke with Rome.

Interest in the Church's origin has not had the effect which investigation of a similar character seems to have had in England. In Ireland there has been little to tempt Churchmen to ape the practices of Celtic or Norman ecclesiastics. Irish Churchmen have made no attempt to water down the Protestant character of the post-Reformation Church; and to the present day the Protestantism of the Church of Ireland is, to English Churchmen at any rate, its most noticeable feature. Irish Churchmen see Romanism at close quarters; Romanism, moreover, which has less need than Romanism in England to keep its ugly side—its arrogance, cruelty, and distrust in human nature—from the public eye. They are not tempted to sentimentalize over monasticism, celibacy, the confessional, Mariolatry, and other post-Apostolic additions to Christianity. On the other hand, they do not as a body favour the emotionalism of those who pride themselves on their evangelical purity. A visitor from England has described the 'atmosphere' of the Theological Society of Trinity College, Dublin, and indeed of the whole college, as reminiscent of the eighteenth century; and

a Roman Catholic friend has spoken to me of rationality as being the college's most obvious characteristic. Rationality, we know, was characteristic of the century before last. Mathematics, which those of us who are not mathematicians regard as essentially a study for rationalists — though not necessarily for those who spell their title with a capital R—was for many generations as characteristic of Dublin University as of Cambridge. Locke, who did so much towards giving eighteenth century philosophy its direction, was studied at Dublin even in his lifetime; and the works of Bishop Butler — the *Analogy*, of which a notable edition was published in 1860 by Bishop Fitzgerald, of Cork, and the *Sermons* — formed the philosophical background of the ordinary Arts student of the last century.

Clergy whose minds were trained in such a school were unlikely to put the Church into the position to which Fascists have exalted the State. The constitution of the Church, moreover, since 1869, had discouraged Fascist pretensions. That constitution no doubt owed much to the abiding influence of Archbishop Whately (who had died in 1863) on the minds of the men responsible for its provisions. Among the Irish clergy Whately (who was not generally appreciated) had a few devoted followers, but they were men of more than average ability and force of character, men such as William Fitzgerald, a T.C.D. professor and afterwards Bishop successively of Cork and Killaloe, and James Thomas O'Brien, Bishop of Ossory from 1845 to 1874. The disestablished Church in its early years benefited greatly by the statistical skill of Joseph Galbraith, a mathematical Fellow of Trinity, and by the genial wisdom of George Salmon, almost equally famous as a mathematician and theologian, and long to be remembered as the author of *The Infallibility of the Church*, probably the hardest book to refute that the champions of Rome have so far had to deal with.

The task that faced Irish Churchmen in 1869 was no light one. A constitution was necessary, not 'for a new communion,' but for 'one of the most ancient Churches of Christendom.' Hints were got from the practice of the Antipodean Churches, and before long the Church of Ireland had set up a Representative Body for the management of its property and finances, and had entrusted legislation to synods — a diocesan synod and a general synod which met annually in Dublin and legislated for the Church as a whole. The government of the Church is as democratic as one could expect a government established seventy-five years ago to be. In the House of Representatives there are 648 members, of whom 416 are laymen. Laymen form an integral part of the bodies responsible for the choice of bishop and of parish clergy, and at the elections outnumber the clerical members. But laymen, as far as

they have to do with the government of the Church, are *viri*, not merely *homines*. Persistent efforts have been made in recent years to induce the Synod to admit women; the example of Parliament has been cited, and members have been reminded of the useful work done by women on church vestries; but the efforts of the innovators have so far been unsuccessful, and in the matter of Church legislation women's wishes can be expressed only through the mouths of men.

Despite disestablishment and disendowment, the Church began its independent career in 1869-70 with many advantages. It was still legally the Church of Ireland, and it remained in possession of its cathedrals and other churches. In Dublin, Cork, Limerick, and other towns, in which the members of the Church of Ireland were greatly outnumbered by the Roman Catholics, the most striking ecclesiastical buildings belong to the minority. The minority, however, was in 1870 not so small as it has since become, and Society was still overwhelmingly Protestant. The National Education Commissioners and the Christian Brothers for more than a generation had been reducing illiteracy among Catholics, but secondary and university education had not yet produced a Catholic middle class able to hold its own socially with Protestants. A rapid change, however, took place with the institution of the Intermediate examinations and the founding in 1880 of the Royal University (succeeding the Queen's University, of which the 'Godless' Queen's Colleges were parts). Dublin University, as has been noted, had been open to Catholics from 1788, and its prizes, from sizarships to fellowships, had been open to competition from 1873; but Trinity was under a clerical ban, and only strong-minded Catholics whose social position was reasonably secure dared to defy the bishops. (The ban is still in existence. In his Lenten pastoral this year Archbishop McQuaid warns parents and guardians, under the pain of committing mortal sin, against sending sons or daughters to the 'Protestant University of Dublin.')

But in seventy-five years considerable social changes were bound to take place in any Occidental country. In the twenty-six counties of Ireland such changes have been almost revolutionary in character. A strong Catholic middle-class has come into existence (with the goodwill, be it said, of all thoughtful Protestants, who would naturally desire to deal with educated opponents rather than with boors). The Protestant population has declined in numbers and in social influence; and in political power it has become almost negligible. Yet the ancient cathedrals and parish churches still seem to claim a Protestant character for the cities in which they stand. Dublin has two Church of Ireland cathedrals—St. Patrick's, a Norman foundation, which is 'national' (its canons

belonging to various dioceses), and Christ Church, founded by Sitric the Norseman about 1038, which is the cathedral church of the diocese. The Roman Catholics have a pro-cathedral, but are believed to have plans for the building of a cathedral. Some years ago, it is known, they were negotiating with the Church of Ireland authorities for the transference of the ownership of Christ Church. Nothing came of the negotiations, and nothing was likely to come of them. Christ Church and St. Patrick's are bound to the Church of Ireland by many ties, ties of association as well as those made by law. To take either building from its owners would be somewhat like depriving an ancient family of its portaits and heirlooms. It would, in fact, be a hundred times worse. Legally, the old cathedrals and other churches are as much the property of the Church of Ireland as the cathedrals and parish churches of England are the property of the English Church.

Beautiful buildings are a noble inheritance, but their possession does not make a great church. The Church of Ireland cannot afford to live on its past; antiquarianism will not keep it alive. It may or may not be the Church of St. Patrick; more important is the question whether it is really what it is in name, the Church of Ireland. In Northern Ireland it has considerable numbers, but in the Twenty-six Counties its membership has dropped to little more than 100,000 — about five per cent. of the Eire population. But of course as long as it is the Church of Ireland it can claim to be judged as a whole.* And as a whole it is doing at least one thing of very great importance: it is helping by its all-Ireland constitution to keep alive the possibility of a re-united Ireland. Without it, the racial and traditional differences of North and South might easily make the cleavage between Northern Ireland and Eire even wider than that made by the politicians. The Roman Church is an all-Ireland body, but as a unifying agency it counts for nothing, perhaps less than nothing. It has not the ear of the party in whose hands lie the fortunes of Northern Ireland. Its clergy, compared with the clergy who are fathers of families, can do little towards bringing about mutual understanding between North and South. Furthermore, the attitude of its clergy to the British Commonwealth is, to say the least, doubtful, whereas loyalty to King and Commonwealth is still, despite all discouragement, almost as

* 'During the greater part of the [1861—1936-37] period the Irish population as a whole was diminishing, and the relative decrease in the Church of Ireland was slight. Its members formed 12 per cent. of the population of Ireland in 1861, and 11·5 per cent. in 1936-37; and the Presbyterians to-day form actually a larger proportion of the whole country than they did in 1861.' (*Irish Protestantism To-day and To-morrow*. A demographic study by R. P. McDermott and D. A. Webb. A.P.C.K., Dublin and Belfast.)

deeply felt by the clergy and laity of the Church of Ireland south of the Border as by the clergy and laity of Northern Ireland.

About fifty-five years ago, that old man eloquent, William Alexander, then Bishop of Derry (later Primate), reviewed the state and prospects of his Church. He began his work as bishop when the Church was a State establishment and when it still had the support of an influential landed gentry. In 1890 he saw, or thought he saw, 'a reduced episcopate, an alienated England, an establishment in ruins, a gentry in *deliquium*, a Protestantism in agony.' I wonder what he would see if he were still alive. In Ulster, a few months ago he would have seen the creation of a new bishopric, the united dioceses of Down, Connor and Dromore having become too populous for one man's oversight. He would certainly not see an establishment in ruins; he would see a Church as young apparently and vigorous as it had been at any time in its long history. He would see gentry reduced in numbers and in wealth but probably more firmly *adscripti glebae* than they had been in 1890. Whether he would still see an alienated England is a question which I, who have been straitly shut up within the Four Seas of Ireland for over five years, should not like to answer; but I would say without hesitation that the old bishop would not find nowadays in Ireland a Protestantism in agony. In the 'bad times,' between 1919 and 1921, many Protestants were murdered and many Protestant families left the country, as Protestants left it during Tyrconnell's régime, but the ill-treatment of Protestants in the 'bad times' no more extirpated Protestantism, even in Southern Ireland, than the dragonnades extirpated Protestantism in the Cevennes. Even in remote parts of Co. Cork there are still well-filled churches; there is in fact at least one part of the country where the only church in the parish belongs to the Church of Ireland. The Protestantism of the Church of Ireland is as vigorous as ever, but it has become more enlightened. We cannot leave our country, but the 'wireless' brings us facts and opinions from all the world. Our Protestantism has had to subject itself to criticism, and members of the Church of Ireland, one hopes, are now Protestants such as the good Bishop would have had them be, showing in their lives the spirit of 'the evangelist, St. John, and not a feeble imitation of Dr. Titus Oates.' H. R. CHILLINGWORTH.

Note. — I am largely indebted for my facts to the *History of the Church of Ireland,* edited by Dr. W. Alison Phillips, M.R.I.A., formerly Lecky Professor of Modern History in the University of Dublin (Oxford, 1933), and chiefly to chapters vii and viii of Vol. III, the work of the Rev. N. D. Emerson, LL.B., Ph.D., and to chapters ix and x, the work of the Very Rev. C. A. Webster, D.D., M.R.I.A. I have consulted, *inter alia,* Bishop Patton's *Fifty Years of Disestablishment* (Dublin, A.P.C.K., 1922) and the *History of Ireland* by the late Dr. Edmund Curtis (Methuen).

THE RELIGION OF JESUS

By the Rev. Henry Mick, M.A., S.T.D.

IN presenting an article like the following, which breaks rather sharply with tradition, it is not easy to determine the best form employ. The 'safest' procedure, for the writer, would be that a carefully documented thesis. This, however, has disadvantges which would seem to forbid its use, even though I expose yself to criticism by the course I have chosen. There is no reason hy criticism should be resented providing it is objective, emancited, informed and constructive. I have deemed it wise, however, employ enough reference to make it clear that I am not entirely t of touch with the thought of the past or present, even though e pattern I attempt to weave is different from that of traditional hristianity.

Personally, I first became interested in the Religion of Jesus, such, in 1925 when reading *The Religion of Jesus and the Faith f Paul* by Adolph Deissmann, the Selly Oak Lectures of 1923 n *The Communion of Jesus with God and the Communion of aul with Christ.* This book, like all Deissmann has written, is ill well worth reading; indeed, it is probably the best work to ate on the subject. However, it was the title rather than the connt of the book that influenced me most. Prior to that time I had ad *The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus*, the Bruce Lectures of 917 by James A. Robertson; and since I have read *The Religion f Jesus* by Walter E. Bundy, Professor of English Bible, De auw University; *Essential Christianity* by Samuel Angus; *iving Religions and a World Faith* by William Hocking; and ich references to the subject as may be found in the writings of . F. Scott, S. J. Case, William Morgan, John Baillie, and others. hile most of these writers are in the first rank of Christian interreters in our time, the careful student will not read far until he ecomes aware that we are still in the elementary stages of thinkg about one of the most important questions of all time—the upremacy and authority of Jesus in the realm of personal religious xperience. Thus for the past twenty years, as I have had opportnity, I have been reading and thinking, speaking and writing, pon the subject of the Religion of Jesus; and in the meantime raying my brethren, who do not agree with me, not to adjudge e worthy of stripes or of bonds because I urge that we permit ghteousness to 'set us in the way of His steps.'

I.

The world we know is in dire need of four unifying factors. The first is that of a powerful and practical rallying centre which will transcend all barriers of race, nation, class, colour and even creed. Many emperors and prophets have attempted such a synthesis, but have never succeeded in completing it. Such a factor cannot be provided by any mundane teacher, prophet or emperor, however wise or forceful. It can be found, and found only, in God as Father of all men without external discrimination, and this God a spirit infinite and eternal who can be worshipped by all men in spirit and in truth. This is the one and only rallying centre we know that can be offered without embarrassment and that carries an inherent probability of acceptance by the whole human race, so diversified in tradition, environment and innate characteristics.

The second factor is a common morality. It will not do for Great Britain and the United States to have one moral standard; France, Spain and Italy another; Germany a third; Russia a fourth; China a fifth; and Japan a sixth. There must be a common standard that is at once feasible and acceptable when promoted with adequate psychological insight and prophetic zeal. Such a common standard can be found in the words, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' That this is not simply ecclesiastical idealism is seen in a recent and very realistic statement from the pen of Sir Thomas White when writing on *Permanent World Peace*. Sir Thomas White approaches his conclusions with these words:

> 'Permanent peace is of the spirit, not of the hand or mind of man. We shall have it when men and nations "love their neighbours as themselves" and a Kingdom not of this world is firmly established in the hearts of its more than 2,000,000,000 inhabitants.'

This is one of the great statements of all time; and brings into bold relief the common standard of morality without which permanent peace has been and is impossible. Long ago Harnack reminded us that

> 'Jesus laid down no social programme for the suppression of poverty and distress, if by programme we mean a set of definitely prescribed regulations. . . . And yet no religion, not even Buddhism, ever went to work with such an energetic social message, and so identified itself with that message as we see to be the case in the Gospel. Because the words "Love thy neighbour as thyself" were spoken in deep earnest; because with these words Jesus turned a light upon all the concrete relations of life, upon the world of hunger, poverty, misery; because, lastly, He uttered them as a religious, nay, as *the* religious maxim.'

The third factor, without which we perish, is that of a new and worthy standard of greatness. Mankind has had many 'greats' in its long and varied history: Alexander, Charlemagne, Peter, Frederick and Catherine. We have also had Napoleon the 'First'

d William the 'Second.' We, too, have had coal kings, oil kings, mber merchants and land barons. Upon these men we have con- rred honours, as we have reared monuments to their memory. it they have given us neither peace, justice nor a sure word of ophecy. Jesus was not great as anyone of them was great, and yet

> 'God hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name.'

his statement is literally true. To-day we are in desperate need a standard of values that is 'not conformed to this world,' a ndard that will put most of what is first now last, and what is st first. The lion, the eagle, and the bear, which have been driven the dark recesses of the earth, must cease to be employed as our ditional symbols, and in their places the horse, the cow, the eep, and the hen with her chickens, must be given the place of nour because of their great contributions to the service of men. the religious realm we have not far to seek for One who emplified this way of life. The Master said 'I am among you as e that serveth'; and 'whosoever of you will be chiefest, shall be rvant of all.' This is the solvent for a world of disparity, com- ttition, and strife. Well did Lecky say,

> 'the Church . . . has preserved in the character and example of its Founder an enduring principle of regeneration.'

The fourth factor is an adequate and elevating dynamic. onaparte is reported to have said that two powers and two only ove man—fear and interest. I beg to differ. Many of the noblest hievements of earth, such as the creation of beauty and human rvice, have had a much higher motivation than that suggested the 'Little Corporal.' There were many that followed Napoleon nself from a higher motive, even when he 'mingled the eagles France with the eagles of the crags,' or when 'the infantry of e snow and the cavalry of the wild blast scattered his legions e winter's withered leaves.' This is a poetic reflection on patriot- n at its highest. This same spirit has been exhibited again ten ousand times by land and sea and air in the first World War and this. But one of the noblest souls of this century reminded us ring the last war in a supreme moment that 'Patriotism is not ough.'

The world, the whole world, must be motivated by love, the ghest common emotion of mankind, or sink into chaos, confusion d despair. Thus 'love suffers long, and is kind; it envieth not; th not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily ovoked, thinketh no evil' (I *Cor.* xiii, 4, 5). Franz Werfel reflects e true insight of his own Bohemia when he avers that

> 'Progress without the Christian ingredient of love and charity has proved itself the ground of strife and misery, and will bring ultimate annihilation.'

II.

In these four prerequisites to our continued existence upon this planet in any rational semblance of decency we have the fundamentals of religion. What is religion if it is not that which unifies or binds us together; provides us with a common and adequate moral standard; gives us a worthy conception of greatness; and furnishes us with an elevating dynamic? But is there a religion among the practising religions of earth that writes these four factors pre-eminently above its altars? If there is such at the present time I am not aware of it. However, there once was such a religion. It was the religion that was experienced, practised and enjoyed by Jesus Himself as He walked and talked and lived with the sons of earth. His followers soon began to modify the inner purity of that revelation; and when at the Reformation the fathers of the faith, realizing that 'a religion is commonly purer at its source than in its lower reaches' (William Morgan), attempted to return to the fountain-head of our faith, they stopped with the interpreters of Jesus, rather than going on to Jesus Himself.

It is said that Abraham Lincoln never formally united with a Church. When asked about his attitude in the matter Lincoln replied,

> 'If I could find a Church which would write two things and two things only above its altars, namely, "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and . . . Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," I would join that Church.'

What amazes the thoughtful person is that no such Church could then be found, nor can such a one be found to-day.

It will now be seen that when I speak of the 'Religion of Jesus' I am not thinking of traditional Christianity, in any one, or all, of its many forms. Christianity, in at least one sense, has been a religion of dogma and division; and while it has accomplished much it has not saved us, even in the cradles of the Western Church, the Eastern Church, and Protestantism, from the terrible tragedies that have and do now beset us.

And further, when I use this term, the 'Religion of Jesus,' I do not mean the 'externals' of His religion which would simply be the Judaism of His time, in as far as He conformed to it; nor do I quite mean the religion which Jesus taught, though here qualification is at once necessary. There is no commentary on a prophet's teaching as good as his own way of life. This, also, is true of Jesus, however difficult it may be at times to isolate His message from that of the Evangelists who reported it. The distinction I wish to draw is one of 'approach,' and to accomplish what I have in mind we should proceed by way of the 'Life' rather than the 'Teaching' of Jesus, with the understanding that these

n never really be separated; and frequently I supplement the rmer by the latter. Thus when I speak of the Religion of Jesus, mean the spiritual life which Jesus Himself experienced, prac- ed and enjoyed during the days He walked and talked with en. Dr. Rufus Jones is right in saying that

> 'If by any chance Christ Himself had been taken by His later followers as the model and pattern of the new way, and a serious attempt had been made to set up His life and teaching as the standard and norm of the Church, Christianity would have been something vastly different from what it became. Then "heresy" would have been, as it is not now, deviation from His way, His teaching, His spirit, His Kingdom.'

his is what I mean by the 'Religion of Jesus'; and it is my con- ntion that we must recover it or perish. Of course, this will mean God-centred, not a Christ-centred, religion for the whole world. ome may not be able to follow even the Master in taking such a ep.

III.

Our traditions having been what they are and our present actices being what they are, it is probably necessary to point out me things that had little or no part in the Master's religion fore indicating what were its fundamentals. First of all it must borne in mind that Jesus had completed his spiritual pilgrimage fore any of the dogmas that have rent the Church East and est, and North and South, were formulated. How strange the scussions and conclusions of Nicaea would have sounded to im is now well known to every objective student of the New estament. This simply leads to the conclusion that dogma as ch, especially Christological dogma, had little or no part in the iritual making of Jesus or His message. Let him who doubts is examine such reflections of the Master's inner self as are und in His Great Manifesto (*Luke* iv, 8, 19), in the Lord's ayer (*Matthew* vi, 9-13), and in the parable of the Last Judgment *Matthew* xxv, 31-46).

If dogma had a negligible place in the religious life of Jesus, ternal law, rules and regulations had even less. It is true that e quoted the 'Law' to one who came to Him as an enquirer. But ren the Decalogue was not the final test in the case cited; and as r as Jesus Himself was concerned He lived above the Law from oice. Mystical fellowship with the Father and spiritual effective- ss with those about Him seemed to be His guiding star.

Ceremonial, too, which had been given so large a place before is time and has been since, had small interest for Him. It is true at He was baptized and observed the Passover, but for fastings, remonial lustrations and stated prayers, however long, He emed to care little. He lived in an age when fasting was valued,

but He Himself 'came eating and drinking'; as He also defended His disciples for eating on market days without ceremonial washings.

Least of all did fear have any part in the spiritual making of Jesus. He did not fear nature, man, death, judgment or hell; and, I say it reverently, He did not fear God, His Father and ours. Yet one finds as careful a teacher as Deissmann overlooking this point; and during the long history of the Church, Jonathan Edwards had many predecessors and followers in proclaiming the lot of 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.' But this form of appeal Jesus never used with the penitent who came to Him. Indeed, the Master's whole method of evangelism will richly repay the most careful and detailed study. It has rarely been followed within the Church that bears His name.

IV.

We are now in a position to consider in the affirmative the salient features of the Religion of Jesus. The first feature of that religion we observe as we follow this magic figure across the pages of the Synoptic Gospels is that of strongly infectious spirituality; a warm mysticism, by which I do not mean asceticism. Though He was man, a young man and a layman, He enjoyed prayer. For Him it was the highest of all friendships — communion with God. He prayed early and late, and sometimes long. He prayed in inspiring places such as the garden, the hillside, and by the lake. He prayed on momentous occasions, often alone but sometimes with others. He loved the habitation of God's House, and 'as His custom was' went into the synagogue on the Sabbath Day — not apparently for what He could get but for what He might mean to others. The Scriptures must have been His daily rendezvous. James Stalker has reminded us that there is hardly a tract of the Old Testament which we may explore but we find that His 'blessed feet' have been there before us. All of this points in the same direction: Jesus' approach to life was religious, radically and exclusively religious. This in its fulness constitutes His uniqueness.

Hardly less conspicuous than His warm mysticism was the Master's spotless purity. Traditionally this has been referred to as the 'sinlessness of Jesus.' That this term leaves something to be desired Dr. Nathaniel Micklem persuaded me, at least, in a very able article more than a decade ago. However, the fact of this 'stainless statesman' is yet before our eyes and those of the whole world. Carlyle excused the vices of Burns on the grounds of contemporaneous standards. But Jesus requires no such apology. He has met the highest ethical standards of His own age, of our age, and of all intervening ages. Of how few can this be said! But

s is just what is needed in the world we know: a morality that absolute, not relative, and applicable to all times, persons, pups, and crises. It was no empty note that Dr. W. R. Inge unded when he called for a revival of Puritanism. What we ed is a revival of the morality of Jesus that will touch all of life, ivate, social and public.

A third element in the religion of Jesus was His profound man sympathy. He wept over Jerusalem; He saw the multitude sheep without a shepherd, and was moved with compassion; He ed little children; was anxious for the poor, and was touched their affliction. Most of His deeds of mercy ('miracles') were formed to relieve human ills, whether of body or mind; and is manner of dealing with the wayward has been a challenge to ages.

In 'the prayer that teaches to pray' His disciples are exhorted offer a petition for daily bread, and that they may be loosed m their debts. Here every man recognizes a prayer in his own gue. Thus the prayer has become universal. Again, His social ssion is seen in the best-loved of all His parables, that of the ood Samaritan.' But nowhere does it shine more clearly than in parable of the Last Judgment (*Matthew* xxv, 31-46) and in His eat Manifesto (*Luke* iv, 18, 19). In the former, when man is presented as receiving his final test, there is no word as to ether he believes in the Virgin Birth, the Miracles, Substitunary Atonement, the Resurrection of the Body, the Ascension, the Second Advent. But much is said about feeding the ngry, befriending the stranger, clothing the naked, visiting the k and wooing the wayward. When we turn to the Manifesto we ve the crowning climax of His inspiring attitude:

> 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He has anointed me to proclaim Good News to the poor; He has sent me to announce release to the prisoners of war and recovery of sight to the blind: to send away free those whom tyranny has crushed, to proclaim the year of acceptance with the Lord' (Weymouth).

this is the Good News of Jesus Christ, then there are many ange and foreign pages in the long history of the Church.

The fourth and final feature of the religion of Jesus indispense to a divided Christendom and an arrogant Church is His erance and open-mindedness. This may not always be clear to se who concentrate on such diatribes as are attributed to the ister against the scribes, Pharisees, and Saducees. But His erance becomes clear when we examine the 'occasional' inmation we have concerning His attitudes. When John declared, aster, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and he follow not us: and we forbade him, because he followed not us,' Jesus d, 'Forbid him not.' Further, when the Samaritans resented the

intrusion of Jesus and His disciples into their land, and James and John suggested the calling down of fire from heaven upon them. Jesus reproved James and John with the words 'Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of.' Again, the same open-mindedness comes into purview when Jesus is speaking of 'one of these little ones that believe in me' (*Mark* ix, 42), which in *Matthew* (xviii, 1-6) is quite mistakenly made to refer specifically to children; and, still further, in a very severe passage wherein He is represented as declaring to the 'Chief Priests and Elders of the people' 'that the publicans and the harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you.' This, indeed, represents an idealism so high that probably few to-day can accept it without reservation. But we are bound to be seized by the ecumenical sweep of His utterance as He journeyed toward Jerusalem:

> 'They shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, and shall sit down in the Kingdom of God. And, behold, there are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last' (*Luke* xiii, 29, 30).

Nothing short of this attitude will heal the wounds that afflict the Church of God and the body politic to-day. In our pilgrimage to the Great Physician the Church should lead. One of the senior philosophers of North America, William H. Hocking, has spoken a word, a great word, in this connection:

> 'For how,' asks Dr. Hocking, 'can there be an international law or order or working league or federation of states until there is an accepted level of moral understanding among men to give vitality to its legal code? Religion has its service to render to world order; but in its divided state it contributes rather to the theory of impassable gulfs between East and West, between Nordic and Jew.'

This is a terrible indictment, and more terrible because of the awful truth it contains. But there is a remedy; it is to be found in the Master's way to the heart of the Father — in the Religion of Jesus.

Here, then, is a religion which provides an immediate common rallying centre for all branches of Christendom — a religion that can hardly be rejected by sincere Christians, once it is propounded, without at the same time rejecting the authority of Jesus in the realm of religious experience. We have here, also, a religion which offers the mystical, ethical and aesthetic qualities which the children of God, under varied forms and names, have sought throughout the ages, and which they might here too find if we, on our part, were faithful to the trust He left us.

If with such a presentation and plea it is necessary for me to offer a Confession of Faith, I beg to join with Dr. Karl Reiland sometime rector of St. George's Church, New York, and the late Professor Samuel Angus of St. Andrew's College, Sydney, Aus-

alia, the former of whom used the Confession while the latter ade it known to the reading world in his book, *Essential hristianity*:

'We believe that God is spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.

We believe that God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the whole earth.

We believe that God is love, and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God.

We believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

We believe that the Lord Jesus is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

We believe that if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another.

We believe in the grace of our Lord, in the love of God, and in the fellowship of the Spirit.'

myself would add, We believe in the immortality of the soul and ie life everlasting. However, Dr. Reiland has written me that the eason he 'omitted any mention of immortality is that it is implicit h the Religion of Jesus.'

LIBERAL JUDAISM TO-DAY

By Rabbi Israel Mattuck, The Liberal Jewish Synagogue, London.

LIBERAL Judaism grew out of Rabbinic Judaism, moving away from it in some ways, continuing it in others, and in hers revealing what it had concealed, developing what was latent it, emphasizing what it had neglected, and so constituting a fferent presentation or interpretation of historic Judaism.

Rabbinic Judaism was centred in the Law. By the Law it eant Bible and Talmud, which it recognized, with especial emnasis on their laws, as the revelation of God's mind for the nduct of human life. The Hebrew word for the Law, *Torah*, hich literally means instruction, describes its character more early; it is God's instruction to men. It contains a multitude f laws, spiritual, ethical, ceremonial, and just civil. It was e constitution of the Jews covering all aspects of life. Its cereonial prescriptions, however, have been exalted into a prominence ershadowing its other parts; so that the attitude of Liberal daism to them must be given the first place in any attempt to scribe it.

Outwardly, Liberal Judaism is distinguished from Orthodox daism, which follows Rabbinic Judaism, in its Synagogue serces, in the way it observes the Sabbath and the Holy Days, and the religious observances it requires from its adherents in their

personal and home life. Some of its changes affect only customs. The services in Liberal Synagogues have prayers in the vernacular; in Orthodox Synagogues all the prayers are in Hebrew with the exception of a few that are in Aramaic. In many Liberal Synagogues the men worship with uncovered heads; in Orthodox Synagogues that is an offence. All Liberal Synagogues have organ music to accompany the services; Orthodox Synagogues exclude it. Though all these changes have sometimes evoked the most vehement criticism of Liberal Judaism, they really touch only customs. But in some other changes Liberal Judaism has abrogated laws.

It has substituted for the many detailed, and even meticulous, prescriptions which Rabbinic Judaism imposes for Sabbath observance the principle that whatever violates or obscures the Sabbath spirit should not be done, and whatever brings home its spirit should be done, on the Sabbath day. It maintains a neutral attitude towards the dietary laws, leaving it to individuals to decide whether or not to observe any of them according as to whether or not they find help in them to a Jewish life. It ignores the Rabbinic laws of marriage and divorce, and all the civil laws in the Talmud. It has abolished all differentiation between men and women; they sit together at Synagogue Services; they have the same rights and duties in all religious matters. These, and other changes like them, affect prescriptions which, being in the Law, are to Orthodox Judaism divine commandments; they are not just departures from tradition. Traditionalism, though it may look like Orthodoxy, is only the rationalization of the nostalgia which Orthodoxy sometimes leaves when it has gone, to fill the gap caused by a lost belief. The Orthodox Jew observes the dietary laws not because they are traditional but because, in his belief, they are commanded by God. To depart from the Law in a matter of religious observance is, therefore, like heresy.

Though Judaism has definite beliefs, it never had compulsory dogmas. It has had so little of a dogmatic character that the Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn could say that it did not matter what a Jew believed so long as he practised the observances commanded in the Law. That is an exaggeration, but that such an exaggeration was possible shows the undogmatic character of Judaism. The place which the articles of a creed hold, I think, in Christianity was, in Judaism, given to reilgious observances. Liberal Judaism has been criticised, and opposed, not so much for its ideas as for the changes it has introduced in religious practices. Liberal Judaism feels entitled to make these changes because it does not attach to the ceremonial laws the absolute value

d validity of divine commandments. It does not accept the Law a perfect revelation, in all its details, of the mind of God.

Here then we reach a fundamental difference in thought between Orthodox and Liberal Judaism, a difference from which all ner differences between them radiate. Orthodoxy begins with e belief that the Law contains a perfect revelation from God. must, therefore, be treated as perfectly true and right, and en so treated everything in it bears witness to its divine aracter. Liberal Judaism, on the other hand, begins with e idea that the Law must be subjected to an examination by man reason and put into the general framework of history d human knowledge; and accordingly finds much in it that ows its human element. Liberal Judaism accepts unreservedly e general result of the critical study of the Bible, interpreting it cordingly as the record of a progressive revelation in which God d men participated, rather than as an act of revelation in which od expressed His will and mind fully, perfectly, and for all ne, using men merely to record it.

The Law, however, maintains a place of fundamental importce in Liberal Judaism. First, it is the symbol of Judaism. condly, it is the repository of the revelations God gave to Israel rough its prophets, poets, sages and lawgivers. Thirdly, it supärts the Jews' claim that they have been, and are, a channel of velation, and that by virtue of that fact they are God's witnesses d chosen servants. Fourthly, it contains the fundamental and rmanent ideas and ideals of Judaism which were achieved by its velopment in the past and which must regulate, control and ect its continued development. It does not contain all of God's velation to mankind, for as a Rabbinic saying proclaims, 'Truth God's seal,' so that every truth discovered by men is a revelan from God. But the Law contains the fundamental revelation out God Himself and the duties He lays on men, who are His ldren.

The revelation, however, which produced the Law was not an but a process. The Law embodies a progressive revelation and pports the belief in a progressive revelation of which it is a t, the basic part for the spiritual and moral aspect of human e. Because of the permanent values which Liberal Judaism finds the Law, the Law is for it a link between God and man, the ish way of approach to God, and the document of the covenant ween God and Israel. Because it reveals the mind of God, men entering into it, identify themselves with Him. And men enter it by imbibing its spirit, the spirit dominated by the love of d and eagerness to serve Him with love and justice, which ether constitute righteousness.

The Law has differentiated Judaism fundamentally from Christianity, making it not only a different religion, but in a sense also a different kind of religion. Just as Christianity drew its distinctive character from the belief in the Incarnation, so Judaism drew its distinctive character from the belief in the Law. But the two beliefs are not only different, they fall partly into different universes of discourse. They carry different atmospheres; they create different religious frameworks. It has often been said that Judaism offers a way of life, and Christianity offers a way of salvation. Like most generalizations, the statement contains only a partial truth, but it suggests a distinction between the two religions which involves more than their divergencies in faith. They differ in their conception of God; but they differ also in the content which they give to religion. Religion, as conceived and expressed in Judaism, includes a Law. And by pursuing righteousness in God's name, men bring themselves nearer to Him, take Him closer to themselves, identify themselves with His kingdom, and move forward to the fufilment of their lives in Him.

Religious ceremonies, too, have a place in the Jewish approach to God; they can, like prayer, vivify His presence. Ceremonies prescribed in the Law have that power for Jews in a special degree. Liberal Judaism distinguishes, however, between obsolete and living ceremonies, between those which once may have served to bring men nearer to God but have lost their significance and efficacy through the development of human thought and in the changed circumstances of Jewish life, and those which retain their spiritual and moral power either in their original meaning or in a new meaning related to, and developed out of, the original meaning. While, then, Liberal Judaism gives to religious observances a secondary and subsidiary place in religion, ascribing to them not an absolute or final but an instrumental or relative value, it maintains the view that when rightly practised they serve the approach to God. The Day of Atonement is perhaps the best example; when observed spiritually it can infuse the spirit of men with the vivid realization of God which is the essence of Atonement.

In its judgment on any observance Liberal Judaism takes into account not only its value for the spiritual life of the individual but also its communal value; its value, that is, for the community of Jews, for the Jewish people as a people of religion. Historic Jewish institutions constitute the outward religious bond which unites the Jews of the world. Carried to its extreme, this consideration would enforce the maintenance of every religious observance coming from the past, of every traditional rite. But it cannot be carried to its extreme in Liberal Judaism because it has to be combined with the criterion of religious significance for

dividuals. The communal consideration might seem to require e continued observance of the many dietary laws in the codes, it the fact is that they have lost religious signficance for many ws, including many who may still call themselves Orthodox or raditional. On the other hand, the seventh day Sabbath, even ough many Jews cannot observe it as a day of rest, is so heavily pregnated with Jewish history, and corresponding significance r the collective religious life of the Jews, that its religious value r the community so far outweighs its apparent neglect by many dividuals as to enforce its maintenance.

Liberal Judaism develops the Law. Rabbinic Judaism itself iginally followed the principle of development in religion. he Pharisees claimed for their more important extensions of the ws in the Bible that they were part of the Law revealed at Sinai. he methods, however, by which they supported the claim were artificial that clearly in most cases the laws must have come st and the Biblical basis for them found afterwards to canonize em. In other words, Pharisaism gave the authority of revelation laws developed away from the Biblical law. Its underlying idea found in a parable which, although it occurs in a late Rabbinic ook, yet fairly represents the Pharisaic point of view.

'A king once gave to each of two favourite servants a bundle of x and a measure of wheat. One of the servants wove the flax to linen of which he made a cloth, and of the wheat he made ead. The other did nothing with his flax and wheat. After a ne the king returned and asked what they had done with his fts. The first servant pointed to a table where the bread lay vered with the cloth. The second servant produced a basket th the wheat and flax as they had been given him. And he was eatly ashamed. So, when God gave the Law to Israel, He gave to them like wheat to be made into flour and like flax to be made to a garment.'

The parable, which belongs to the Rabbinists' controversy with e Karaites, a sect of Jews who accepted the Biblical laws but jected the Rabbinic laws, defines the historic relation between harisaic and Biblical Judaism, saying explicitly that the Law as not a static revelation, that Judaism not only admits, but de- lands, development. By applying the principle of Pharisaism, ough in a different way and with different results, Liberal Juda- n preserves the Jewish feeling for the Law without imprisoning ought and practice within its letter. It maintains belief in the aw as a whole without being compelled to follow every detail in It can believe in the Bible without accepting the first chapter *Genesis* as a factual record of creation, or feeling obliged to oid garments made of a mixture of cotton and wool. It can

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believe that the Law contains a revelation without believing that every detail in it accurately expresses God's mind.

In its general attitude to ceremonies Liberal Judaism follows the Judaism of the Prophets. They gave the ritual aspect of religion only secondary place; some of them seem to have given it no place at all. The central concern of Prophetic Judaism was the relation between God and men, established by men's inner realization of God, 'the knowledge of God in the heart,' and producing conduct characterized by justice, mercy and humility. There was, however, something more than the negative objection to ceremonies in the prophets' attitude to them; it affirmed the immediate relation between God and men.

Pharisaism, too, emphasized the immediate relation between God and every individual. The Law established it. Coming from God it could, through study and obedience, be appropriated by everyone. It was not too simple for the wise, nor too difficult for the simple. But the Law developed a mediatory significance. Moreover, after the destruction of the Temple, Pharisaism preserved the priestly element in Judaism by maintaining through study and in prayer the memory of the sacrifices of the Temple, with the belief in their atoning power.

Liberal Judaism eliminates the whole of the priestly element in Judaism. It affirms an immediate relation between God and men, a relation which enables every man to go straight to God, so that God is moved to forgive sin by the penitence of the sinner and to pour out His grace on the suppliant by virtue of his supplication. God gives men and humanity His co-operation in the process of spiritual fulfilment which is called salvation.

This view of the relation between God and men implies the historic Jewish doctrine of man, which ascribes a divine quality to every man, while recognizing the elements in his constitution which may lead him to sin. Not sin but the danger of sinning is part of the human inheritance. So, too, is the possibility of virtue. The ultimate destiny of man with the conquest of sin and the fulfilment of his life lies in the hereafter. In the Judaism of the past the hereafter meant life after death, or life in the resurrection of the Messianic age, or both. For Liberal Judaism it means only the first. It does not teach the belief in resurrection, nor the belief in the coming of a personal Messiah. On the other hand, it maintains the hope for a Messianic age when humanity's destiny will be consummated, through the full recognition of God's rule, in the establishment of His Kingdom on earth; the time when 'the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea,' when under the guidance and impulse of that knowledge men and nations shall live in peace and righteousness.

hat was the Prophetic ideal. Liberal Judaism emphasizes it. Its moteness from actuality does not refute it but only makes it ore urgent.

In another respect Liberal Judaism returns to Prophetic Judan. It gives prominence to the belief in the religious function of rael, the Jews' mission to the world. It may be defined as the ligation to contribute the distinctive ideas of Judaism to the velopment of the world's religious thought, and the influence of daism to the spiritual and moral evolution of humanity. How r the mission entails the duty to seek individual proselytes to daism is a question to which those who speak authoritatively for beral Judaism might give divergent answers, though they would l agree that it should receive genuine proselytes gladly. But the ission of Israel involves more than the conversion of individuals; aims to influence the world, it is a collective function of the Jews the collective life of humanity.

Liberal Judaism, therefore, conceives Judaism as a universal ligion. It is universal in the sense that it has a message for the brld; it is universal also in the sense that it can be at home everynere in the world. In the Orthodox interpretation of Judaism needs Palestine; only there can it be lived fully. Only in rusalem might the Temple be rebuilt and its services restored. beral Judaism excludes the hope for the restoration of the emple with its sacrifices. Whatever pressure Palestine may rough historic memory exercise on the sentiment of the Jews, e Jewish religion long ago ceased to be bound to Palestine. The brld is its home.

In its conception of God, Liberal Judaism maintains, uncomomisingly, the Jewish emphasis on His unity. It enhances that ity, however, by importing into it a new meaning, added to the d one and implicit in it. God's unity is not only numerical, it is also tegral. It means not only that there is only one God, not two or ore, from whom the universe emanates and under whose dominion endures, but also that the one God is indivisible and unanalysle, having neither parts nor aspects, being one and the same roughout and in all aspects, manifesting Himself in an infinite mber of ways but being the same in all His manifestations. He s an infinite number of attributes, but they are unified in His ity. Love and justice, mercy and righteousness, are in Him ended into a harmony, without the conflict or contrast they frently present in men. God is loving and just, with love in His stice and justice in His love. As Montefiore wrote:

> 'His character or being is harmonious. We with our human needs split up that character or being into attributes or qualities; we speak of His justice, His mercy, His righteousness, His love. But the unity of God makes us believe that all these qualities are essentially one. There

> is no opposition between justice and mercy, between righteousness and love. The whole harmonious divine being of God is operative in all His actions. Something like this is the main religious signification to us today of the dogma of the divine unity.'

It is, I think, fair to say that in this development of the idea of the unity of God, Liberal Judaism has made a distinctive contribution to Jewish Theism, which Orthodox Jews, too, would probably accept.

To sum up. In expounding any form of Judaism religious observance must be given a large place. Different forms of Judaism are distinguished from one another in the first place by differences in their respective Synagogue services, by the religious institutions they maintain in their corporate lives, and by the religious observances they require from their adherents. These matters are prescribed in the Law. Differences about them ultimately, therefore, involve, and issue from, differences in the attitude to the Law. Liberal Judaism maintains the Law idea but it rejects the authority of the Law. It holds the belief that God sends His revelations to men in line with their spiritual, intellectual and moral development. The Law, therefore, contains a progressive revelation and is itself the chief part, and the symbol, of a larger progressive revelation. As a result Liberal Judaism maintains some of the ceremonies and institutions in the Law, but ignores others. Like the Prophets, it gives to ceremonies only a subsidiary place in Judaism, valuing them only as they serve to stimulate and express the Jewish feeling for God in the individual Jew, to promote the service of God by truth, righteousness and love, and to maintain the religious unity of the Jews for their collective religious mission to the world. To the Judaism of the past, it adds the recognition of modern thought and the application to present circumstances.

Liberal Judaism is historic Judaism developed historically. It follows the Prophets in its attitude to ceremonies and its emphasis on the immediate relation between God and men. It follows Pharisaism in its idea of a developing revelation. And it uses modern thought in expressing the fundamental Jewish conceptions about God, man, the universe, and the relations between them. It rejects the authority of tradition for the sake of a higher authority, truth. Though based on the Law, the revelation which God gave to Israel, it is not bound to all its regulations and ideas. In this way Liberal Judaism meets the intellectual problems which the development of human thought has imposed on all the historic religions, and which, in the case of Judaism with its many ancient religious rites, has been aggravated and complicated by changes in the life of the Jews. It is a presentation of Judaism developed out of the past, enriched by the present, and ready for the future.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL THINKING

By the Rev. F. R. Tennant, D.D., B.Sc., F.B.A.,
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

AS Miss Emmet observes in *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*,* contemporary philosophers are not producing etaphysics or systems interpreting 'the nature of things.' This ct does not imply that the age-long metaphysical quest is either in or defunct; but if, as Miss Emmet's recent book endeavours shew, metaphysics has been, and can only be, an interpretation science, history, religion, etc., in terms of analogies, it will be t a vain attempt to discover the nature of ultimate reality.

Metaphysical questions are 'questions about reality.' As eality' is often used as a synonym for 'actuality,' denoting the orld as known by common sense, and this is regarded by many ilosophers as but phenomenal of the reality which metaphysics quires about, it is advisable, for avoidance of ambiguity, to de- ne metaphysics as concerned with *ultimate* reality. It is promised at in this book 'reality' will be used as meaning 'that which is eeded over and above other propositions in order to make true tegorical propositions true'; and this requisite is 'what is, in me sense, "matter of fact."' But is there any other sense of natter of fact,' apart from purely psychical events, than the ysical objects and their connexions of which common sense and npirical science speak? If not, and I do not see how there can , reality, as Miss Emmet has defined it, should be identical with hat I have distinguished as actuality, and that alone. Meta- ysics would then be nothing other than science, or at most a *ientia scientiarum* : a conclusion happening to be the same as what implied if metaphysics consists solely of analogies derived from e sciences.

Various types of analogy are described, distinguished and aluated in chapter i; but before the subject of analogical think- g can be further discussed excursion into the field of theory of owledge is found necessary; and this is undertaken in the fol- wing chapters.

The first question to arise is as to what are the *data* of experi- ce, that being the totality of mental functionings, or the psychi-

* *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*. By Dorothy M. Emmet. (Mac- llan & Co. Ltd., 1945; price 10*s*. 6*d*.)

cal life. These data, as is stated on p. 19, are usually said to be sensations. The author continues:

> 'But "sensation" may be used in two ways. (*a*) It may be used to mean "sensa" or sense-data, as contents of awareness (*e.g.* colours, sounds, smells). This can be called the phenomenological meaning. (*b*) It may be used to mean processes of sensing. This can be called the physiological meaning.'

I will venture to say that this latter meaning is a very improper meaning, if it be a generally received meaning of 'sensation' at all, which I doubt. The 'processes of sensing' which it is said to denote are not processes *of* sensing, in the former sense, but are cerebro-neural events accompanying it. What physiologists may have miscalled 'sensibility' is really neural irritability, a physical process disparate from a mode of consciousness. As for the term 'phenomenological,' used frequently elsewhere as well as in the passage I have quoted, where the reader would probably have expected to meet with the word 'psychological,' its meaning for the author needs to receive comment. As is stated on p. 37, 'phenomenalism' is a name which has been used to cover the views of different philosophers — the view of Kant concerning physical objects and the views of such as in this book are called logical empiricists [*e.g.* Berkeley?] and logical positivists [*e.g.* Mach?] concerning sensations. The word is thus comparable with 'lawn,' which denotes a plot of turf and the material of a bishop's sleeves. As the original and historical meaning of 'phenomenalism' is the Kantian, and his phenomenalism has nothing in common with the doctrine of the other philosophers, one can only say that these have been miscalled phenomenalists. They should have received one or more of the names subjective idealist, sensationalist, and solipsist.

It is only from the so-called phenomenalism of Mach, etc., that the adjective 'phenomenological,' as used in this book, can have been derived, so a phenomenological meaning of 'sensation' should imply that sensations are changes in the subject, and not objects presented to the subject. This implication is recognized and definitely asserted on p. 64. But phenomenalism is identified (pp. 9, 37) with analysis of experience into sensations and ideas derived therefrom; and from these two premisses it follows that any use of sensations as data of experience and knowledge involves the view that sensations are subjective. And that, of course, is not true: the developement of knowledge of the external world from sense-data has been described by psychologists who give good reasons for regarding sensations as objective elements in individual experience. Miss Emmet seems not to have come to a decision as to whether sensations are subjective or objective. Her

statements hitherto noticed seem to involve the former view; but there are others in which approval is bestowed on the view that experience contains elements which are not due to our own activity [but are thrust upon us, willy-nilly, so to say] and may be due to some external world.' Her recognition of the difference between perception and conception, and her estimations of realism and idealism respectively, seem also to imply belief in the objectivity of sensations.

There seems to me to be a similar vacillation or oscillation as to adoption of the psychological or of the psychophysical standpoint and mode of procedure, and in the evaluation of them. They are not on a par, in respect of relevance to the epistemologist's business, though they seem here and there to be treated as if they were. From the psychological point of view, and *in ordine cognoscendi*, sensation is fundamental: from the point of view of physiology, and *in ordine essendi*, if physiology were right in regarding nerve-stimulation as the cause or spring of sensation, sense-perception is (as is said on p. 93) superficial. The psychological method is said to have the advantage (p. 19), and it is

> 'very inviting to give an account of sense-perception in purely phenomenological [psychological] terms' (p. 60): 'we shall go most of the way,' it is promised (p. 40), 'in accepting a phenomenalist account of the contents of experience.'

On the other hand, Miss Emmet clings to what Whitehead calls 'the witness of the body,' and finds value in his description of a percipient organism as bipolar, which seems to imply that mental and physical activities are integrated into one actuality, and that mind arises out of physical activities and is through them (rather than through the objectivity of sensations) in contact with the world. Miss Emmet tells us that she cannot see, without thus invoking psychophysics, how perceptions can supply knowledge of a physical world transcending the percipient. Is not this due to adoption, for the time being, of the view that sensations are subjective? When, for the time being, she adopts the opposite view, she speaks as if sensations were the primary form of what 'transcends,' or is other than, the subject, and were our first touch with external reality. She candidly confesses that she has not acquired a satisfying view of the nature of apprehension, and I trust that the fault-finding in which I have been exercising myself may have indicated the reason why. Whitehead's mingling of physiology with psychology is perhaps responsible for Miss Emmet's troubles, and the obscurity of some of her paragraphs may possibly be due to the influence, less potent now than formerly, of that teacher; for his books, whatever be their merits, are not models of lucidity. *Apropos* of this I may take occasion momentarily to relieve the

tediousness of my epistemological criticism by a brief anecdote.

> Years ago, when in conversation with an eminent philosopher, I bewailed my philosophical incompetence manifested in my inability to understand much in Dr. Whitehead's writings, and the Professor replied: "My dear sir, you may congratulate yourself: inability to understand Whitehead is the surest sign of clear-headedness!" Whether or not this jest contains truth, I found it comforting.

In chapter iv several inter-related subjects are discussed. One of these is the meaning of 'truth,' and the merits and demerits of the correspondence-theory and the coherence-theory. The objections which are here urged against the former of these theories seem to spring from the author's inability to conceive of any kind of correspondence other than copying. In what sense, it is asked, can an idea correspond to a thing if it is not a copy of the thing? One may answer that ideas of things are abstractions *from* things, and denote one (or more) of the elements constituting the thing. The idea of triangularity, for example, is derived from percepts of three-sided surfaces, by attending exclusively to one feature common to them all: there would seem to be no marvel in its applying to them, or being valid of them, and in that sense 'corresponding.' Relevance, again, is a relation that may properly be called 'correspondence.' A map of Lakeland is not a copy in the sense of picturing its scenery, but it corresponds to the district in that it correctly informs us as to many facts about it. Again, it is asserted (p. 77, *note*) that a proposition can have correspondence to another proposition, but none to a fact. But unless there be something that we can call correspondence between the proposition 'Mr. X. spent the whole of yesterday in London' and the fact that he did so, such that the proposition may be called true, while the proposition 'Mr. X. spent the whole of yesterday in York' is to be called untrue, there surely could be no more significance in human language than in the buzzing of bees: no rationality and no science.

The next question raised is as to the adequacy of such descriptions of scientific theory in idealistic and mathematical terms as have been given by Cassirer and Eddington. These accounts are examined with critical acumen, with learned mastery of abstruse subject-matter, and with as much thoroughness as is consistent with brevity. Rather than accepting them, the author inclines to the view represented by Meyerson, and rightly insists that there are empirical elements involved in the construction of scientific theory, or to be taken account of in such theory, which cannot be reduced to empty concepts or logical relations. As to scientific realism, which regards its models and conceptual entities (*e.g.* electrons) as realities of the ultimate order, I think an equally sound conclusion is reached: the physicist is entitled to say that

Nature, in so far as it is known at present, behaves *as if* the realistic claim were valid, but no more. Science's models, used for the co-ordination of facts and the interpretation of the phenomenal world, are of the nature of analogies.

After the interpretation of scientific thought, religion is discussed. Religious thought, it is truly remarked, is not so impersonal as science. Science, having transcended individual experience (on which, of course, it ultimately depends) through the mediation of intersubjective intercourse, can talk of the public objects (as distinguished from the private objects of unsocialized experience) which are independent of this or that individual's experience. Thus it has attained to a higher degree of 'standardization' of its data than is possible in the case of religion, where there is less of agreement as to method and more play of individual temperament, etc. Moreover, the primary *data* of religious thought are further to seek than those of science. The common conviction that they are immediate cognitions is here (and I think rightly) repudiated, since what is taken to be immediate (unmediated) is that of the mediatedness of which the believer is unaware, and consists of what is truly immediate overlaid with interpretation in terms of received doctrine. Religious experience, however, is said to involve relations with an external power which becomes symbolized in terms of human relationships. It should rather have been said there that that religious experience is believed by religious believers to involve these relations, as the question whether they really exist or are only emotional states is not answered. It is taken up again, however, in the following chapter. The conclusion thus far reached is that the religious mind needs to seek expression in symbols, while recognizing that in whatever sense these symbols convey knowledge of the transcendent it cannot be in the sense of literal description.

In the succeeding chapter, on revelation and faith, the important question which, as I have said, was not answered in the context in which it was presented, is neither directly nor categorically answered. It is repeated that religion and theology spring from

> 'states of mind in which a peculiarly vivid kind of awareness and responsiveness to reality beyond ourselves seems to give insight into its nature,'

and all that is added, relevant to the question as put in its present form is

> 'And *if* (italics are mine) we are right in suggesting that one characteristic of such states is awareness of reality as qualitatively other than ourselves, and as having some absolute character which impresses and challenges us' [then . . . .]

The reader would desire to learn how, if there is 'awareness of

reality' in these states of mind, it differs from the immediate acquaintance which was previously repudiated; but he is not told.

Another way in which religious knowledge may conceivably be mediated is by revelation, which is generally understood to be divine communication imparted to particular individuals or communities at specific times and places, and conveying knowledge unattainable by man's natural or unaided faculties. The subject of revelation is fully and efficiently discussed, and the different conceptions of revelation which have been entertained by theologians are described and discriminated. The view represented by Archbishop Temple, that the medium of revelation is events evocative of appreciation, is preferred to the view that it is propositions—truths as they exist in the divine mind. For this preference the good reason is given that a communication is not a revelation unless it is received with comprehension, which involves such assimilation or interpretation as the human mind, with the make-up peculiar to it, can supply. The significance of this observation is further brought out in a subsequent inquiry as to whether an event can carry an interpretation inherent in itself or can only receive interpretation from interpreters. In the latter case, the author observes, there is a difficulty about the elevation of the scriptures or of oecumenical decisions to the status of revelation, inasmuch as their interpretations of the significance of Christ's life are conditioned by the thought-forms and traditions of a particular period.

There is a great difference between the older conceptions of revelation and those of Kirkegaard and Barth. These receive searching criticism. Scornfully independent of philosophy and history, the 'neo-orthodoxy' is found to be based on nothing but ungrounded personal conviction; and the mental state of convincedness 'is certainly no guarantee, in any sphere, that we are not mistaken.' Rational persons will enjoy reading Miss Emmet's courteous castigation of this extreme form of irrationalism.

Revelation, according to Barth, is not apprehended by reason or any natural human faculty, but by faith [difficult to distinguish from credulity], which is a divine gift, enabling its recipients to see the world from the point of view of God. This brings us to the question, what is faith? or rather to the question, what mental attitudes have received, from one quarter or another, the name of 'faith'? These are discerningly discussed. Instances are cited of the use of 'faith' to denote confidence or trust, intellectual assent, belief, voluntary choice of beliefs, acceptance of the higher probability, and response of 'the whole man.' The last of these denotations is preferred to the others. There is yet one more activity, not here mentioned, that has been called faith, viz. *certitude* as to the actuality of what is as yet but imagined—the hoped for and unseen

-and adoption of practical relations thereto which may suceed in inging it from the realm of the ideal into that of known actuality. his is faith as described by the writer of the *Epistle to the ebrews*, and him alone, or nearly so, amongst theologians. It is in to the *Reason* which Kant distinguished from the *Understanding*: it is involved in reliance on the unprovable principles nich underlie inductive science; and it was the precondition of e invention of the steam-engine, etc., and of the discovery of nerica by Columbus.

All that is written in this book concerning theology, science d history is well worth reading. It manifests much wider and per learning than that which is evinced in the field of analytic d genetic psychology, and abounds in sound judgements lucidly pressed.

By way of approaching the main question with which this book concerned—*i.e.* in what sense metaphysics may be held to be th analogical and significant—a chapter is devoted to the nomist attempt to justify an analogical method in metaphysics. would be impossible to condense here the author's excellent position and sound criticism of the theological metaphysics of nomism, so I must confine myself to saying that the conclusion ached is that the analogies of which it makes use fail to afford monstrably pure characterizations of the *ens realissimum*.

The last chapter, save one of less importance and rather of the ture of an appendix, deals with the nature of metaphysical nking. This is said to be concerned with reality transcending perience, but the description of it seems to me to be applicable a *scientia scientiarum* rather than an attempt to ascertain the ture of the ultimate realities or reality of which the actual world, science, may be appearance.

> 'The metaphysician, it is asserted, constructs, with the aid of analogy with "some form of relationship," a model comparable with those of the physicist, which is also called an intellectual form, such as supplies a comprehensive co-ordination of experience. Such a creation must respect empirical facts, but involves evaluation of the "forms of relationship" from which it is derived as being of especial significance or importance for the particular metaphysician.'

I trust that my inability to translate some of the paragraphs of s chapter in terms of my own 'apperceptive system' does not volve misconstruction in the foregoing reproduction, in consed form, of Miss Emmet's doctrine; but if it does not, I fail see how the metaphysics which she discusses differs from ence. As to metaphysics having been, or being compelled to be, nstituted by personal evaluations, I would venture to suggest at this assertion involves exaggeration. It is possible that Plato's

search for the real was motivated partly by his love for beauty of form, Aristotle's by interest in the processes of biological development, Spinoza's by desire to explain the peace which comes from acceptance of the inevitable, and that similar motivations may be assigned in the cases of Descartes, Hegel, and recent philosophers; but I doubt whether this is the whole of the truth. If we take account of the life-histories of the founders of the classical systems, and of the logical relations between the systems of such of them as were more or less contemporaries, we find something more needs to be said. For instance, Spinoza was led, on purely intellectual grounds, to transcend the dualism of Descartes: Leibniz, to overcome what seemed to him intellectual inadequacies in the systems of both Descartes and Spinoza: Kant was 'awakened from his dogmatic slumber' in inherited rationalism by Hume's empiricism, and Hegel was moved to his type of idealism through realising the otiose character of the thing-*per-se* as it was conceived by Kant, who postulated it in order to save himself from idealism.

In conclusion, I would express my doubt as to the tenability of the view that the metaphysical quest *necessarily* involves either personal evaluations of aesthetic and such like kinds or thought-processes of the analogical type alone. It may be an attempt to ascertain to what characterization of ultimate reality the knowledge contributed by the various sciences points us if it does not compel us. At any rate it has reached the negative conclusion that materialism is an impossible ontology. If there should ever emerge a crucial test to decide between dualism and spiritualism, and to decide in favour of the latter of them, it could hardly be said that spirit is an analogical model. If our psychological knowledge precludes the assertion that sensations are either subjective states, or creations out of nothing by their subject, or petty absolutes such as would once have received the name of *causa sui*, there would seem to be no alternative left but to regard them as the outcome of co-operation between subjects and things-*per-se*. There can be a purely intellectual and distinterested inquiry as to whether facts point to the world being a One, or a Many, or a One and a Many: such an inquiry is prosecuted in Ward's *Realm of Ends*. Further instances might be supplied, but these will suffice as illustrations of metaphysical thinking that is neither the outcome of personal predilection nor analogical.

THE MEDIAEVAL PHYSICIAN

By the Rev. John Todd, M.A., F.S.A., Rector of Waterstock, Oxford.

'He that sinneth before his Maker,' writes the author of *Ecclesiasticus*, 'let him fall into the hand of the physician.' d John of Salisbury, that embodiment of twelfth-century learn-, would certainly have agreed that treatment at the hand of the ysician was punishment enough for any sin. This long-suffering iolar had no very exalted ideas of the mediaeval physician. he professors of the theory of medicine,' he says, 'are very nmunicative. They will tell you all they know, and perhaps out their great kindness, a little more . . . But I must say nothing iss of them. It pleaseth God for the punishment of my sins to fer, and to fall too frequently into their hands. They must be thed and not exasperated, that I may not be treated roughly my next illness.'

Nor is the good bishop alone in his unfavourable estimate of mediaeval physician, for a poem written in the early days of ward III describes 'these false fisiciens that helpen men to ,' and in the *Vision of Piers the Plowman*, William Langland n calls them murderers who cause men to die before their time :

> 'For mortherers aren mony leches, lord hem amende!
> Thei do men deye thorw here drynkes, ar destinie it wolde.'

r had Margaret Paston any confidence in the London physi-ns of her day, for on June 8th, 1464, she wrote anxiously to husband : 'Also for Goddys sake be war what medesyns ye e of any fysissyns of London; I schal never trust to hem be-use of your fadr and myn onkyl, whos sowlys God assoyle.'

This mistrust of the mediaeval physician was not without some tification, for judging by the remedies which they commonly scribed, it is marvellous that any patient escaped death at the tor's hands. After the death of Galen, the last and, with the ception of Hippocrates, the greatest of Greek physicians, in A.D., Greek medicine rapidly declined and entered upon its rk Age, and the Byzantine medical writers who followed Galen e largely either mere compilers or ignorant quacks. Even xandra of Tralles, brother of the architect of S. Sophia's, Con-ntinople, and one of the greatest Byzantine medical writers in sixth century, relies on charms and amulets, of which the owing are good examples :

> 'An amulet for quartan ague which I have proved by many experiments. Take a live dung beetle, put him in a red rag and hang him about the patient's neck. A green lizard together with the parings of the patient's nails may be used instead of the beetle.'

'For epilepsy take a nail of a wrecked ship, make it into a bracelet and set in it the bone of a stag's heart taken from its body, whilst alive, and put it on the left arm. You will be astonished at the result.'

The Anglo-Saxon and early Norman physicians drew their knowledge from the *leechdoms* or medical books of Saxon times, many of which have been preserved. They provide curious reading, for they have a prescription, or rather a charm, for almost every conceivable disease. The lunatic or 'fiend-sick man' had to drink his concoction out of a church bell whilst the mass-priest sang over him: *Domine, Domine, Sancte Pater omnipotens* . . . Even for troubles of a domestic origin the Saxon physician was able to prescribe a remedy:

Against a woman's chatter take at night, fasting, a root of radish.

Many a man must eagerly have devoured his radish root, hoping for the best, but it is doubtful whether many men troubled to try the following:

In case a woman suddenly turn dumb, take pennyroyal and rub it to dust, wind it up in wool and lay it under the woman. It will soon be well with her.

Meanwhile the standard of medical knowledge was rising considerably in the Southern Italian city of Salerno. There the Greek medical tradition had probably never really died out, and for more than two hundred years, from the eleventh to the end of the thirteenth century, Salerno was a vigorous centre of medical education. Here compulsory examinations in medicine were introduced, and in 1231 the Emperor Frederick II, *Stupor Mundi*, forbade anyone to practise or to teach medicine until they had passed an examination held by the Masters of Salerno.

'Considering the harm which may arise from the ignorance of physicians,' ran the decree, 'we ordain that no one shall henceforth practise physic unless he be first publicly examined by the Masters at Salerno and present testimonials to ourselves or to our representative and receive from us or from him licence to practise.'

It was at Salerno that a famous little book on medical etiquette, *De Adventu Medici*, was written c. 1100 A.D. The author, Archimathaeus, gives excellent advice about the doctor's visit, how the doctor should behave and how the question of the fee might tactfully be introduced at the end of the visit:

'When called to a patient commend yourself to God and to the angel who guided Tobias. On the way learn as much as possible from the messenger, in order that if you discover nothing from the patient's pulse or water, you may still astonish him, and gain his confidence by your knowledge of the case.

'On arrival, ask his friends whether the patient has confessed, for if you do so after the examination it will frighten him . . . Next proceed to feel his pulse, remembering that it may be affected by your arrival, or the patient, being a miser, by his thinking of the fee . . . Tell the patient that you will cure him by God's help, but inform his friends that the case is a most serious one. When the patient is nearly well, address

the head of the family, or the sick man's nearest relative, thus: God Almighty having deigned by our aid to restore him whom you asked us to visit, we pray that he will maintain his health, and that you will give us an honourable dismissal.'

But what did as much as anything else to spread the fame of lerno was a little work which was written, probably c. 1200 A.D., led *Regimen Sanitatis* or *Flos Medicinae*. It is a didactic em written in leonine hexameters, and gives a number of die- ic and hygienic precepts. It must have been a perfect boon to mediaeval physician, and few works have had so large a cir- ation as these rhyming prescriptions. The *Regimen* has been nslated into most languages and has passed through at least hundred and forty editions! Many a piece of homely wisdom, l repeated, has its origin in the *Regimen* of Salerno.[1]

The mediaeval physician did not enjoy a reputation for ortho- xy. 'His studie was but litel on the Bible,' says Chaucer de- ibing his Doctour of Phisik, and John of Mirfield, a contem- rary of Chaucer, and physician at S. Bartholomew's Priory, ndon, wrote: 'If the physician is a good Christian, which rarely opens . . . '*quod raro accidit*. There is no doubt that the un- thodoxy of some of the mediaeval physicians was largely due to influence of Averroism at Bologna and at the sister University Padua, for after the eclipse of the medical school of Salerno, se two universities became medical schools second only to ntpellier in importance. In Bologna and Padua was taught only Arabic medicine but Arabic astrology and Arabic philo- hy. Most famous of Arabic philosophers was Averroës, whose ching (whatever it might be philosophically) was popularly an eistic pantheism. 'There cannot be the slightest doubt,' says shdall (*Mediaeval Universities*, Vol. i, p. 264), 'that under the ne of Averroism a thinly-veiled materialism, which treated the st fundamental doctrines of Christianity with no more respect n the myths of paganism, became fashionable amongst the cul- ted physicians . . . particularly in that north-east corner of y which included Bologna and her twin-sister the Venetian versity of Padua.' The mediaeval student, studying his medi- e in such an atmosphere, could hardly escape the influence of unorthodox teaching, and it was almost certainly in Bologna Padua that the proverb '*Ubi tres medici, duo athei*' arose. vertheless, the Church made use of the mediaeval physician its own ends, for in order to make auricular confession uni- sal, the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 decreed that it was

[1] '*After dinner rest a while, after supper walk a mile,*' is from the *Regimen*. lso '*Joy, Temperance and Repose, slam the door on the doctor's nose,*' h appears in the *Regimen Sanitatis* as:

Si tibi deficiant medici, medici tibi fiant
Haec tria, mens laeta, requies, moderata dieta.

the duty of every physician to induce the patient to confess, and this law was later re-enacted more strictly by Pope Pius V who, in 1566, decreed that if the patient had not confessed by the third day, and did not furnish a written certificate to that effect, the physician must abandon him.[2]

Much of the medical practice of the Middle Ages was in the hands of Jewish physicians, and these Jewish doctors were far ahead of their Christian contemporaries in the healing art. They were forbidden by Canon Law to attend Christians, for the Church feared the influence which the Jewish physician might gain over his Christian patient, but in practice, dispensations and permits were so easily obtained that the prohibition was largely nullified, and the Popes were glad to avail themselves of the medical skill of the Jews. In 1290 the Jews were banished from England, but in the reign of Henry IV certain Jewish physicians were allowed to return to this country. In 1409 the celebrated Dick Whittington received permission to send for a Jewish doctor, and Maistre Sampson of Mierbeaue (probably Mirabeau in the south of France) came to attend his wife Alice. Next year Henry IV was so ill that foreign medical aid was deemed necessary, and Elias Sabot, '*doctor in artibus medicinarum*,' was brought from Bologna. Elias did not succeed in healing the king, for in 1412 David di Nigarelli of Lucca was summoned, and given 80 marks per annum for his services. This physician was apparently more successful than his predecessor, for not only was he made Warden of the Royal Mint, *physicus et custos monetae regis*, but was also granted naturalization, the first Jew to be naturalized in this country.

To-day we are familiar with women doctors, but in the Middle Ages women were not so successful in obtaining recognition in the medical world. In 1322 a woman named Jacoba Felicie was arraigned before the Court of Justice in Paris by the Dean and Masters of the Faculty of Medicine, charged with having practised in the city and suburbs contrary to an ancient ordinance forbidding anyone to do so who had not studied and received the degree of Master of Medicine from the faculty in Paris, and been approved by the Chancellor.

In England Henry IV was petitioned by 'your poor bedeswoman Joan' to be allowed to practise, but with what result we do not know, although we can guess. Apparently some women were practising, for in 1421 the physicians petitioned Parliament that no man should be allowed to practise physic without having graduated in 'the scoles of Fisyk withynne som Universitee . . . undur peyne of long emprisonement and paynge XL li. to the kyng; *and that no Woman use the practyse of Fisyk undre the same payne.*'

[2] Lea, *History of Auricular Confession*, Vol. I, p. 263.

An essential part of a mediaeval physician's training was the udy of astrology. Phlebotomy or blood-letting could only be rformed when the moon was in a certain phase, and the surgeon ust study the stars carefully, for an operation could be performed ly when the planets were favourable. Even such a modern-inded man as Roger Bacon declared that astrology was 'the tter part of medicine,' and the great surgeon, Guy de Chauliac 298—1368), attributed the Black Death to the conjunction of ree planets, Saturn, Jupiter and Mars in Acquarius on March th, 1345. That racy physician and traveller, Andrew Boorde, iting in the reign of Henry VIII, had a contempt for those edical men who did not know their astrology. 'If phisicions had thing to do with Astronomy, Geomatry, Logicke and other iences, Coblers, Curriars of lether, Carpenters and Smithes and such maner of people wold leave their craftes and be phisicions, it apereth now a daies that many coblers be; fie on such ones. . . Above all things, next to grammer, a phisicion must have rely his Astronomy, to know how, when and at what time every edicine ought to be ministered.'[3]

The planet most propitious to blood-letting and to the taking medicine was Jupiter. Consequently the sign of Jupiter (rather ke the figure 2 with a stroke across the lower part) was prefixed to e mediaeval prescriptions. This sign has been corrupted into the tter R with a stroke across the tail, and to this day physicians ite this latter sign before their prescriptions, a curious little sur-val testifying to the great part which astrology once played in edicine.

Another essential qualification of the mediaeval physician was e ability to diagnose disease by the inspection of the patient's ine, and the urine-flask, a glass flask of peculiar shape, became e emblem of the medical profession. For a physician 'to cast e water' was as common an act as to take a temperature to-day, d the phrase is used by Shakespeare in the sense of diagnosing disease. Macbeth is speaking to his physician about the state of otland and says:

> 'If thou couldst, doctor, cast
> The water of my land, find her disease,
> And purge it to a sound and pristine health,
> I would applaud thee to the very echo.'

In Oxford may be seen on a buttress of the cloisters on the west le of the quadrangle of Magdalen College, a splendid stone ure of a fifteenth century physician erected in 1506. He is per-rming a uroscopy and is examining intently the flask in his right

[3] The Breviare of Health: Wherein doth folow remedies for all maner of knesses and diseases the which may be in Man or Woman. Expressing the scure termes of Greke, Araby, Latin, Barbary and English, concerning isick and Chirurgerie. Compyled by Andrewe Boorde, Doctor of Phisicke, Englishman. 1547.

hand, whilst with his left he clutches his purse and side of his gown.

The first teacher of medicine in Oxford, whose name has survived, was Nicholas de Tyngewick, who lectured in the Physick School, the site of which is now occupied by the west cloisters of All Souls'. Tyngewick was physician to Edward I, and in 1307 attended the king in his last illness. The drugs used by the royal physician included a comforting electuary made with ambergris, musk, pearls, jacinths, pure gold and silver, oils of wheat, ash and bay, water of roses of Damascus and wine of pomegranates. The apothecary's bill for these medicines amounted to £134 16s. 4d., and the cost of taking them from London to Carlisle was £159 11s. 10d. This was indeed medicine fit for a king! The papal remedy for gout, although less expensive, was no less strange. Pope John XXI, who became pope in 1276 (the only Portuguese to attain that office) was a physician before his elevation to the papacy. He compiled a book of remedies, *Thesaurus Pauperum*, which became the most popular medical handbook in the Middle Ages. Here is the Pope's prescription for gout:

> 'Take a very fat puppy and skin him, then take juice of wild cucumber, rue, pellitory, ivy berries, juniper berries, euphorbium, castoreum, fat of vulture, goose, fox and bear, equal parts, and stuff the puppy therewith. Then boil him. Add wax to the grease that floats on the surface and make an ointment. Or, if you like, take a frog when neither sun nor moon is shining. Cut off its hind legs and wrap them in deer skin. Apply the right leg to the right foot and the left leg to the left foot of the gouty person, and without doubt he will be healed.'

The papal remedy was not exactly attractive, but at any rate, it was preferable to an operation at the hands of a mediaeval surgeon. Lanfrank of Milan (d. 1315) was the greatest surgeon of his day and taught in the famous College of S. Côme in Paris. His method of treating a malignant ulcer was to cut away the corrupt flesh and bone with a hot iron, but he admits that a patient will not stand this treatment for long, 'a man schal not bere a cauterie but ii monthis outher iii at the mooste.' For headaches he recommends the use of hot irons on the back of the head 'whaune the akynge of a mannes heed wole not go awei,' and he tells us that by this method he cured a woman 'that hadde passiouns in hir head manie divers' when all other remedies failed. Doubtless the aches vanished as the hot irons approached! Have we not known the tooth stop aching when we reach the dentist's door?[4]

[4] There was a much pleasanter way of curing a headache. Amongst the relics kept in S. Bartholomew's Hospital, Oxford, was the comb of S. Edmund the Martyr. Anyone suffering from headache would be cured if he combed his head with this comb. The cult of relics must often have been a successful rival of the mediaeval physician.

But it was not only the patient who ran risks at the hands of the ediaeval physician; the mediaeval physician also ran risks at e hands of the patient, for if he failed to effect a cure he might id himself in a very unpleasant situation. Even as early as the ode of Hammurabi, c. 2000 B.C., the surgeon who bungled an peration paid a frightful penalty:

> 'If a doctor has treated a man for a severe wound with a bronze lancet and has caused the man to die, or has removed a cataract of the eye for a man with the bronze lancet, and has caused the loss of the man's eye, one shall cut off his hands.'

So the mediaeval physician who undertook to cure a patient id failed, might have to pay dearly for it. True, the penalty was ot always as drastic as that meted out by King John of Bohemia, e blind king who was killed at the Battle of Crecy, for that royal atient had his physician sewn up in a sack and thrown into the iver Oder because he had failed to cure the king's cataract.

On December 6th, 1436, William Frauncey of Nottingham ok action against Robert Wawne who had undertaken to cure gnes, wife of William, and for which he had been paid eleven ence in advance. William complained that the medicine had arly killed the aforesaid Agnes (which we can well believe), 'to e grievous damage of the said William'; and in the same Court, 1482, Richard Brown complained of Thomas Bell, surgeon, at he had failed to cure his leg 'before the Feast of Whitsuntide xt following,' although he had contracted to do so. Even the eat William Clowes, Sergeant Surgeon to Queen Elizabeth, on ebruary 2nd, 1575, had to pay twenty shillings for having failed cure a patient.

Of course there were quack doctors in those days as in these, d the punishment meted out to Roger Clerk of Wandsworth ght well be revived for his successors.

In 1382 Johanna, wife of Roger atte Hacche was ill, and Roger erk undertook to cure her.

> 'Whereupon the said Roger atte Hacche, trusting in his words, gave him twelve pence, in part payment of a larger sum, which he was to pay him in case the said Johanna should be healed. And upon this, the same Roger Clerk, then and there, gave to the said Roger atte Hacche an old parchment, cut or scratched across, being the leaf of a certain book, and rolled up in a piece of gold cloth, asserting that it would be very good for the fever and ailments of the said Johanna; and this parchment so rolled up, he put about her neck, but in no way did it profit her; and so, falsely and maliciously, he deceived the same Roger atte Hacche. And he produced the said parchment here in court, wrapped up in the same cloth in proof of the matters aforesaid.
>
> 'And the said Roger Clerk personally appeared, and the said parchment was shown to him by the Court, and he was asked what the virtue of such a piece of parchment was; whereupon he said that upon it was

written a good charm for fevers. Upon being asked by the Court what were the words of this charm of his, he said: *Anima Christi, sanctifica me; Corpus Christi, salva me; in isanquis Christi, nebria*[5] *me; cum bonus Christus tu, lava me.* And the parchment being then examined, not one of those words was found written thereon. And he was then further told by the Court that a straw beneath his foot would be of just as much avail for fevers as this said charm of his; whereupon he fully granted that it would be so. And because the same Roger Clerk was in no way a literate man, and seeing that on the examination aforesaid, as well as on other afterwards made, he was found to be an infidel and altogether ignorant of the art of physic or of surgery; and to the end that people might not be deceived and aggrieved by such ignorant persons . . .'[6]

Roger was led through the city with trumpets and pipes, riding on a horse without a saddle, with the parchment and a whetston (the symbol of a liar) hung round his neck, and hanging in front of him the unseemly emblem of the medical profession.

The fees of the mediaeval physician varied considerably. Henry VI and Henry VII paid £40 a year to their physicians, whilst Edward III paid £100 to one and only £20 to another. John of Arderne, who had much experience as a surgeon in the Hundred Years' War, never charged less than a hundred shillings for the cure of a fistula, and said that a great man ought to be charged 100 marks (£66 13s. 4d.), or £40 with robes and a hundred shillings a year for life. Nicholas Colnet and Thomas Morstede, the physician and the master-surgeon in the army of Henry V when that king landed in Normandy in 1415, received twelve pence a day and a share of the loot, but Morstede's twelve assistant-surgeons received sixpence a day each, the same pay as an archer. Considering that a labourer received a penny a day, this pay was really liberal. It was customary for the mediaeval physician to receive part of the payment in advance, and if the doctor failed to make a contract with his patient he might lose his fees altogether.

Mox fugit a mente medicus, morbo recedente.

It is a long journey from the mediaeval physician to his modern representative, and no profession has changed more since the Middle Ages than the medical. To-day no profession exhibits such a combination of scientific efficiency and unselfish service, and anyone who has experienced both at the hands of a wise physician or a skilful surgeon will agree with the graceful tribute which Seneca paid to his doctor, *Pretium operae solvitur, animi debetur; We may pay for the work, but to the spirit behind it we are still in debt.*

[5] Evidently for *sanguis . . . inebria.*

[6] Riley, *Memorials of London in the 14th and 15th centuries.*

THE RESURRECTION

By P. Gardner-Smith, B.D., Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge.

NEVER did the world stand in greater need of the Christian Gospel of the Resurrection than it does to-day. Even in this untry, which has been spared many of the worst horrors of war, e feel that the old order is dead; whilst on the continent, torn d ravaged by six long years of war, civilization itself is in nger of extinction. Can these bones live? We may talk bravely, htly perhaps, of the need for reconstruction, but how many asp the immensity of the task? It is not only cities and buildngs at have been shattered. The Christian Church still presents its ernal message of hope, but as we look at Poland and Holland d Greece and Germany its witness seems heroic.

In a more personal and intimate sense the Easter message nfronts the world. We do not know yet, indeed we shall never ow, how many human lives have been sacrificed to Hitler's mad mbition, but for the second time in thirty years Rachel stands eeping for her children. Have so many young lives been snuffed t by the sad finality of death? Or can we still take assurance in e Church's resurrection faith and believe that death is the gate life?

It has been remarked during the present war that letters of ndolence seldom emphasize, or even mention, the Christian pe. Sometimes it is assumed, but in many cases the tacit admis-n is made that the future is altogether dark. The majority of ose who have lost their friends no longer reason from the resur-ction of Christ to that of His followers. They may be consoled the thought of duty bravely done, but they sorrow as men with-t hope for them that sleep. Even among those who profess and ll themselves Christians the resurrection faith has burned dim. d there is a lurking suspicion that the Persian poet was right:

> 'One thing is certain and the Rest is Lies—
> The Flower that once has blown for ever dies.'

For many reasons, therefore, the appearance of a new book on e Resurrection of Christ is timely, and the publishers of the ristian Challenge series are to be congratulated both upon the ection of a subject and of an author to treat it with firm faith d sound scholarship.[1] Professor Michael Ramsey calls his book

[1] *The Resurrection of Christ.* An Essay in Biblical Theology. By Michael msey, Van Mildert Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham and non of Durham Cathedral.

'An Essay in Biblical Theology,' and his primary object is to examine the place of the Resurrection in the thought of the early Church. This he does with obvious competence. The conviction that Jesus Christ had been raised from the dead was not merely one among the many distinctive beliefs of the apostolic writers, it was the vital assurance on which all else was founded.

> 'We are tempted to believe that, although the Resurrection may be the climax of the Gospel, there is yet a Gospel that stands upon its own feet and may be understood and appreciated before we pass on to the Resurrection. The first disciples did not find it so. For them the Gospel without the Resurrection was not merely a Gospel without its final chapter; it was not a Gospel at all.'

That is to put it strongly, but Professor Ramsey goes on to justify his statement by a detailed examination of the first Christian preaching, the *kerygma*, which finds expression not only in the recorded speeches in *Acts*, but also in the whole New Testament literature, not least in the four Gospels. In the light of its faith in the Resurrection the early Church knew its Lord, not merely 'after the flesh,' but as revealed, vindicated, and glorified as the divine Saviour of the world. As Sir Edwyn Hoskyns was wont to insist, all study of the theology and ethics of the New Testament must begin with the passages about the Resurrection, for without that there would never have been a New Testament to study.

> 'It is therefore historically and theologically necessary to "begin with the Resurrection." For from it, in direct order of historical fact, there came Christian preaching, Christian worship, Christian belief.'

So much will be freely admitted, except that it would have been more accurate to claim the *belief* in the Resurrection as the foundation of Christian theology. How that belief arose it is one of the objects of this book to reveal.

But a question does arise as to the relation of this early Christian Gospel to the Gospel of the Kingdom preached by Jesus Himself, and this is one of the urgent problems of the day. From the time of Julian it has been objected that the preaching of Jesus was one thing and the teaching of the Church another, and to-day it is not unusual to find the Gospel of Christ contrasted with the Gospel about Christ which has become the foundation of Christian theology. Professor Ramsey faces this question, although his treatment is too brief to be wholly satisfying:

> 'The good news that Jesus preached was the coming of the Reign of God. The Reign had come. Both the teaching and the mighty works of the Messiah bore witness to it. . . . But though the Kingdom was indeed here in the midst of men, neither the teaching nor the mighty works could enable its coming in all its fulness. For the classic enemies — sin and death — could be dealt with only by a mightier blow, a blow which

the death of the Messiah Himself alone could strike. And the righteousness of the Kingdom could not be perfected by a teaching and an example for men to follow; it involved a personal union of men with Christ Himself, a sharing in His own death and risen life.'

o doubt such teaching is in accordance with apostolic thought, .t can it be justified by reference to the authentic utterances of sus? Professor Ramsey writes:

'There is a hint at the identity between the Gospel of Jesus and the person of Jesus in the arresting words, "For my sake and the Gospel's" (*Mark* viii, 36; x, 29).

ıt surely more than this was needed before he could fairly con-ıde

'Thus it was that the Gospel preached by Jesus became merged into the Gospel that *is* Jesus. This is the Gospel which the Apostles preach.'

ıt how much of the apostolic Gospel was really founded on the aching of the Master? And, in particular, is not the central sition of the Resurrection, on which Professor Ramsey insists, mething new in the apostolic witness? Only a few references to e Resurrection can be quoted from the synoptic Gospels, and eir authenticity is not unquestioned.

Professor Ramsey reminds us that the Gospels were not writ-n as biographies in the modern sense. They were written to em-dy the Gospel of salvation through Jesus Christ the Son of God.

'There was one Gospel. In it, amid whatever varieties, the Passion and the Resurrection had the pre-eminent place. And the whole story — ministry, Passion, Resurrection — was told not as a piece of biography but as the drama of God's mighty act as deliverer.'

rhaps he hardly realises that it is just this fact that sometimes akes the Gospels difficult to use as historical sources, for pre-cupation with theology may have seriously influenced the pre-ntation of the history on which it ostensibly rests. As he says, 'the first Christians lived in a double perspective,' and 'it is from this double perspective that all the Apostolic literature was written.'

hat is the trouble. If it is really history that is required, double rspectives are dangerous; and if, for instance, the author of the ourth Gospel was as much preoccupied with the theological inter-etation as Professor Ramsey suggests in chapter vi, it is useless seek for history in his account of the life of Jesus.

The problem of the relationship of history to theology, of fact interpretation, underlies all Professor Ramsey's book. He ates in his Preface:

'In recent years there has been no lack of treatment of the historical problems of the narratives of the Resurrection: but these problems have too often been discussed in separation from the Gospel with which the history is bound up and from the theology which made the story of Easter worth the telling.'

A close study of his book does not make it clear what exactly the writer means. How else but in a spirit of detachment should historical problems be discussed? The first task of the historian is to discover what happened at a particular time, and to the performance of such a task 'theology' is wholly irrelevant. The work of theology is to interpret the facts when they have been determined with reasonable probability, not to influence the judgement of the historical critic. Inasmuch as Christianity is an historical religion this point is of vital importance. The Church has built its creed upon certain events believed to have taken place in a particular period of history, and therefore the Church is deeply concerned with the verdict of the historian as to whether those events did actually occur. But the Church must leave the historian to do his work in his own way, reverently and with a full sense of responsibility, yet fearlessly and impartially, uninfluenced by theological considerations. In some passages Professor Ramsey admits this:

> 'If historical critics have sometimes made the mistake of investigating the history without due appreciation of the theology with which it was linked from the very first, it would be a no less grievous mistake to rest in theological affirmations and to belittle the scope of scientific historical enquiry. It is by their readiness to welcome such enquiry and to participate in it, that the teachers of Christianity make good their claim that the Gospel rests upon fact' (p. 37).

Again,

> 'It is with history that we are concerned. What happened? That is what Christians desire to know. In seeking the answer there is need for the most scientific approach to historical truth that is possible' (p. 55).

Again,

> 'In connection with the Resurrection narratives no difficulty must be ignored; and the possibility must be faced that, here as elsewhere, unreliable and legendary elements may have found their way into the traditions and the documents. The technique of literary and historical criticism, the analysis of sources and of the work of editors, must be employed to the full' (p. 56).

He makes no surrender to the Barthians:

> 'They sometimes appear to deny that the examination of historical evidence had in the Apostolic age, and can have to-day, *any* part in the Resurrection faith. Here it is hard to follow.'
>
> 'It seems wiser to draw back and to attempt the harder task of holding together both the serious treatment of historical evidence and the belief in the living God of the Bible' (p. 120).

Why not indeed? And yet Professor Ramsey seems unable quite to make up his mind. Perhaps more than he realises he is under the influence of theologians who care little for history and who are content to build upon sand. He clings to the idea that history and theology must be somehow intermingled, and he does not make it clear that the tasks of the historian and of the theologian are complementary but distinct. The assertion in his

Preface, 'As to presuppositions it is impossible to write history without them,' is disconcerting, and it is repeated at intervals throughout the book. If it means that no historical critic is capable of judging evidence without prejudice, it will be resented, and so will the tendency to assume that prejudice, when it exists, is always on one side. The author supports his contention with quotations from Lake, Streeter, and Luce, a measure of the importance he attaches to it; but certainly none of these scholars would go so far as to admit the general impossibility of studying history without 'presuppositions,' whatever they may have said on particular points. One is left with an uneasy feeling that Professor Ramsey may be trying to justify by a *tu quoque* argument the influence of theological presuppositions on his own historical judgements. And as to that, what else is meant by his insistence on the danger of discussing historical problems in separation from 'the Gospel'?

In view of the author's admission of the importance of a candid scrutiny of the evidence for the historical fact of the Resurrection it is much to be regretted that within the limits of this little book he was not able to give more space to the critical problems involved. Chapter iii, entitled 'History and Belief,' insists that the New Testament writers evidently regarded the Resurrection as a miraculous act of God and not merely the survival of an individual personality. Something happened which was not expected, something which led directly to the foundation of the Christian Church. The disciples 'became subject to the impact of Jesus Christ, moulding their minds and hearts.' Jesus Himself appeared to them, a fact of which St. Paul is the primary witness. Without question they believed on the evidence of their own experiences that Jesus was yet alive.

But what of the evidence that their conviction was founded, at least in part, on the discovery by the women that the tomb was empty on the third day?

> 'There is no reference to this evidence in documents earlier than the Gospels; and the question arises, Did the empty tomb have a place in the primitive tradition?'

Professor Ramsey thinks with Schmiedel and Lake that the *belief* in the empty tomb is implied in the words of St. Paul, 'how that Christ died . . . and that he was buried . . . and that he hath been raised again on the third day.' This can hardly be disputed, but St. Paul does not say what was the ultimate source of his belief, and the question remains unanswered whether it was an inference from the belief in the Resurrection, or whether it rested on such evidence as afterwards came to be embodied in the Gospels. In any case, the traditions of 55 A.D. are not quite 'primitive.'

After a brief review in chapter iv of some critical theories, Professor Ramsey passes in chapter v to an examination of the Gospels themselves. Here it must be said at once that sixteen pages are quite insufficient to deal in any but the most perfunctory manner with the very complicated questions involved. If from the first the Church's faith had been founded primarily on the discovery of the empty tomb one would have expected the vast importance of that discovery to have controlled the tradition, so that in all essentials the story of the women's visit would have been accurately reported in all the churches. Instead, we have in the canonical Gospels four accounts which differ in almost every particular. Professor Ramsey is well aware of this, and he contrasts the 'utter simplicity' of the Marcan story with the legendary embellishments of Matthew. Yet he makes light of the discrepancies, and claims that 'the presence of embellishments makes it all the more impressive that the stories retain so many signs of a truly primitive perspective,' quoting specially the Marcan narrative and the Lucan story of the walk to Emmaus.

> 'Such are the traditions that we find behind the narratives in the Gospels. Some of them are embellished, and some are strikingly undeveloped. That we should expect to be able to weave the stories into a chronological and geographical plan seems inconceivable. But if we eschew the quest for an external unity between the stories, we can the more perceive the inward unity that belongs to them. They are, with very few exceptions, at one in the *manner* of their testimony; and this is a manner which it is very hard to attribute to anything else except the spiritually subtle nature of the event itself. They are at one in that which they affirm, both by cross-reference and by direct description: the appearances of Jesus and the discovery of the empty tomb. Moreover they are at one also with the primitive Apostolic preaching that Christ was buried and was raised again on the third day.'

This paragraph invites criticism in almost every line. Why should it seem inconceivable that we should expect to be able to weave the stories into a coherent plan? If an event happened at all it happened in only one way, and contradictory accounts cannot all be true, though they may all be false. What exactly is meant by the statement that they are at one in the *manner* of their testimony? What is a 'spiritually subtle event'? It is hardly true to say that the Gospels are at one in affirming the appearance of Jesus, for Mark records no appearance, and the other Gospels do not record the same appearances. That the Gospels are at one with the primitive Apostolic teaching would not be surprising if their accounts were founded as much on that preaching as on any exact recollection of the events themselves.

To the actual examination of the Gospel narratives Professor Ramsey devotes less than twelve pages, and in those pages he includes some discussion of the question of the 'lost ending' of

Mark and an examination of the Galilee and Jerusalem traditions. This brevity is to be regretted because it is only after a more adequate study of the facts that we can hope to reach any firm conclusion as to the place of the empty tomb in the earliest traditions. If, when certain obvious accretions have been cleared away, we can discover a 'primitive tradition' according to which the women found the tomb empty on Easter morning, then we may be constrained to admit that this discovery was in part the foundation of the Church's faith in the Resurrection. But if the several narratives differ widely on matters which might be considered essential, and if we can see in the later evangelists how presuppositions progressively modified earlier traditions so as in fact to falsify history, then we are bound to ask when this process began, and whether the primitive tradition may not have been something quite different from that which appears in any of the Gospels. Professor Ramsey does not deny that traditions may have been developed and corrupted, but he hardly faces the question as to when the process began. Indeed, he has not allowed himself space to deal with the problem at all, and he minimizes its importance.

> 'It is a fascinating study to attempt to harmonize what the evangelists tell us and to essay a reconstruction of the events in an ordered scheme of time and place. Up to a point the attempt may be successful, but a limit is always reached. That this is so need not disturb us, for the right question for the historian who is aware of the nature of the Gospels and their composition is not, Can a harmony be constructed? How utterly suspicious we ought to be if here alone in the whole range of the Gospel narratives, a neat harmony could be provided! No: the right questions are: Can we account for the plan adopted by each evangelist? Do the narratives include primitive traditions? Do these traditions concur with one another in their testimony to the main event? Are these traditions corroborated by other evidence about the primitive preaching of the Apostles? It does not seem to be too confident for us to affirm that the answer to each of the questions is, yes.'

It is difficult to think that any reader who has studied the problems involved will be satisfied with this. No harmonization of the narratives is possible, but this fact 'need not disturb us.' We ought to be 'utterly suspicious' if a neat harmony could be provided. But why? Granted that a firm historical foundation existed, there is no reason why accounts circulating after forty or fifty years should be mutually inconsistent; and 'the right question for the historian' is, What actually happened?

It is worth while to consider the facts. Mark, the earliest evangelist, says that three women came to the tomb to anoint the body of Jesus. Matthew speaks of two women and changes the purpose of their visit. John knows of only one woman, and says nothing of her intentions. Mark records the natural perplexity of the women as to how they should roll away the stone, and their discovery

that it had been rolled away already. Matthew improves on this. Apparently after the arrival of the women there was a great earthquake, and an angel descending from heaven rolled away the stone and sat upon it. Luke merely says that the women found the stone rolled away, but he adds that they entered the tomb and found not the body of Jesus. John differs widely. No sooner does Mary see that the stone is taken away than she runs to inform Peter and the beloved disciple, and it is they who find the tomb empty. All these accounts cannot be true, and Professor Ramsey rejects Matthew's, but where is the 'primitive tradition'? Can we say more than that certain women came to the tomb and found it open?

What then? Mark says that the women entered the tomb (or approached it, for there is an important textual variant); there they saw a young man in white sitting on the right, and they were amazed. The young man reassured them and told them that he knew their errand; the crucified Jesus was not there, he was risen. They must go and tell His disciples and Peter, 'He goeth before you into Galilee, there ye shall see him as he said unto you.'

This is sober narrative. The women met a young man whose presence disconcerted them, as well it might at such an hour and in such a place. He told them that Jesus was not there. When Mark wrote this it was believed that he announced the Resurrection and sent a message ordering the disciples to return to Galilee, where they would see Jesus. But the women cannot have so understood the young man at the time, for they ran away trembling and astonished *and said nothing to anyone*. Whether this was originally the ending of Mark's Gospel or not, the significance of these words can hardly be exaggerated. Professor Ramsey's comment is amazing:

> 'Silence and fear have their own message. They tell us, more than words can, of the overwhelming reality of the Resurrection.'

There is no discussion of the identity of the young man, although the question is vital to the interpretation of the Marcan story. The evangelist probably assumed that he was an angel, but he does not say so, and there is evidence that many in the early days were doubtful. He might have been the risen Lord, and so some supposed. (Hence the doublet *Matt.* xxviii, 9, 10, which repeats the message of verses 5-7; and further evidence for the survival of this belief is provided by *Jn.* xx, 14, where Mary sees Jesus and does not recognize Him. His words are a repetition of the words of the angel, as in *Matthew*, although they are different words.) Or the young man might have been the angel who had rolled away the stone, as Matthew's main tradition makes plain. If he was really an angel, then two angels were more appropriate,

as in *Lk.* xxiv, 4 and *Jn.* xx, 12. But of course it was just possible that he was a human being, perhaps 'the gardener,' as according to *Jn.* xx, 15 Mary at first supposed. The evangelists have woven these alternative explanations into their narratives without realizing that they were alternatives, and the result is confusion.

What did the young man say? The widest divergence is apparent in the traditions embodied in the Gospels, and the only possible conclusion is that the women had no very clear recollection, or if they had it was soon forgotten in the growth of the legend. The discrepancies of the Gospels are clear evidence that, as the story was retold, appropriate words were put into the mouth of the young man, or the angel, or the angels, or the Lord Himself, but little reliance can be put on any of them.

One point Professor Ramsey admits to be important. When Mark wrote, the tradition with which he was familiar supposed that the first manifestation of the risen Christ had been in Galilee, and the young man was believed to have said, 'He goeth before you into Galilee: *there* ye shall see him.' But this perplexed some who believed that the body of Jesus had been raised from the tomb on the morning of the third day. Why should the disciples journey all the way to Galilee to see Him? The 'gap between the experience of the women and the experiences of the disciples who saw Jesus' was not helpful from an apologetic point of view, for it made impossible any checking of the women's story by the disciples. So the tradition was soon modified. Luke flatly contradicts Mark's statement that the women kept silence, and John actually represents Mary as fetching two of the disciples in order that the great discovery may be made, not by 'a half-frantic woman,' as Celsus called her, but by two male witnesses. Moreover, Luke deliberately alters the young man's words into 'Remember how he spake unto you while he was yet in Galilee,' and goes on to describe the appearances of Jesus to the disciples in Jerusalem on the very day of the resurrection. Can anyone seriously doubt which of these traditions is the earlier? Burkitt, in one of his fits of perverse ingenuity, defended the Jerusalem tradition, and he impressed Lake, but the probability seems overwhelming that the earliest stories related the first appearance of Jesus in Galilee. We can see why the primitive Galilee tradition was modified and in the end forgotten; we cannot see why a primitive Jerusalem tradition should have been transferred to Galilee before the time of Mark's Gospel.

Professor Ramsey says:

> 'It is probable that the Galilee theory, in its extreme form, will go the way of many theories that have for a time dominated historical problems.'

But what is there 'extreme' in preferring one of two alternatives

as the more probable? Later appearances in Judaea are not ruled out. But that is not the point. The point is that the earliest tradition which is embodied in *Mark* (and survives, curiously enough, in *Jn.* xxi) put the *first* appearance of Jesus to the disciples (or Peter?) in Galilee. The story of the women became known later, perhaps much later, and its apparent significance was realized; but then it was too late to check the facts, and there was little control of legendary embellishments. The women's experience fitted with the Church's faith that Jesus was risen, but it was not the foundation of that faith.

'The real weakness of the Galilee theory,' says Professor Ramsey, 'is that it rests primarily upon a conjecture as to the contents of the lost ending of *Mark*,' and he is disposed to deny that *Mark* ever had an ending other than xvi, 8. The statement is hard to defend. The Galilee theory rests upon the plain words of *Mark* xvi, 7, 8, which would be quite pointless if the disciples were to see Jesus in Jerusalem before they set forth for Galilee. If the later accounts of Luke and John are to be preferred to the earlier narrative of Mark, which the author calls 'tradition in its pure form,' then it is difficult to see on what principles historical criticism is to be conducted.

The actual course of events may be reconstructed with some confidence. The women went to the tomb, as Mark says, to anoint the body of Jesus. Instead of finding the place deserted at that early hour, as they had expected, they were accosted by a stranger who told them that Jesus was not there. He may have said more, but they were much too frightened to remember his words. Trembling and affrighted, they ran away and told no one of their adventure. The disciples returned to Galilee when the feast was ended, if indeed they had not set forth already. There by the lake they saw Jesus, Peter being specially prominent in the interview which followed, as St. Paul and St. John say. Others had similar experiences, and the conviction was established that Jesus was indeed alive. Then the women told their story; they had been to the tomb on Easter morning and had failed to find the body of Jesus. The inference was inevitable; Jesus had been raised from the grave on the third day. The inference may have been justified, but it *was* an inference, and it was not the origin of the Church's faith in the Resurrection. In Professor Ramsey's own words,

> 'Is it possible that the Apostles' belief that the *body* of Jesus had been raised from the tomb was a false inference derived from Jewish presupposition as to what a resurrection meant, whereas in fact the Resurrection was a survival of the spirit of Jesus?'

The world stands in desperate need of the Gospel of the Resurrection. It longs to know that death is not necessarily the

end of human life, and still more, that the Church was founded in communion with the living spirit of Jesus, and that He is still a living Saviour. Will its need be satisfied if the Church continues to found its case on a number of confused and contradictory stories of an empty tomb? Or should the Church restore the emphasis to that evidence which the Apostles found convincing? That the Apostles and their friends had experience of the presence of Jesus after the crucifixion is attested by the witness of St. Paul, who knew them, by their own subsequent testimony, and by the foundation of the Christian Church. It may be said that few if any events in history are better supported by evidence, and if the witnesses were all mistaken, then no historical testimony can be believed. But whether the tomb was empty or not is a question of secondary importance, and neither assertion nor denial can ever be proved on the basis of the surviving evidence. The same may be said of another vexed question: 'What became of the physical body of Jesus?' What is vital is the fact that Christ overcame death, and for that the evidence is overwhelming. It will be a tragedy if the Church continues to be misled by those who can only see an act of God in a miracle, whether that miracle be well-attested or not.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RESURRECTION AND PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY*

Twelve years ago Messrs. Allen and Unwin Ltd. published a translation of the *Life of Jesus*, by Professor Maurice Goguel. Its reviewer in these pages described it as the most comprehensive, the best-balanced and the most informative book on its subject which had appeared for five years (*M.C.*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 215 and 216). It can safely be said that nothing has appeared since then to supersede Goguel's work in its comprehensiveness and the range of its information.

To his *Life of Jesus* Goguel wrote a sequel, as promised. In the volume which will follow the present work we shall see how a religion grew out of the work of Jesus; all that the early founders did, however, was to develop the feelings and experiences which, directly or indirectly, had been implanted in them through the impression made on them by his person and by his teaching (*La Vie de Jesus*, Eng. Trans. p. 585). Goguel closes his work with these words:—

> 'The faith which Jesus had been able to plant in the hearts of a few men, feeble and hesitating as it was, had roots which were too deep ever to be eradicated. Nothing was finished; in reality everything had just begun. The faith in the Resurrection was about to be born, and with it Christianity, which was destined to conquer the ancient world and to march through the centuries.'

Hence Goguel calls his sequel *The faith in the Resurrection of Jesus in primitive Christianity. A study in religious history and psychology.* The

* *La Foi à la Resurrection de Jesus dans le Christianisme primitif*, by Maurice Goguel. (Leroux, Paris.)

title is significant. To the question what happened in the interval between the crucifixion and Pentecost, tradition has always answered the Resurrection and the Ascension. The evidence for these events in the form of the stories in the gospels of the empty tomb and of the appearances of Jesus has been treated as if it had been submitted by witnesses in a law court who were consciously endeavouring to present a judicial account of events of which they had been accidental observers. The Christian apologist asked that the discrepancies in the evidence should be treated as indications that the witnesses were genuine and that the empty tomb should be accepted as the proof of the resurrection, while the rationalist claimed to show that the evidence is riddled with contradictions and that the empty tomb can be explained by other hypotheses such as that Jesus never died on the cross. This traditional mode of argumentation has never led to any convincing or conclusive result, and never will do so because it is based upon the rationalist's assumption that facts are imposed upon the mind ready-made and that belief is wholly an affair of the intellect. But forty years ago William James, F. C. S. Schiller and Henri Bergson disclosed that what we take as facts are selections from experience prompted by our feelings, emotions and will. All schools of psychology accept this as fundamental. We observe and perceive according to our prejudices and purposes. The will to believe is acknowledged to play a weighty part in all cognitive operations. Our beliefs mould our way of looking at and expressing what we experience, so that the same statement expresses both belief and experience, both fact and faith. Goguel is the first religious historian and theologian to our knowledge to bring this revolution in psychological analysis of the working of the mind to bear upon the problem of the resurrection.

> 'The tradition concerning the resurrection of Jesus, until it settled into its final form in the canonical texts, was like a living organism embodying the most vital elements of primitive Christianity. It expressed its essential nature. It was not merely a statement of certain facts, but expressed certain feelings, a certain state of mind, a certain kind of religious life and experience. That is why it had the power to give birth to a religion. If we confine ourselves to the paths of historical and literary criticism, we shall never get beyond the circumference of the problem and the secret of primitive Christianity will remain beyond our reach. Yet it is just that method which has been most frequently employed. It is not sufficient to study the narratives and the facts which rightly or wrongly they affirm: we must also consider the sentiments, emotions, and ideas which the first Christians implied by the narratives of the resurrection no less than the credence they attached to them as narratives of fact. The relation between their belief in the facts, and the sentiments supporting that belief, must be studied. It is commonly thought that the Christian religion came into existence because men believed that the body of Jesus left the tomb alive. On the other hand, it may be possible that men believed that Jesus escaped because there remained in the hearts of the disciples a confidence and hope in Him which the horror of the drama of Calvary could repress for a time but never succeeded in completely destroying.
>
> 'The affirmation made by the first Christians that Jesus was risen has a dual meaning: it is (1) an announcement of fact—Jesus left the tomb alive; (2) an affirmation of faith, lying outside all possible verification by experience, since it implies that Jesus lives a life of immortality, the life in heaven of the world to come. These two affirmations of fact and faith are closely bound up with each other. They are commingled in the same formula, "Christ is risen," which sometimes expresses the idea of a return to earth, sometimes the idea of a life in heaven, and

most frequently both ideas simultaneously. What relation is there between these two conceptions of the resurrection or the triumph of Christ over death, as it would be perhaps better described? What is the peculiar characteristic of each, and their origin? That is the whole problem of the resurrection. The tradition contains in all a string of affirmations about facts, of which the first disciples were or would have been witnesses. So far as the narratives of the resurrection, the empty tomb, the appearances, and the ascension affirm facts, they are tested by the historical method and by that alone. If some of them may be suspected of being literary creations, yet it is beyond dispute that the first disciples were convinced that they had spoken to Jesus, that they heard His voice, and that they had been in the presence of a real person and not a phantom.

'On the other hand, the faith of the first Christians contained elements of a very different kind, expressed in such statements as that the Lord lives for ever in heaven, that He has all power in heaven and earth, that He has conquered the powers of death, and henceforth is no more subject to them but by His victory can justify, sanctify, and save those who believe in Him, that He acts upon them, notably by His Spirit, whom He sends to them, and will return at the end of time to complete His redemptive work. These affirmations are purely religious in character. That does not mean that the historian can ignore them, but that he must adapt his method to the situation created by the fact, that in the belief in the resurrection affirmations of fact and expressions of ideas, religious emotions, and sentiments co-exist and are closely commingled.

'This does not in any way imply any mitigation of the rigour of the historical method or any limitation of the field in which it may be legitimately used, but quite the reverse. A question of literary history does not receive exactly the same treatment as one of economic or legal history. Political history, military history, the history of art have each their own method or, to be more exact, their own difference in method. The method has also to be adapted to the peculiar subject matter of religious history. In this realm what matters most are not so much the exterior and objective facts as their effects upon the feelings, the interpretations put upon them, and the consequences drawn from them. What counts are the interior and subjective facts, the psychological phenomena which are released by the exterior happenings. If on the morning of the third day Jesus had left the tomb without anyone knowing or believing it, the event would never have given birth to the Christian Church. The Church was born because the disciples were absolutely and sincerely convinced that Jesus had triumphed over death. This belief, which contains in germinal form all the subsequent development of Christianity, is independent of the objective reality of the events which were capable of giving birth to it and on which it relies. No proof that the body of Jesus remained in the tomb would have destroyed all the spiritual and religious results which flowed from the belief in the resurrection or have dealt a mortal blow at the Christian religion. On the other hand, we might be able to prove by evidence which no historian could call in question that on the morning of the third day the tomb of Jesus was found empty, but even then the historian would not be compelled to agree to the interpretation which Christian faith has put on the fact. To get, then, to the heart of the question, it is the nature of the belief in the resurrection which we must consider before everything else' (pp. 6—9).

Accordingly Goguel unravels the two separate strands in the tradition: (1) the affirmation that Jesus was alive in heaven; (2) the affirmation that Jesus

had appeared on earth. A careful analysis of the New Testament reveals that (1) was the prior affirmation and independent of (2) and that it is always claimed that Christ saves sinners because He is alive in heaven.

> 'All the rest, the empty tomb, the appearances, and the ascension are only the manifestation and proof of this celestial life. This proof became more precise in form as it had to be adapted to the needs of the Church, and in particular to the necessities of evangelisation and the defence of the faith against opponents' objections. The development of the tradition concerning the resurrection was determined by the need of giving expression to the belief in the heavenly Christ and giving as rigorous proof as possible of Christ's victory over death' (p. 441).

In its most primitive form, as shown in the speeches of Peter recorded in Acts, the conception of the heavenly Christ is quite independent of any material manifestation of His resurrected body. The tradition concerning the empty tomb Goguel treats as a pendant to the affirmation that Jesus was a celestial being, which was developed out of it. There is no reference to it in the speeches of Peter in *Acts* or in Paul's statement about the resurrection in *I Cor.* v. He points out that a Jew would need no more material evidence for thinking that, if Jesus was in heaven, His body was not in the tomb, than we should require for thinking that a person was not in two places at the same time. A Jew who disbelieved in the Resurrection would take it for granted that believers could point to the empty tomb, and would therefore suspect that the body had been disposed of, as the story of the placing of a guard in *Matthew* shows. On the other hand, the statements concerning the burial reveal conflicting traditions: (*a*) that the body of Jesus was given a hasty burial by the Jews to avoid the profanation of the sabbath, (*b*) that friends of Jesus gave the body an honourable burial. Goguel points out that there are adequate motives for (*b*) superseding (*a*), but not *vice versa*. Tradition also conflicts concerning the place of the origin of the belief in the resurrection, both Galilee and outside Jerusalem being named. If the body of Jesus was given a hasty burial, and the faith originated in Galilee, it would have been not only unlikely but impossible for anyone to have doubted that the tomb was empty. The original gospel proclaimed 'Jesus is living in heaven: therefore the tomb is empty.' But Goguel maintains that, as it was preached to those who did not believe this, of necessity the message became

> '"The tomb is empty: therefore Jesus is alive in heaven." The imagination spontaneously conceived the conditions in which the women came to the sepulchre and found the tomb empty' (p. 445).

The earliest tradition concerning affirmation (2), that Jesus had appeared on earth to disciples, appears in *I Cor.*, cap. xv. Goguel notes that Peter is mentioned as the first recipient of a christophany and that Paul does not differentiate between the one granted to him and the others, save that the former came a considerable time after the latter. Goguel accepts William James' description of conversion as the emergence into the field of consciousness of volitional and emotional forces which had for some time previously been active beneath the threshold of consciousness. He shows that Paul's conversion with the accompanying christophany fits into this psychological description, and compares it with those of Edmund Scherer, the Sadhou Sundar Singh, and Ratisbonne. He suggests that the other christophanies were of the same nature except the first one.

> 'The original christophany came to a man, Peter doubtless, who already thought and hoped that Jesus had triumphed over death and was alive in heaven, but had never entertained any thought of the manifestation of Jesus on earth before the *parousia*. Those which followed came to men who were aware of the tradition concerning the appearances but

had not themselves experienced them. Some of them, Paul in any case and perhaps James, refused to believe that the christophanies were real, because they considered Jesus nothing but a blasphemer or a madman on whom hung the curse of God. The first christophany came to one who believed in Jesus and loved Him, but had never thought of His manifesting Himself on earth after His death, while Paul's christophany came to one who knew that Jesus' disciples claimed that they had seen Him alive, but did not himself love Him or believe in Him. The first christophany created a new faith, while the others caused their recipients to absorb a faith which was already established' (p. 395).

It will be seen, therefore, that Goguel rejects the traditional belief that the crucifixion completely destroyed the faith of the disciples in Jesus as the Messiah and that the resurrection created this faith *de novo*. He claims that the disciples' faith in the resurrection was not a recreation but a restoration under a new form after a temporary eclipse caused by the crucifixion of the feelings which they entertained for Jesus during His ministry. As Goguel had shown in his *Life of Jesus*, when Jesus understood that His death was certain, He did not despair of His work but believed that after His death He would be manifested as the Messiah. The disciples, after His death, believed that Jesus was the Messiah living in heaven with God. In this way Goguel makes Jesus Himself the origin and source of the faith in the resurrection in a much more direct manner than has hitherto been conceived.

After Goguel has analysed the tradition into its two separate and independent elements of the belief in the celestial Christ with its corollary of the empty tomb and the belief that Jesus had appeared on earth, and has accounted for their origin, he demonstrates how the tradition developed from the necessity of linking up the two different strands, ironing out inconsistencies, answering objections, and consolidating them into a coherent scheme. The story of the empty tomb was found, as the gospel spread, to be in itself an insufficient proof of the resurrection, while the appearances provided a more compelling reason for belief.

'It (the empty tomb) became then an introduction to the stories of the christophanies; at first these stories were simply appended to it as in Luke and the apocryphal gospel of Peter; next, as the narratives of Mark and Matthew show, the angel was sent not just to declare that Jesus was risen, but also announced that the disciples would see Him again. The two themes of the empty tomb and the appearances are more closely knit together in Matthew's Gospel, where to the story of the visit of the women, in which an appearance in Galilee is announced, is joined a story of a christophany at the tomb, albeit in a form which reveals the addition. The two stories become combined into one in John's Gospel, where Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene, who, faced with the empty tomb, thinks that her master's body has been taken away' (pp. 447 and 448).

The belief that Jesus had appeared to His disciples did not destroy the primary conception of the glorified Jesus living in heaven.

'Neither could be sacrificed for the other, since one was necessary to the preaching and defence of the Christian faith and provided an indispensable counterweight to the Passion, while the other was so interlocked into the structure of the faith that it formed an essential part of it. To keep both recourse was had to an interim period between the life of Christ on earth and His life in glory, which was marked by the appearances and ended in the ascension. In this way was established what we find in the New Testament, the cycle of the resurrection with its three elements of the empty tomb, the appearances, and the ascension.

> 'At a considerably later period the idea of an active resurrection, *i.e.* of Jesus rising again because, being the divine Logos, His flesh alone was subject to death, definitely replaced the idea of a passive resurrection brought about by an act of divine power. Then it was no longer possible to think of Christ between his death and resurrection as in that state of unconscious somnolescence which it was thought the generality of men experienced until the day of the resurrection, but he had to be thought of as active. In this way the doctrine of the descent into Hades came into being, first as the descent to preach to the dead, afterwards as the descent to destroy the forces of evil, the latter being partly derived from the old myth of the struggle between the powers of heaven and those of hell' (pp. 444 and 445).

This, as briefly as can be given by extracts from Goguel's work itself, is his reconstruction of the development and origin of the tradition of the faith in the resurrection. Goguel himself is aware that this work will possibly surprise and perhaps pain the traditionalist. But, as he himself says in the preface to his work:

> 'A psychological analysis of the conditions in which the Christian faith originated and developed is only a description and makes no claims to be an explanation of it. Like everything else which concerns human personality, a mental process constitutes in the last resort a mystery, and a mystery is not explained but interpreted according to the personal position which each of us assumes towards the problem of religion. Whether positive, negative, or even agnostic, it is essentially irrational since it comes from an *a priori* fiat dictated primarily by reasons of the heart. If the belief in the resurrection of Christ originated in such conditions as I think, the philosophic and religious problem which it raises belongs to another sphere of enquiry. Everyone must solve that according to his personal convictions. Either it can be left unsolved and called insoluble, or the psychological analysis can be given the value of an explanation, or it can be said that in the depths of the subconscious ego and non-ego meet and that in these depths spiritual activity takes place between the most intimate part of human personality and some power beyond it and different from it' (pp. viii and ix).

Yet, as Goguel points out, description and interpretation cannot be entirely separated.

> 'The theologian takes his facts as given. His function is not to prove them but to interpret them and elicit their spiritual meaning. In doing that he passes beyond the facts, even when they are, as in the case of Christianity, irreplaceable *data*. The historian, on the other hand, if he is to fulfil his task must not be content with drawing up an inventory of unrelated facts, but must connect them together and try to grasp their connection. To do that he cannot neglect the feelings and emotions with which the facts are charged. Facts create feelings and emotions, while the feelings and emotions in their turn determine the mode in which the facts come to be expressed' (p. x).

It hardly seems possible to adopt Goguel's analysis and give it the traditional interpretation. His work will revolutionise both historical and theological studies of the resurrection and strengthen rather than weaken the faith in the reality of the resurrection for those who believe that God performs His miracles in the realm of the spirit where 'the witness of the Spirit of God witnesses to our spirit.' It gives the *coup de grâce* to the distinction made by Catholic modernists between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, since Goguel claims that those who first knew Jesus as risen had never in

the depths of their hearts ceased to accept Him as Messiah, though men had killed him.

> 'The disciples accepted a personal identity between Jesus and the Christ of glory, and primitive Christianity attached prime importance to this idea. Christ was not a being mysteriously revealed to his disciples in the period following the passion, but hitherto unknown or merely expected. The risen Christ was the master Himself, the only difference between Him and what He was in the days of His ministry being that on the day following His death He was raised to transcendent glory' (p. 110).

Goguel's book forms a comprehensive study and fulfils Archbishop Frederick Temple's prediction that we should be forced into a theology based on psychology. We have been able to give only the merest outline of its theme. It is much to be hoped that before long an English translation will be published so that its contents may become available to both English and American students.

H. C. SNAPE.

TEN CRUCIAL QUESTIONS*

The ten *Little Talks on Religion* by Dr. G. W. Butterworth, to be sold at the S.P.C.K., price 2d. each, are learned and lovely. They immediately reminded me of two quotations, made by an ancient and a modern wise man respectively: '*Veritatis simplex oratio est,*' which is a Latin echo of Euripides, and a verse of William Watson's when he speaks of beautiful writing as 'the rose upon Truth's lips, the light in Wisdom's eyes.' Thus I commend confidently and happily these talks to readers of *The Modern Churchman* for themselves and for their young friends.

If this be true, as it is, that '*inest in nobis natura quaedam cupiditas insatiabilis veri videndi,*' then our junior friends will find satisfaction in the titles alone—*How did the World Begin? What's Wrong with the World? Am I Responsible for my Life? Can a Nation Live without Religion?*—to mention four only of the ten talks. I feel like 'de gals who made much wunnerment dat Brer Fox could talk dataway' in four to six pages of 4½ by 3½ inches each. For example, in his first talk Dr. Butterworth indicates with Turneresque word-painting the enthralling picture of the world's astronomical and geological beginnings without using long words, and then makes the young man realise that Mind was before Matter, and leads him to GOD.

> 'It is necessary then to go behind the fiery, gaseous matter of the scientists. It cannot explain itself. It cannot think, still less love . . . Now cease for a moment to look outwardly, and look within, into the depths of your own mind. You are greater than many electrons, yet you cannot explain yourself. The Power who planned you must possess the qualites you possess, but in an infinitely greater measure . . . If He chose to take ages over it, instead of a few hours, that is His business. In the beginning GOD created.'

I remember in a great Public School where I succeeded an outstandingly effective teacher most unworthily that he stimulated the boys to love learning without telling them anything obviously, and his rival believed in telling them everything and exactly where to put the dots and crosses. Dr. Butterworth

* *Little Talks on Religion,* by G. W. Butterworth, Litt.D. (1) How did the World Begin? (2) What's Wrong with the World? (3) Am I responsible for my Life? (4) How does Jesus Christ reveal God? (5) How can Jesus Christ help me? (6) Is the Bible true? (7) What is a Miracle? (8) Can a Nation live without Religion? (9) Do we live after Death? (10) If I become a Christian—What then? Published by the Modern Churchmen's Union. Price 2*d.* each. Sold by the S.P.C.K., Northumberland Avenue, W.C.2.

observes the former method. Perhaps his most original and difficult talk is *Can a Nation Live without Religion?* One short section is headed:

'The Illusion of Science.

It may be felt that the resources of modern science are so great that men can abandon religion without fear. In the old days life was precarious; now it seems stable and safe. We can produce all that men need, and once we have solved the problem of distributing it fairly there will be no necessity for religion. Science is definite and its results are sure; religion is hazy, and the plain man cannot see what purpose it serves. Yet we must not let ourselves be dazed. The same science which enables us to grow two blades of grass where only one grew before . . . also enables a body of covetous men to destroy crops in order to prevent the price from falling. It also enables men, who can secure power through violence, to circulate falsehood and to suppress truth. The fact is that the true well-being of a society depends not on its scientific knowledge but on the character of its citizens. And this character depends on the beliefs which they hold about the purpose and destiny of human life. Every political and economic problem is at bottom a moral one: and every moral problem is at bottom a religious one.'

I am going to ask by own 'Under 25 Club' to write me short reviews and criticisms of these talks. I hope I have written so as to persuade my clerical fellow readers of *The Modern Churchman* to get these talks and to use them in some similar way.

W. Stanhope-Lovell.

THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS*

'It is time,' write the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, in a 'Call to Service' at the opening of this book, *Man-Power in the Twentieth-Century Church,* sponsored by the Missionary Council of the Church, 'for the Church to face its distinctive obligations in the post-war world, and nothing narrower than a world-horizon befits its character.' The Missionary Societies have calculated that approximately 800 volunteers will be called for in the two years after the war.

There would be no Man-Power problem, remarks Canon McLeod Campbell, if it were generally acknowledged that the Church, as a universal community, was leading the world in the quest for universal community.

'Its service would then be acclaimed as a privilege and its ministries as posts of honour: whole-hearted surrender to its call would be recognised as giving freer play to human personality than any lesser cause could give.

'But no acknowledgement is of general acceptance to-day. . . . There are those who seriously doubt whether the Church is either courageous enough or cohesive enough to have anything to contribute to world unity.'

Canon McLeod Campbell quotes the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Training of the Ministry to the effect that,

'Not a few men are deterred from seeking ordination by the lack of unity among Christians. . . . The cause of Christianity, and incidentally of the Ministry, will be well served when Christians as a whole are seen to be more actively and resolutely concerned in the achievement of Christian unity.'

Yet he records it as his belief that,

'Movement there certainly is, not least among those whose convictions compel them to criticise and resist tendencies which they regard as unsound. Wounds are healing from below. Mutual understanding

* *Man-Power in the Twentieth-Century Church.* By J. McLeod Campbell. (Church of England Press and Publications Board. 2/6. 1944.)

deepens. Complacency is dissolving. . . . Moreover, it is overseas that the range of co-operation has extended to limits unthinkable even twenty-five years ago. During that period National Christian Councils have come into existence in thirty different countries.'

The quest for universal community is certainly a noble one, and not alien to the oldest traditions of the Christian Church. Our author quotes Professor Bury, the distinguished Cambridge historian and editor of the incomparable Gibbon :

> 'Christianity served to emphasize and intensify the idea of the unity of mankind. . . . With the Christians the idea acquired a new and intense meaning inasmuch as they believed all the inhabitants of the earth to have a common vital interest, though they might not know it, in the Christian dispensation.

The contribution of the Church to-day should not be different; but if this is to be so there will have to be an almost complete transvaluation of ecclesiastical values. This book is dedicated to the Chaplains of the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, presumably in the hope that these men will take a hand in the tasks outlined in it. There are also many thousands of men and women in the Forces who comprise the major part of the vitality of the nation. These people are not to be taken in by the customary cant of fraternity or by platitudes about unity. They will not mind devoting themselves to any work which seems worth while, to some undertaking which appeals not only to their idealism but also to their intelligence and sense of realities.

J.C.H.

WHAT IS AN EVANGELICAL? AN ENQUIRY*

What is an Evangelical? An Enquiry is the title of a pamphlet containing, in substance, a paper read recently to the Evangelical Fellowship of the Diocese of Rochester by Max Warren, General Secretary of the C.M.S., and preceded by a Foreword from the Bishop of Rochester. It is both timely and helpful, both understanding and forward-looking, both healing and constructive.

The Bishop appropriately recalls the situation confronting the Church at the end of the last war, when, as he says, bishop after bishop held that 'the future lay with the Evangelical school of thought! Ten years later the Evangelicals 'had split over the Bible and the Prayer Book.' He holds: 'To-day the Evangelical school of thought faces a fresh opportunity,' and he asks the insistent question: 'Will Evangelicals betray their trust a second time, and sink deeper into the slough of frustration and discouragement?' Such questions speak not just to one section of the Church, but to all sections, and to the whole in its demanded integrity, comprehensiveness and unity.

Mr. Warren holds that 'a faulty appraisal' was at the root of the distemper of Evangelicals, and that this may be seen as a failure in adjustment of three different kinds. 'There is our failure to come to terms with the fact of the Church; there is our unwillingness to accept the essential nature of human community; there is our persistent confusion of the divine intention with the divine achievement.' Such failures—and others of which other schools of thought may be more conscious—arise, as it seems to me, from a basic failure in integration, both within individuals and within sections of the Church. Speaking as an Evangelical, Mr. Warren sums up many of his conclusions when he describes present weakness

> 'as due to a tendency amongst us to see Evangelicalism as an end in itself instead of seeing it as a constitutive part of a larger whole, making within that whole its own distinctive contribution.'

* *What is an Evangelical? An Enquiry*, by Max Warren (London: The Church Book Room. 1945).

Here is his positive answer to the question 'What is an Evangelical?':—

> 'An Evangelical is one who, within the wide loyalties of the Christian Creeds and the particular order and worship of the Church of England, holds with a particular tenacity certain cardinal principles. These are his insights into how the Creeds are to be interpreted and applied to the daily life of man. Some of these cardinal principles he shares in common with other schools of thought. *It is, however, the particular balance in which he holds these cardinal principles which truly constitutes the Evangelical.*'

The 'cardinal principles' which, Mr. Warren holds, distinguish the Evangelical are these four: *The priority of Evangelism* (would it not be better to say '*of the Evangel*'?); *Emphasis on the need of Conversion; Trusting the Holy Spirit;* and *The Priesthood of all believers.*

The following testimony, from a recent article in the *Cambridge Historical Review* by Canon Charles Smyth, is rightly and fittingly quoted:—

> 'Within the incredibly brief space of half a century the Evangelicals, although a minority, converted the Church of England to Foreign Missions, effected the abolition of the Slave Trade and of slavery, and initiated factory legislation and humanitarian reform, healing the worst sores of the industrial revolution. Has any Church in Christendom accomplished so much in so short a time?'

I close this brief review of a timely pamphlet—which should be read, not only by Evangelicals but by Modernists and by Anglo-Catholics, to give them insight into aspects of the whole heritage and the task of integrating the Christian community to which all schools of Christian thought and practice must make their contribution—with the question: Since the paramount task of the Church *is resident in its basic faith,* is there any more important part of that task than that of fearless confrontation of the facts of history and of human nature so that we may reach a deeper and truer and more dynamic statement and presentation of that faith?

C. J. WRIGHT.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE BOY, THE CREED AND THE PROTESTING PEDAGOGUE

SIR,

Who can comprehend what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height of reflex 'thinking'! Here we have *The Modern Churchman,* one of the very few religious journals in the world that tries hard to respect objectivity and reason, quoting with what might and might not be approval in its March issue (p. 296) the following comment of Dr. P. T. Freeman, on '*I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth*':

> 'There are, I think, few people who would not assert that.'

Waiving aside the problem of correlating the concept of 'Maker' with modern scientific thought-patterns, how can a man of Dr. Freeman's status possibly—I mean, without indulging in subjective, automatic and uncritical thought—believe in an *Almighty* God? I fail completely to see that such a belief can be vindicated at the bar of open-eyed experience and science. What is the relevance of the concept of almightyness unless, of course, we mean by it something different from what we say, *viz.* that this Supremely Worthful Reality is staggeringly powerful (compare *Math.* xix, 26; *Mk.* x, 27)? If Dr. Freeman means *that,* and if many enlightened religious thinkers when they use the word 'almighty' mean *that,* as I am sure some of them do, why don't they say it? How this candid admission would clear the air for

balanced thinking in this realm of religion where credulity and dogmatism are so astoundingly rampant!

GWILYM O. ROBERTS,
Presbyterian Minister.

[Of course we feel and have stated on various occasions our objection to the term 'Almighty' in our Creeds. The Greek original, *Pantokrator,* would be more correctly translated 'All-Ruler,' and it is a great pity that in our Prayer Book revision of 1928 this rendering was not adopted. The term 'Maker' (*Poietes*) is also Greek for Poet or Author and suggests a mode of creative action which is neither materialistic nor mechanical. The term 'Creator' is therefore much to be preferred to 'Maker.'—ED., *M.C.*]

SIR,

THE TRANSFIGURATION.

Mr. Swayne, in his interesting letter to the March number of *The Modern Churchman,* endeavours to place a natural interpretation on the Transfiguration. He says:—

> 'The two disciples, James and John, in their excitement sprang to their feet—the sun was behind them—and their shadows fell on the fog-bank. Two misty forms rose, one on each side of Jesus. The disciples gesticulated, and so did the misty forms. These, in the account of the Transfiguration, become the figures of Moses and Elias, who then appeared conversing with Jesus.'

Now, I have had two experiences, under the same atmospheric conditions as he describes, when deer-stalking with a keeper. They were both on the sky-line of a range of hills running east and west, about 3,000 feet above the sea.

The sun was shining, and the mist was boiling up from the colder precipices of the north side, and melting from the warm currents coming from the south. On this mist was projected our own magnified shadows surrounded by an oval, prismatic rainbow, which advanced and retreated according to the density of the mist. I could only see *my own* individual shadow, and never that of the keeper. When we stood behind each other the shadows became blurred, like a composite photograph. This phenomenon was not new to the keeper, who had often seen it before. I am satisfied that, under the conditions described by Mr. Swayne, you can only see your own shadow, and never that of another distinct individual. We must look beyond Nature for an interpretation of the Transfiguration.

GILBERT COLERIDGE.

Haversfield House, Kew Green, Surrey.

SIR,

THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE.

The article on non-Christian religions in your March number classes Hinduism with Neo-Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Islam, but surely the first is directly derived from that instinctive recognition of non-human powers which is common to all mankind. The other three are most certainly the result of religious reform movements inaugurated by the faith of their founders —that faith which is always the personal response to a personal challenge.

Hinduism is the one survivor of the great elaborations of primeval nature worship, and still preserves, as part of its religious system, certain features almost invariably associated with the worship of goddesses and known to us—outside Hinduism—only in allusions in our Old Testament, the pages of the *Golden Bough* and such museums as that in Cyprus.

Two scenes stand out clearly in my memory. I only wish I could put before you the gloomy, forbidding interior of the Temple of Madura. By the

black image of Kali, in the flickering gleam of the smoky ghee lamps, would stand a tall priest, with long, powerful limbs and expression fitting well that of the goddess he serves. By the open door a group of temple girls are half bathed in the sunlight, half shrouded by the smoky shadows of the Temple. Beneath would be the words: *Religion—without Prophets.* As a pendant is a picture of the Friday service in one of the three women's mosques in Peking. The Bathhouse and Library, with its well chosen, well cared for, well produced books, are in the outer court. The whole of the inner is given up to the Mosque. There are neat rows of ordinary Chinese cloth shoes outside the main room, which is well filled with reverent rows of devout worshippers faced by the Lady A-Hêng and two assistants, each one wearing a special robe and headdress and each one trained in the reading of Arabic and conduct of the service by her own husband—in each case himself an A-Hêng. Beneath stands: *Faith in God and His Prophet.*

That I may not be accused of judging everything from the woman's standpoint, I add the closing episode in a Mongol mystery play, symbolising the overcoming of the dark old gods of human sacrifice. When even the ox-headed demon, with a bleeding human heart speared on his trident, had been subdued and paced meekly beside his black-robed vanquisher, the Abbot recited the sins of the people over the flames of the sacred fire—his mouth and nostrils covered with gauze lest his breath should defile it. Then the paper on which the sins were listed was dropped into the flames, and when only the ashes remained the little shrine was raised on carrying poles on to the shoulders of lamas, who bore it over the bowed heads of a line of kneeling worshippers, out of the great court, beyond the outer gate, over the green steppe to the gentle rise, where sparsely placed stones marked the boundary of the temple precincts. There, on a rough stone altar, all was consumed. It was a deeply moving spectacle and all round one felt, if one did not hear:

'I take refuge in the Buddha.
I take refuge in the Doctrine.
I take refuge in the Order.'

Face to face with other faiths and philosophies, the missionaries of to-day are well aware that they themselves must learn as well as, and before they can, teach. They show the same spirit as Fr. Leo Gillet, in his *Communion in the Messiah,* in which he pleads for a new approach in Christian missions to the years in which the Christian must be ready to receive as well as to give.

A Dutch Roman Catholic, Fr. van Strachen, who has had his first seven years in Japan, says, in a book published this year:

> 'The Church, grown up in the Western World, has the inevitable drawbacks of this [Western] supercivilisation in her outward structure, discipline and methodology. Hence the sincere efforts of the Japanese Christians to cut away all that pertains to the Roman cultural background.'

Mr. Renwick, in the *Listener* of April 12th, 1945, goes further:

> 'One of these days there will be a Church of China, not orthodox according to either Rome or Minneapolis, but, I fancy, very interesting theologically and very valuable. For behind everything lies that ancient, deep-rooted philosophy of life.'

A. G. Bowden-Smith.

Sir,

SYNESIUS AND THE IMAGINATION.

Can you allow a pendant to Mr. Spode's more than welcome short article on 'Synesius and the Imagination'? 'The Imagination,' he says, 'is the creative power of the soul,' and those of us who know and value Douglas Fawcett's great works on *Divine Imagining*, built up on *The World as Imagination,* are emboldened afresh to claim our human kinship with the divine

reative power. To Fawcett the Ultimate Cause is no otiose Absolute about vhich it is not legitimate even to say that it exists, but a vivacious 'Divine magining,' about which he is able to speak with infectious enthusiasm, as ffording

> 'dreams of a Dionysus aglow with creative joy, love and beauty, an ocean of laughing life, an ecstatic, infinitely versatile player who ranges from glory to glory, donning and doffing splendours in the mood of a sunset cloud.'

nd as if even his own 'imagining' were not graphic enough, he must ctually quote a poet's vision given us by Evelyn Underhill:—

'NOT TO ME.

The unmoved Mover of philosophy
And Absolute still sum of all that is,
The God whom I adore—not this!
Nay, rather a great moving wave of bliss,
A surging torrent of dynamic love
In passionate swift career,
That down the sheer
And fathomless abyss
Of Being ever pours, his ecstasy to prove.'

awcett writes as a philosopher and metaphysician, yet with unaffected and ven humorous charm and lucidity as well as poetic 'imagination'; and hough he is unable to accept a personal deity (in spite of his 'Dionysus'!), t to those of us who were drawn to explore behind the Heavenly Father Vho is the object of Christian worship, to the Unnameable of mystical Jews d others, and have found intellectual and spiritual satisfaction in Dunning's rofound short study of 'God and the Absolute,' this illuminating, this vivifyg of the Ultimate Power by Fawcett offers a Reality which can not only peal to the 'creative power' of the soul, but suggests that close relationip between man and the Creator which authorises what *The Modern Churchan* has some time ago given us an excuse for claiming, the 'Consciousness' God, brought home to us through Jesus Christ. That was in a review of . H. Counsell's commentary on the Fourth Gospel (unfortunately out of int). In that book the author, despite other translations, would interpret t. John's' Logos as 'Consciousness'—that consciousness of spiritual kinip which is so frequently referred to as the personal possession of Jesus by . Wright in his exposition of the Fourth Gospel contained in your comehensive volume, *The Mission and Message of Jesus*. This 'Consciousss,' Mr. Counsell would teach us, was at the heart of 'the Mission and essage of Jesus' as well as in the heart of the Master Himself; and as e clear note will set vibrating a whole satisfying chord, so Mr. Spode's ticle 'Synesius on the Imagination' has awakened a harmony in some of r 'imagining' souls and wedded several notes of thought in a rich 'Conousness' of our partnership in the artistry of creation with that 'Divine agining' which is the Source of all Beauty.

Mr. Spode is no doubt justified in saying 'It is rarely seen that the vital ntre for art, religion and science is in the imagination.' At least we must mit it has been sadly neglected in much of our would-be religion, but with r living philosopher's absorbing work on 'Divine Imagining' to enlarge d furnish our dreaming minds, it should give a new brightness and vigour 'the lost radiance of the Christian religion,' to be recalled to the partnerp which the human soul may claim with 'the unmoved Mover of philohy' as well as with Him Whose 'Consciousness' of a Father's presence d power we may share. We, too, may fortify ourselves with Mr. Spode's al quotation from Santayana: 'The whole of Christianity is thus religious

and efficacious only when it becomes poetry, because only then is it the felt counterpart of personal experience and a genuine expansion of human life.' For the Poet *is* the Creator, and so should the Christian be, as a sharer in the 'Divine Imagining.'

HENRY J. TRUEMAN.

WANTED: A MODERN CHURCHMEN'S BRAINS TRUST.

SIR,

It has occurred to me that *perplexed* ministers of all the churches would be thankful to you if you would open the pages of *The Modern Churchman* to them to express their difficulties, and give an answer—a sort of Brains Trust—to enquiring ministers and laymen. This theological fog surrounding the Incarnation, and the real nature of Christ's mission; the awful camouflaging by the ordinary clergy and ministers is fatal to the influence of the Christian religion. We want straight, *not evasive*, answers to our questions. For example, how we should like a reasonable explanation of (1) the title of 'Son of God' in both the Old and New Testaments in the light of (2) the obedience of Christ, or the relation of Jesus to the absolute Creator and Preserver of all mankind; (3) therefore, how could we even speak of a 'crucified God'? (4) What is really Christ's '*sacrifice for sin*'? And so on.

A. H. WALKER.

[Would our readers tell the Editor what they think about this proposal? —ED., *M.C.*]

ANNUAL ELECTIONS TO THE COUNCIL OF THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION.

SIR,

May I give notice that the following members have been duly nominated and elected to serve on the Council of the Union for the next three years: Miss A. M. Ashley, Miss M. K. Body, Rev. Dr. G. W. Butterworth, Rev. C. E. Godfrey-Thomas, Rev. Canon Marcus Knight, Rev. F. I. L. Rees, Rev. Professor Norman Sykes, Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, Rev. T. J. Wood.

Local Branches and Meetings.

Increasing membership and frequent enquiries show the desirability of an early resumption of local activities and of the arrangement of autumn and winter programmes. Fortunately the Chairman of the Council is ready to visit local branches either to give an address or to provide a series of lectures where such will be appreciated. The office is always glad to receive applications for such assistance and to provide lists of members with addresses in any given area. Obviously the publication of the usual list of union members, even if facilities could be secured, would not be worth while until addresses are more settled. The missionary societies always tell their supporters that the need and the opportunities of meeting it have never been greater; we can say the same, and with equal truth.

R. GLADSTONE GRIFFITH
(Hon. Secretary, M.C.U.).

Steeple Claydon Vicarage, Bletchley, Bucks.
June, 1945.

A MODERN CHURCHMAN'S BIBLIOGRAPHY.

SIR,

May I beg this space to acknowledge my debt of gratitude for the scholarly help, given by yourself and several other distinguished modernists, in preparing *A Modern Churchman's Bibliography*? (see the *M.C.* cover of this issue). It is a list compiled in response to numerous enquiries.

W. T. A. PHILPOT, *Librarian.*

Ripon Hall, Oxford.
June 1st, 1945.